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Foreword
Dear reader,
Our aim with the series Simula SpringerBriefs on Computing is to provide
compact introductions to selected fields of computing. Entering a new field of
research can be quite demanding for graduate students, postdocs, and experienced
researchers alike: the process often involves reading hundreds of papers, and the
methods, results and notation styles used often vary considerably, which makes for
a time-consuming and potentially frustrating experience. The briefs in this series are
meant to ease the process by introducing and explaining important concepts and
theories in a relatively narrow field, and by posing critical questions on the fun-
damentals of that field. A typical brief in this series should be around 100 pages and
should be well suited as material for a research seminar in a well-defined and
limited area of computing.
We have decided to publish all items in this series under the SpringerOpen
framework, as this will allow authors to use the series to publish an initial version
of their manuscript that could subsequently evolve into a full-scale book on a
broader theme. Since the briefs are freely available online, the authors will not
receive any direct income from the sales; however, remuneration is provided for
every completed manuscript. Briefs are written on the basis of an invitation from a
member of the editorial board. Suggestions for possible topics are most welcome
and can be sent to aslak@simula.no.







As information and communications technology (ICT) becomes increasingly
important to modern societies, there is a growing need to understand how to design
and operate very large ICT systems. How should a huge system be designed and
operated to support both high availability and rapid change? Will some of the
system’s stakeholders be exposed to events with intolerable impact? Is the system
fragilizing a service of importance to millions of users? These are questions that
need answers.
According to conventional wisdom, the opposite of a fragile system is a robust
system. While stressors or perturbations can easily damage fragile systems, robust
systems can withstand a great deal of pressure. This is why we write handle with
care on a box with fragile contents and nothing on a box with robust contents. In
2012, essayist and scholar Nassim N. Taleb published his landmark book
Antifragility: Things That Gain from Disorder, pointing out that the opposite of a
fragile system is really a system that needs stressors to thrive. We would write
please mishandle on a box with anti-fragile contents. Unlike robust systems,
anti-fragile systems learn from events with negative impact how to adjust them-
selves and become stronger in a changing world. An example of an anti-fragile
system is the human immune system, with its ability to adapt and self-repair. While
Taleb’s book discusses many natural and man-made systems that are anti-fragile, it
says nothing about how to design and operate anti-fragile ICT systems.
Anti-fragile ICT Systems
This book you hold in your hands or are reading on a computing device models
large distributed ICT systems as complex adaptive systems to determine funda-
mental properties that make systems anti-fragile to different classes of events with a
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negative impact.1 For example, a system can be anti-fragile to downtime or the
spreading of malicious software or malware. Because there are many types of ICT
systems and because each type can be anti-fragile to many classes of events, we
cannot study all possible anti-fragile ICT systems. Instead, this book examines
different aspects of anti-fragile systems carefully selected to show that the concept
of anti-fragility offers a novel and useful approach to the design and operation of
complex adaptive ICT systems.
The book first discusses rare events with a large negative impact and argues that
it is, at best, very hard to predict all such events in complex adaptive ICT systems.
It explains why it is necessary to limit the impact of these events to gain robustness
and why learning from the remaining events with a small impact is necessary to
achieve anti-fragility. Since loss of trust is an inherent and general threat to any ICT
system, the book also models why it is vital for an organization operating an
anti-fragile ICT system to build and maintain a strong trust relationship with its
customer base. Next, the book discusses four design principles, namely, modularity,
weak links, redundancy, and diversity, and one operational principle, the fail fast
principle. While each principle by itself is well known and does not provide any
new fundamental insight, collectively the five principles outline a novel way to
design and operate anti-fragile ICT systems.
We apply the five principles in studies of how anti-fragile systems can
(i) achieve high availability, (ii) prevent malware epidemics, and (iii) detect
anomalies. Analyses of real ICT systems such as Netflix’s media streaming solu-
tion, Norway’s telecommunication (telecom) infrastructure, electronic government
platforms, banking systems, and Numenta’s anomaly detection software show that
cloud computing is central to achieving all three goals. The book therefore con-
centrates on the design and operation of anti-fragile systems running on cloud
computing platforms.
There are good reasons why the goals (i)–(iii) were selected. We study systems
that are anti-fragile to downtime because prolonged outages constitute a serious
problem in a world where users are increasingly dependent on ICT systems.
Malware of many different types represents another serious problem affecting the
security and well-being of all Internet users. Since “classical” signature-based
malware detection techniques are inadequate, we study novel solutions to cope with
the large negative impact of malware. Finally, to react quickly to local failures
before they have time to spread, it is necessary to detect system anomalies early.
This is a difficult challenge, since complex ICT systems have many interconnected
entities. Consequently, we study a powerful and general learning algorithm to
detect anomalies.
At the time of this writing, there are no general methods or theories on how to
develop or operate anti-fragile ICT systems. The book studies select philosophical
and practical aspects of anti-fragile ICT systems to gain an initial understanding
1The book should be printed in color or read on a device with a color screen because some of the
figures are hard to understand when reproduced in black and white.
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of them. The main message is that we should stop building fragile ICT systems of
national or international importance and start building anti-fragile ICT systems. The
book’s contents are deeply influenced by Taleb’s work on anti-fragile systems that
thrive in a world dominated by large-impact, hard-to-predict, and rare events,
Daniel E. Geer Jr.’s keynote speech at the Source 2008 Conference,2 and Jeff
Hawkins’ still evolving theory on how the brain learns. The individual chapters are
based on my own published research, basic results in complexity and network
science, presentations by Neil Hunt3 and Adrian Cockcroft4 on Netflix’s web-scale
solution, and talks by Subutai Ahmad5 and Scott Purdy6 on Numenta’s technology
for anomaly detection.
Who Should Read This Book
While this introductory book is, first and foremost, written for undergraduate stu-
dents in computer science, the first half should be understandable to any technically
educated individual interested in the design, development, and operation of large
ICT systems. The first half introduces the concept of anti-fragility, describes the
design and operational principles, and outlines how the principles can be applied to
achieve anti-fragility to downtime. The book’s second half is more technical and
assumes that the reader has an elementary understanding of graphs. It describes how
to achieve anti-fragility against malware spreading and how to detect anomalies.
The whole book should be of interest to new graduate students looking for a
research topic.
The book contains few abbreviations and formal definitions, background
knowledge is introduced as needed, and studies of real systems help clarify con-
cepts and insights. Each chapter is short and to the point, enabling reading in one or
two sittings. Key information is repeated to make chapters easier to understand and
the definitions of central abbreviations are repeated in each chapter they are used.
An effort was made to reference easy-to-understand books, papers, reports, and
webpages for readers wanting more background information. While the book
argues that anti-fragile ICT solutions in the cloud should have a microservice
architecture, it is not a textbook on cloud computing and microservices. More
information on cloud computing platforms and how to implement microservices
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Part I
The Concept of Anti-fragility
Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern societies cannot function without information and communications
technology (ICT) systems. When ICT systems such as electronic government
(e-government) systems, e-payment infrastructures, and mobile phone networks fail,
users can still access alternative systems based on older technologies, but these alter-
natives are rapidly disappearing. E-government services are introduced on the Web
to improve services to citizens and to free up the human resources needed to tackle
the increasing health care requirements of aging populations. Since there will not
be enough government employees to handle a large number of requests over the
phone, on paper, or by personal appointment in the future, it is necessary to deploy
e-government services that remain robust to undesirable incidents over time and that
are available to citizens around the clock.
The robustness and availability of national e-payment infrastructures are also
becoming increasingly important as countries are becoming cashless societies. If a
nationwide e-payment infrastructure goes down in a cash-free society, people will
not be able to pay for necessities. In Scandinavia, this is already more or less the
case, since many people, especially the young, no longer carry cash. While Norwe-
gian banks want to abolish cash altogether to reduce costs, there have been enough
incidents over the last ten years causing unplanned downtime and erroneous account
withdrawals to questionwhether the current e-payment infrastructure can provide the
very high availability and long-term robustness required by a completely cash-free
society.
Mobile phone networks have nearly replaced fixed-line phone systems in many
countries. It is difficult to find spare parts for the old landline systems and they
are expensive to maintain. Norway’s largest telecom company wants all remaining
fixed-phone subscribers to move to mobile subscription plans so it can dismantle the
landline system altogether. Several large incidents have demonstrated how dependent
the Norwegian population has become on mobile phone networks. When areas on
the west coast of Norway lost power for several days because of a severe storm,
the local inhabitants mainly complained about the mobile phone networks being
down, illustrating that people now expect their mobile phones to work anytime and
anywhere.
© The Author(s) 2016




As traditional governmental services, cash-based payment systems, and landline
phone networks are disappearing, there is a growing need for very large ICT systems
with very high availability and sustained robustness to unwanted incidents. How
should such systems be designed and operated to meet the increasing expectations of
users in a rapidly changingworld? Is a particular systemdesign fragilizing a service of
importance to millions of users? Will users be exposed to incidents with intolerable
impact? Common mode failure is a particularly important challenge, defined as a
failure in multiple parts of a system due to a single event. How do we prevent single
events from propagating and taking down many parts in the same manner? This
book tries to answer these questions by modeling large ICT systems as complex
adaptive systems.
1.1 Complex Adaptive Systems
The term complex adaptive system denotes a man-made or natural system consisting
of many entities that interact in involved ways. The entities adapt to each other and
the environment to enable the system as a whole to survive events with potentially
large negative impact [1–7]. ICT systems consisting of large networked computer
systems and many stakeholders, including users, operators, and owners, are complex
adaptive systems, as illustrated in Fig. 1.1. The complexity is due primarily to the
numerous interactions between the stakeholders and the computer systems, the large
amounts of communications between the networked subsystems, and the influence of
changing security and privacy policies, as well as threats such as equipment failure,
extreme weather, and sabotage. Collections of software services running on cloud
computing platforms and nationwide infrastructures for mobile telecom constitute
two particularly interesting classes of complex adaptive ICT systems with many
users, mutually dependent entities, and self-regulating behaviors.
To gain an understanding of why governments and companies build complex
adaptive ICT systems, we consider how valuable distributed ICT systems are to their
Fig. 1.1 A complex ICT system’s global behavior is caused by dynamic interactions between the
stakeholders and the networked computer system and by interactions between the network’s many
subsystems. Changes to policies, threats, or subsystems can cause sudden and large changes in
global behavior
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owners. Here, value can be the ability to provide a population with transactional
services on the Web or the revenue from an online social network. Consider a sys-
tem with N users. The number of possible pairs of connections between users is
N (N − 1)/2, giving rise to Metcalfe’s law, stating that the value of a system is pro-
portional to the square of the number of connected users, N 2. Alternatively, there
are 2N − N − 1 possible sub-groups of users, resulting in Reed’s law, stating that
the value of a system scales exponentially with the number of users, 2N . Both laws
indicate that the value of distributed ICT systems grows very rapidly with the num-
ber of users, making it desirable for governments and companies to build huge ICT
systems of high complexity. In addition, for many networked systems, every new
user makes a system’s services more valuable to the other users.
Complex adaptive systems contain feedback loops, as illustrated in Fig. 1.2. A
feedback loop is a series of interacting processes that together result in a system
adapting to the effect of its previous behavior. Feedback loops arewhatmake complex
systems adaptive. The loops create emergent global patterns or behaviors. Positive
(escalating or compounding) feedback loops propagate and turn local events into
global events, affecting whole systems, while negative (dampening or stabilizing)
feedback loops limit the impact of local events affecting parts of systems. Negative
feedback typically stabilizes a system’s global behavior over a certain operating
range, while positive feedback creates extreme global behavior outside the normal
operating range [1, 3, 4]. Ideally, complex adaptive ICT systems should prevent
positive feedback loops from ever propagating local failures into extreme global
behaviors and causing systemic failures.
The emergent global behaviors of complex adaptive ICT systems are often mod-
eled as stochastic events with given probability distributions.We distinguish between
thin-tailed and thick-tailed distributions (see Chap. 2). If the tails are thin, then out-
liers in the form of extreme global behaviors can be ignored because the thin tails
make the outliers very unlikely. When the distributions have thick tails, the outliers
cannot be ignored because the probability that at least one outlier will occur is sig-
nificant. Many man-made systems, including ICT systems, have positive feedback
loops that cause certain local events to propagate and create extreme global behaviors.
The extreme behaviors, especially unplanned downtime, becomemore common than
stakeholders can accept. These outliers are modeled by probability distributions with
thick tails. Unfortunately, classical methods for risk analysis based on predictions of
Fig. 1.2 Generic feedback loop: an external or internal action leads to a system reaction. The
reaction then causes the system to change, which initiates another action and the process repeats
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Fig. 1.3 Birth–death process illustrating malware spreading
future events tend to underestimate or ignore extreme global behaviors in complex
adaptive ICT systems, even though these events may very well dominate the overall
risk to stakeholders.
A vulnerability in a man-made system can be a flaw in the design, a bug in the
implementation, or amistake in the system’s operation ormanagement. Any complex
man-made system has vulnerabilities. Coincidental errors and malfunctions, as well
as hostile and targeted attacks, exploit vulnerabilities to cause failures leading to
extremeglobal behavior such as unplanned systemdowntime. In particular,malicious
software, or malware, can exploit vulnerabilities and cause information leakage.
Figure1.3 depicts a simple model of an infectious malware epidemic that involves a
positive feedback loop of increased births and a negative loop of increased deaths.
Without deaths, the population size will increase exponentially, that is, negative
feedback is needed to keep the positive feedback under control [1].
The observed fragility of complex ICT systems to prolonged downtime and mal-
ware infections demonstrates the need for better system design, implementation,
operation, and management. The many interactions between the adaptive entities in
the systems create a highly non-linear and time-varying relation between the input
and output that makes it nearly impossible to predict extreme global behavior. Hence,
we need non-predictable techniques to create complex adaptive ICT systems. Taleb’s
work [8–12] suggests that we should develop and operate so-called anti-fragile sys-
tems characterized by two important properties: First, an anti-fragile ICT system fails
early with a small, local impact to break positive feedback loops before they can cre-
ate extreme global behaviors. Second, the prevention of extreme global behaviors
allows stakeholders to learn from small-impact incidents about new vulnerabilities
caused by changes in the system and its environment. The vulnerabilities can then
be mitigated to avoid future extreme behaviors.
This book investigates how to develop and operate anti-fragile ICT systems.
Cloud-based systems are emphasized because cloud computing platforms utilizing
virtualization technologies greatly facilitate the creation and maintenance of anti-
fragility compared to traditional datacenters without virtualization technologies (see
Chap.5).
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Fig. 1.4 Toward anti-fragility
1.2 Fragile, Robust, and Anti-fragile Systems
The research literature has long categorized complex adaptive systems as fragile or
robust to incidents with a particular type of impact. Fragile systems are vulnerable
to the impacts of these incidents, while robust systems withstand or absorb them.
Unlike robust systems, anti-fragile systems learn from such incidents how to function
increasingly well in a changing environment [9, 10]. In fact, anti-fragile systems
need incidents to remain well adapted to their environments. Without the ability to
learn from incidents, anti-fragile systems become fragile over time as the systems
themselves and their environments change. The human immune system, with its
ability to adapt and self-repair, is a prime example of a system that is anti-fragile to
many types of impact.
As depicted in Fig. 1.4, the fragility, robustness, and anti-fragility to a particular
type of impact are best viewed as degrees on a spectrum with fragile systems to
the left, robust systems in the middle, and anti-fragile systems to the right. Systems
have to become robust before they can become anti-fragile and no system can be
anti-fragile to all possible types of impact [10]. At present, there is no general tech-
nique to measure fragility, robustness, and anti-fragility. However, this book will
demonstrate that it is not difficult to recognize when a system is fragile, for exam-
ple, to downtime or malware spreading. Furthermore, it will introduce design and
operational principles that move toward anti-fragility in Fig. 1.4.
1.3 Overview of Book
Taleb [10] introduced the concept of anti-fragility to analyze and explain why it is not
enough for large natural or man-made systems to be robust to predictable events with
large impact. In an unpredictable world, systems must be able to handle randomness,
volatility, and unforeseen large-impact events. Learning from incidents is needed to
prevent systems from developing fragilities over time.
So far there are no general methods or theories on how to develop or operate anti-
fragile ICT systems. This book studies select philosophical and practical aspects of
anti-fragile ICT systems to gain an initial understanding of them. The main mes-
sage is that we should stop building fragile ICT systems of national or international
importance and start building anti-fragile ICT systems.
The book is divided into five parts. Part I discusses the concept of anti-fragility,
why the concept is important, and how to achieve anti-fragility in general. Part II
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outlines in some detail how different ICT systems can achieve anti-fragility to down-
time and Part III develops a technique to achieve anti-fragility to malware spreading.
Since we need to detect failures to achieve anti-fragility, Part IV discusses how to
detect anomalies in system behavior. Finally, Part V summarizes the book’s main
insights and suggests potential venues for further work.
The contents of Parts I and II should be easy to understand for most readers, while
an additional effort may be needed to understand the more complicated content of
Parts III and IV. To facilitate understanding, certain chapters repeat central informa-
tion introduced earlier in the book. The following sections provide more detailed
summaries of the five parts.
1.4 Creating and Maintaining Anti-fragility
Part I, including the current chapter, outlines how to create and operate complex adap-
tive ICT systems with anti-fragility to different types of impact, such as unplanned
downtime and malware spreading. Chapter2 first discusses rare events with a large
negative impact and argues that it is, at best, very hard to predict all such events
in complex systems. Next, it explains why a system must limit the impact of these
events to gain robustness and why learning from the remaining events with a small
impact is necessary to achieve anti-fragility.
While organizations with anti-fragile systemsmust accept and learn from failures,
they also need to focus on building trust with users to maintain and increase their user
base. Chapter3 defines a simple agent-based model of how trust changes in a user
population. The model illustrates that trust is fragile to incidents directly affecting
few users and that massive distrust is robust to large efforts to regain trust. Since
it is very hard to predict which events have the potential to create massive distrust,
organizations must have procedures in place to handle the impact of incidents before
distrust starts to spread.
The design of an ICT system is the process of defining its components, interfaces,
data formats, data flow, and data storage that together satisfy specified availabil-
ity, performance, and scalability requirements. Chapter4 first provides four design
principles that isolate local failures, keeping their impacts small, while supporting
stringent requirements. Second, it introduces one operational principle that enables
stakeholders to quickly learn from natural and induced failures to maintain a level
of anti-fragility as a system and its environment change. While each principle alone
does not provide any new fundamental insight, collectively the five principles outline
a novel way to design and operate anti-fragile ICT systems. In particular, it is possi-
ble to create ICT systems with higher availability than today’s tightly connected and
highly optimized systems with limited redundancy and diversity.
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A cloud computing platform enables ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources such as CPUs, networks, memory,
and databases that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal manage-
ment effort or service provider interaction [13, 14]. Virtualization technologies are
used to abstract the resources for applications and end users. The availability of a
cloud-based ICT system is measured by the percentage of time it is accessible to
users. A high availability of 99.99%, referred to as four nines of availability, corre-
sponds to about 53min of downtime each year. A complex ICT system is fragile to
downtime if its availability is unacceptably low to some stakeholders, robust if the
availability is acceptable to all stakeholders, and anti-fragile if stakeholders or the
technical system itself learn to maintain an acceptable availability as the system and
its environment change.
Part II discusses how the five design and operational principles from Chap.4 can
be implemented on cloud computing platforms to create highly available software
solutions and mobile telecom infrastructures. To gain insight, we reason about real
systems using philosophical concepts, objects, figures, and impressions of past inci-
dents. The thinking is based solely on publicly available information and is rooted in
complexity science [15–20], where whole systems cannot be understood by exclu-
sively studying their parts; instead, it is necessary to emphasize interrelationships
and changes to understand the systems’ dynamic global behaviors.
Chapter5 outlines how Netflix implemented the five principles in their cloud-
based web-scale solution for media streaming. Chapter 6 explains why Norway’s
e-government system has experienced too much downtime and describes how a
new cloud-based system founded on the five principles can achieve anti-fragility to
downtime. The chapter also references the UK e-government system to argue the
need for user-focused and iterative software development to achieve anti-fragility.
Finally, Chap. 7 discusses fragility to downtime in Norwegian telecom systems and
outlines how the five principles applied on cloud computing platforms can make
telecom systems anti-fragile to downtime.
1.6 Anti-fragility to Malware Spreading
Malware is any form of malicious software used to disrupt computer operations,
gather sensitive information, or gain unauthorized access to private computer sys-
tems.Malware appears as executable code, scripts, active content, and other software.
Malware includes computer viruses, worms, trojans, ransomware, spyware, scare-
ware, and other types ofmalicious programs.Worldwide, trojans, worms, and viruses
continue to dominate among the many malware types.
Malware is a serious threat to anybody using a computer system connected to the
Internet [21, 22]. A networked system is fragile to malware spreading when local
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outbreaks spread far and robust when new malware outbreaks have very limited
spreading. The system is anti-fragile to malware spreading if it first learns to reduce
the fraction of infected devices, for example, to less than 1% and then manages to
keep the fraction of infected devices low even as the spreading mechanism of the
malware changes.
Part III develops a novel malware-halting technique that prevents frequent mal-
ware outbreaks from propagating over huge networks of computing devices. Calcula-
tions and simulations using slightly modified epidemiological models from network
science [23] determine the time-averaged fraction of infected devices. Chapter 8 out-
lines how application stores utilizing compilers with so-called diversity engines [24]
can generate enough software diversity to gain robustness to malware spreading by
halting frequent malware outbreaks with a fixed spreading mechanism. It also argues
that diversity slows down persistent targeted attacks.
Chapter9 studies malware types that spread over networks with an unknown
topology. The malware studied have the ability to reinfect nodes multiple times.
Acquaintance immunization [25] and software diversity are combined to gain robust-
ness to malware reinfections. While reinfections generally help malware stay alive
for a long time, the described halting technique prevents malware outbreaks from
spreading very far before they die out.
Chapter10 combines cloud computing, time-varying software diversity, immu-
nization, and imperfect malware detection/removal to model and analyze networks
that gain anti-fragility to malware spreading by learning to halt and remove malware
with unknown and time-varying spreading mechanisms. Non-infectious malware
mistakenly downloaded by computer users are viewed as infectious malware with
limited spreading ability.
1.7 Anomaly Detection
To achieve anti-fragility to a particular type of intolerable impact, local failures
must be detected before they can propagate into systemic failures. Humans are often
needed to determine whether a local anomaly is just a benign change or a local failure
with the potential to create a systemic failure. Current ICT systems deploy various
techniques and heuristics to detect anomalies. For example, banks and credit card
companies have a rich set of heuristics to detect fraud [26].
In Part IV,we study a general learning algorithmbased on the biology of the brain’s
neocortex. The learning algorithmwas developed by Hawkins [27] and implemented
in software by the company Numenta (http://numenta.com). The algorithm is able
to predict the behavior of a wide variety of systems. If a prediction and the actual
behavior differ, then an anomaly is detected. Chapter11 discusses the biological basis
for the learning algorithm and provides an overview of the algorithm itself.
Numenta’s experiments with different types of streaming data, including metric
data from cloud applications, show that the algorithm detects anomalies that are
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hard for humans to discover. Chapter12 illustrates how the early detection of subtle
anomalies allows systems or their stakeholders to take early action to prevent local
failures from creating intolerable impact.
1.8 Ongoing Explanatory Work
Part V consists of Chap.13. It summarizes the book’s main insights and discusses
possible research directions to further increase the understanding of anti-fragile ICT
systems.
Overall, this book is a result of the author’s ongoing long-term effort to under-
stand what Taleb’s [8–12] philosophical investigations and Geer’s [28–33] systems
thinking tell us about the design, implementation, operation, and management of
complex adaptive ICT systems. Both Geer and Taleb look to nature to understand
anti-fragile systems. In nature, sexual reproduction creates many species consisting
of individuals who genetically differ from each other. An infectious disease is very
unlikely to wipe out an entire population, since some individuals are almost certainly
genetically immune. In other words, while each individual is vulnerable to diseases,
the population survives due to a diverse gene pool.
While the author avoids superficial references to biology and Darwin’s theory of
evolution in the book, he agrees with Geer and Taleb that there is much to learn from
nature on how to build complex ICT systems. In particular, Geer has stated several
times that computing devices should have a relatively short life unless they are easy
to upgrade. This observation has strongly influenced the work in Part III, leading to
a novel approach to malware halting.
It is hard to precisely model the global behaviors of complex ICT systems. Rather
than trying to develop sophisticated models to accurately simulate the behaviors of
real systems, this book develops toy models to gain an understanding of them.While
these models cannot predict the global behavior of real systems, they provide expla-
nations of important system properties. The suggested malware-halting technique
in Part III demonstrates that it is possible to create novel approaches and solutions
to difficult problems by developing simple agent-based models of networked ICT
systems and then employing techniques from network science to analyze themodels’
properties.
Since many of the ideas presented in this book have yet to be tested in real systems
and since the book by no means covers all aspects of anti-fragile ICT systems,
the author welcomes criticism and debate to shed further light on how to develop
and operate anti-fragile ICT systems. Understanding all aspects of these systems is
an important task for both the research community and the industry—not only for
the author.
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Astakeholder is a personor institutionwith a legitimate interest in a given information
and communications technology (ICT) system. Examples of stakeholders are users,
owners, operators, regulatory government agencies, system architects, and software
developers. Given a set of stakeholders, a complex adaptive ICT system is fragile
to a particular type of negative impact, for example, downtime, if a possible large
impact is unacceptable to some stakeholders in the set and robust if all possible
impacts are acceptable to all stakeholders. The ICT system is anti-fragile if it learns
(perhaps with help from some stakeholders) to maintain an acceptable impact to all
stakeholders as the system and environment change over time.
This chapter first considers rare failures causing unacceptable impact and argues
that it is very hard to predict all such future events. Second, it argues that it is necessary
to limit the impact of failures to gain robustness and to learn from the remaining small
failures to achieve anti-fragility. Third, the chapter discusses limitations of classical
risk analysis methods before finally introducing an alternative definition of risk in
complex adaptive ICT systems.
2.1 Black and Gray Swans
As stated in Chap. 1, global emergent behaviors of complex adaptive systems are
modeled as stochastic events with given probability distributions. For simplicity, we
assume that the studied behavior of a system is modeled by a continuous random
variable with a distribution given by a probability density function (PDF). Figure2.1
shows two PDFs, each with a left and right tail. The tails determine the probability of
outliers in the form of extreme global behavior. The left tail defines the probabilities
of outliers with huge negative impact, while the right tail defines the probabilities of
outliers with huge positive impact. We are only concerned with negative impact in
this book.
As illustrated in Fig. 2.1, there are PDFs with thin tails and thick (or fat) tails. If a
PDF has thin tails, thenmost events occur close to the mean of the PDF. Furthermore,
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Fig. 2.1 Two PDFs, one with thin tails and one with thick tails
Fig. 2.2 Probability and negative impact of a single nonrecurrent swan incident versus recurrent
incidents. The swan is an outlier
outliers far from the mean have such low probabilities that they can be ignored
for all practical purposes. This is the case for the thin-tailed bell curve (or normal
distribution). However, if a PDF has thick tails, then the probabilities of the outliers
are too large to be ignored. Observe that a PDF can also have one thick tail and one
thin tail.
Large man-made systems designed in a top-down manner by successively being
broken down into smaller parts tend to have global behaviors whose probabilities
are defined by PDFs with thick left tails. In general, the thick tails are due to posi-
tive feedback loops created by a series of interacting processes that together result in
systems adapting to the effect of their previous behaviors (see Fig. 1.2). Positive feed-
back loops allow for outliers with unacceptable impact [3, 4]. Taleb [9] distinguishes
between two types of outliers with negative impact, namely, black and gray swans.
Figure2.2 depicts the differences in probability and impact between a nonrecurrent
black or gray swan and so-called normal, recurrent incidents: Both types of swans
are surprising outliers, falsifying previous assumptions about the negative impact of
incidents made by most or all stakeholders of a system.
Assume an arbitrary but fixed set of stakeholders. A black swan is a metaphor for
rare global behavior of a complex adaptive systemwhose huge negative impact comes
as a total surprise to all stakeholders in the set. This type of extreme emergent behavior
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is the “unknown unknown,” a rare bombshell event that none of the stakeholders have
considered.
Two important observations can be made about black swans. First, a black swan
cannot be described by any of the stakeholders because the event is completely
unknown to all of them. Second, while a black swan is a total surprise to all the
stakeholders considered, there may be other individuals outside the group of stake-
holders for which the event is not a big surprise. As an example, while the economic
crisis of 2007/2008 came as a huge surprise tomost people, a few individuals, includ-
ing Taleb [9], foresaw the crisis, even though they could not saywhen the crisis would
occur or exactly how serious the consequences would be.
A gray swan is a metaphor for rare global behavior with a large negative impact
that is somewhat predictable but typically overlooked by most of the stakeholders
considered. It is the “known unknown,” a rare event that some know is possible but
no one knows when or whether it will occur. Because a gray swan is not a complete
surprise to all stakeholders, it tends to have less impact than a black swan. However,
its impact is still huge. For simplicity, we often neglect to define a set of stakeholders
when we discuss gray and black swans. However, the reader should assume that
users, owners, software developers, operators, and regulatory government agencies
are always among the stakeholders.
2.2 Examples of Swans
Hindsight bias, or the knew-it-all-along effect, is the natural tendency, after an inci-
dent has occurred, to conclude that the incident was foreseeable, despite there hav-
ing been little or no objective basis for this conclusion. Hindsight bias [6, 9] causes
observers to miscategorize black swans as gray swans after the fact. Moreover, dif-
ferences in understanding, personal involvement, and available information cause
individuals to disagree on whether a large-impact event is a black or gray swan at
all. Consequently, it is hard to make all observers agree on what incidents are gray
and black swans in complex ICT systems, especially when the observers have no
access to the stakeholders. We can, however, give examples of incidents that many,
but perhaps not all, security experts will categorize as swans.
When the computer worm Nimda first appeared on the Internet in September
2001, it spread quickly, causing hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, accord-
ing to press reports. Although the public was familiar with worms at the time, we
characterize Nimda as a black swan because it was the first infectious malware
with multiple attack methods [30]. Nimda’s five attack methods made it extremely
difficult to foresee all of their consequences. The large number of infected com-
puters demonstrates that the attacks surprised computer owners, software vendors,
and information technology departments. While NIMDA caused much damage, it
could have been much worse. The worm occurred only one week after the 9/11
terrorist attacks. According to Geer [30], the backdoor installed by NIMDA could
have been exploited to run denial-of-service attacks on emergency services all over
16 2 Achieving Anti-fragility
the United States, causing public loss of confidence after the nationwide uncertainty
created by the shock of 9/11.
In August 2001, a company providing services to Norwegian banks installed
new disks in a backup system used to mirror the production environment. System
operators inadvertently routed the instruction to format the disks to the production
environment rather than to the backup system. The error rendered production data
inaccessible on about 280 disks, thus halting the production environment. This rare
incident affected 114 banks and roughly 1 million users. It took seven days before
payment card, ATM, Internet banking, and phone banking services were all back to
normal operation. While the total cost to the company is not publicly known, it was
likely very large, since the company had to compensate the banks for their financial
losses. This gray swan occurred because administrators did not pay enough attention
to the established security procedures and thus triggered a single point of failure in
the system.
While we should always try to remove single points of failures from ICT systems,
there exist systems for which a single point of failure is an essential side effect of
the design [30]. The single red phone on the American president’s desk is a good
example. Many red phones would be a far worse solution from a risk management
point of view. When a single point of failure is a design requirement, we need to
deploy defense in depth, which is not a research-grade problem. Hence, we will not
discuss single points of failure in any detail in this book.
2.3 Limiting the Impact of Failures
To understand the challenges of curbing the impact of failures in complex ICT sys-
tems, we study why it is so hard to predict rare events with large negative impacts [9,
34]. Let the term incident denote an event with negative impact. To predict any future
incident, we must describe the incident, estimate its probability, and calculate the
impact. Many incidents causing, for example, unplanned downtime are predictable,
especially incidents due to single points of failure. As an example, ICT systems with-
out redundant data storage or backup power are sure to fail sooner or later. However,
swan incidents exist that are very hard or even impossible to predict.
In fact, it is very hard to accurately predict extreme global behavior in complex
ICT systems [7, 34]. Because the systems have too many dynamic interactions for
humans to even enumerate all the possible scenarios leading to outliers with a huge
negative impact, it is easy for all stakeholders to overlook a future swan, thus making
it black. Furthermore, it is hard to estimate the probabilities of identified gray swans,
because a complex system changes significantly and perhaps abruptly over time and
because a system’s recorded history might not contain a single swan; for example, a
100-year flood is not likely to show up in 10 years of historical data.
Complex systems’ lack of well-defined boundaries makes it hard to build models
to accurately estimate the probabilities of gray swans. Taleb utilizes power laws to
illustrate that small model errors greatly affect rare events’ estimated probabilities
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[11]. Experience with a particular system type helps estimate gray swan probabilities
in a similar new system. However, because the estimation of gray swan probabili-
ties in a large system requires many assumptions, especially when considering the
design of a system that has not yet been implemented, the estimates carry significant
uncertainty. All in all, it is very hard for stakeholders to accurately predict the gray
swans that actually occur. In addition, even if a system owner mitigates all the gray
swans, an unknown black swan can still cause huge damage.
Since the probability of each black and gray swan is both small and unknown,
it is tempting to ignore swans altogether. However, because a complex ICT system
is typically vulnerable to many swans, there is a significant probability that at least
one swan will occur. Thus, no matter the quality of the risk analysis, swans causing
unacceptable impact will occur in complex ICT systems sooner or later; unless the
systems are especially designed and operated to limit the impact of rare, unforesee-
able events [3, 4, 6, 10].
To avoid surprising outliers and help ensure event distributions with thin left tails,
Chap. 4 proposes four design principles to isolate local failures affecting small parts
of systems, thus preventing them from propagating into systemic or global failures
affecting complete systems.
2.4 Learning from Small Failures
In an interesting monograph, Sidney Dekker [17] recounts series of small, rather
insignificant everyday decisions leading to major disasters, including large oil spills
andplane crashes. There are no easily detectable properties of the decisions that signal
major disasters in the future. In fact, given the information available at the time, most
of the decisions are reasonable when studied in isolation. However, over time, the
decisions reduced thediversity and redundancyof the systems andmade themsteadily
more fragile to disasters. This fragilizing processwasmainly driven bypressure to use
fewer resources and to produce results faster. Some stakeholders contributed to the
system fragility by introducing conflicting requirements and regulations, while other
stakeholders encouraged risky behavior to reach certain goals, such as producing
large quantities of oil.
The accident scenarios described by Dekker [17] further demonstrate that broken
parts are not the major reason for disasters in complex adaptive systems. Rather,
it is the stakeholders’ inability to cope with the complexity of a system and its
changing environment. Lack of understanding, insufficient communication between
stakeholders, and pressure to improve a system’s “efficiency” all increase its fragility
to disasters. Dekker shows how stakeholders build and operate systems they do not
fully understand. While stakeholders grasp the functionality of each part, the huge
amount of interactions between themany parts and the changing rules and regulations
governing the operations of the systemsmake it impossible for stakeholders to prevent
rare catastrophic events.
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In summary, man-made complex systems in general and complex ICT systems
in particular tend to drift into systemic failure because they become increasingly
fragile due to internal and external changes. The drift occurs slowly, with few or
no obvious indications of increased fragility before a major incident occurs [2, 17,
35]. Since black and gray swans in complex systems limit the stakeholders’ ability
to predict extreme global behavior with a huge negative impact, the stakeholders
must analyze local failures (with limited impact) and introduce countermeasures to
avoid increased fragility due to local failures propagating into global failures. Daniel
Kahneman’s pioneering work [36] and a monograph by Michael T. Nygard [35]
confirm the discussed limits of prediction and the need to learn from local failures.
Since the capacity to detect small failures is crucial to determine vulnerabilities, the
comprehensive monitoring of a system’s behavior is extremely important to achieve
anti-fragility. The goal is not to prevent all failures in an ICT system but to avoid
silent failures and quickly start necessary repairs.
Because systemic failures aremost often, but not always, initiated by local failures
that propagate due to positive feedback loops, it is possible to prevent many swans by
detecting local failures and preventing them from propagating. While all swans may
not be absolutely prevented, it is possible to make rare events rarer and reduce their
impact. Chapter4 proposes an operational principle that induces artificial failures
into a system to quickly detect vulnerabilities with the potential to cause systemic
failures. A team of experts with diverse skill sets should learn from the induced
incidents because a team could respond faster and gain more insights than a single
individual. All team members should have “skin in the game” [10, Chap.23]: When
the members face the consequences of their actions and suffer failure as well as enjoy
success, they become motivated to learn rapidly and not take unwarranted chances.
A team of software developers has skin in the game when it is responsible for both
the development and operations (DevOps) of its software [37, 38]. Another way of
introducing skin in the game is to let team members use their own software as much
as possible.
The increasingly popular DevOps methodology emphasizes communication, col-
laboration, and integration between software developers and information technology
operations professionals. DevOps is a response to the interdependence of software
development and information technology operations. It facilitates learning from nat-
ural and induced failures and encourages software developers to create robust code
so they do not have to fix problems at three o’clock in the morning.
2.5 An Alternative Justification
We have argued that a complex ICT system exposed to swan incidents must be anti-
fragile to the swans’ impacts to thrive over time. According to Taleb [10], the need for
anti-fragility can be summarized as follows: Let X be a random variable representing
events with some probability distribution (given by a PDF) and let h(X) be another
random variable representing the possible impacts, for example, the financial costs
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to a stakeholder. In practice, we care about h(X) and not X . While it is often hard to
change the thick-tail distribution of X , it can bemuch easier to change the distribution
of h(X). Our goal is to ensure that the distribution of h(X) has a thin left tail to avoid
intolerable costly outliers (see Fig. 2.2).
Since a complex adaptive system and its environment change over time, perhaps
abruptly, the distribution of h(X) also changes. The left tail of the changing distrib-
ution of h(X) is unknown because we do not have sufficient data, that is, the history
of the system may not contain any outliers and, even if it did, there is no guarantee
that the future of the system will be anything like its past. Hence, an anti-fragile
system must prevent local failures from propagating into systemic failures and use
local failures to detect and remove vulnerabilities that can lead to systemic failures
in the future.
While the discussed approach leads to a thinning of the left tail of h(X), there is no
absolute guarantee that a swan will not occur in a complex ICT system. Guaranteed
swan-free ICT systems can only be achieved by keeping the systems relatively small
to limit their importance and possible negative impact. It may also be necessary to
isolate systems from each other, for example, systems with particularly sensitive
information should not be connected to the Internet.
2.6 Risk Analyses Ignore Swans
The reader may wonder how classical methods for the risk analysis of ICT systems
rate the impact of swans. The short answer is that theymostly ignore swans altogether.
This unfortunate tendency partly explains why we continue building ICT systems
with tightly interconnected parts, little diversity, and low redundancy that allow local
failures to propagate into systemic failures.
Traditionally, analysts evaluate risk by estimating the probability of a threat
exploiting a vulnerability and by determining the resulting incident’s negative impact.
Analysts often use the values low, medium, and high to approximate the probability
and impact, resulting in the five-level risk matrix in Fig. 2.3. The matrix incorrectly
classifies a gray swan as a medium risk because it has a low probability and high
impact according to the approximations.
As an example, a nationwide outage in a power grid is a medium risk despite the
outage’s ability to inflict damage in the billions of dollars. Since swans, with their
huge impacts, tend to dominate the total risk of complex ICT systems, the use of risk
matrices has lead to a gross underestimation of the total risk associated with many
systems.
The underlying problem is that risk matrices of the type depicted in Fig. 2.3
implicitly assume that the distribution of the impact h(X) has a thin left tail. Since
the probabilities of nonrecurrent outliers or swans are assumed to be so small that
the incidents can be ignored, the risk matrix only represents recurrent incidents with
larger probabilities and smaller impacts than those of swans. However, a complex
adaptive ICT system with many tightly connected parts is very likely to have a h(X)
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Fig. 2.3 The five-level risk matrix underestimates the risk of gray swans
distribution with a thick left tail, making it dangerous to use the risk matrix in Fig. 2.3
because it excludes the possibility of swans.
2.7 Understanding and Reducing Risk
An interesting video exists (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MKcZtvwch1w) of
the late Peter L. Bernstein discussing risk. According to Bernstein, we talk about risk
when we do not know what will happen. Risk simply means that more things can
happen than will happen. Since this book focuses on swans incidents, we use a more
specific and narrow definition of risk. Consider a group of one or more stakeholders
with interests in a complex adaptive ICT system. We define the risk associated with
the group of stakeholders as the largest negative impact of all incidents that can
happen to the group during a fixed period. How the impact is actually measured
depends on the system and the interests of the stakeholders. Impact is commonly
measured in terms of financial loss. Note that our definition of risk is not based on
the probability of an incident. Because the definition of risk is tailored to the book’s
focus on intolerable incidents, it may not be the best choice in other settings.
Risk is a consequence of dependence [31]. A part (or system) X depends on
another part (system) Y if a failure in Y negatively affects the functionality of X .
The main sources of risk in an ICT system are the dependencies between its parts
creating positive feedback loops, which again cause local failures to propagate into
global failures. In general, the growing number of dependencies in increasingly
complex systems causes incidents impacting stakeholders to become less frequent,
because the systems become better at handling recurrent incidents over the normal
operating range. However, at the same time, the impacts of nonrecurrent incidents
are increasing due to the positive feedback loops propagating (combinations of) rare
local events outside the normal operating range.
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In Taleb’s [9] terminology, while incidents affecting stakeholders are becoming
less frequent, gray and black swans occur more often in ICT systems with tight
internal integration as their complexity grows. Since it is hard to determine all the
dependencies of complex systems, the probability of swans in complex ICT systems
is underestimated, causing intolerable impacts because most stakeholders are not
prepared for swans.
As the risk of recurrent incidents is reduced and the intervals between incidents
grow longer, the assumption that complex ICT systems are “safe” also grows, thus
causing a situation (actually a feedback loop) in which stakeholders create increas-
ingly more complex systems with tightly integrated parts [31]. To counter this devel-
opment and reduce the risks to the stakeholders, it is necessary to create ICT systems
with only tolerable failures. Since the causes of swans are, at best, hard to predict,
it is necessary to limit the impact of incidents, even though we have no a priori
knowledge of their causes.
2.8 Taleb’s Four Quadrants
Following Taleb [11, 12], we create a map to classify the negative impact of different
failures in complex adaptive ICT systems. We again represent the impact of events
in a complex adaptive ICT system by a continuous random variable with a particular
PDF. Furthermore, we discriminate between two types of negative impacts, namely,
local and global impacts. Some systems only permit the local impact of failures,
while other systems allow local failures to propagate and create a global (systemic)
impact. The PDF of the local or global impact has a thin or thick left tail.
The four quadrants of the map in Fig. 2.4 represent the four possible combinations
of local and global impacts and thin and thick tails. The quadrants represent four
classes of complex ICT systems with very different extreme behaviors. The map
shows where classical risk analysis works well and where it is of questionable use
Fig. 2.4 The impact of a failure in a complex adaptive ICT system falls within one of Taleb’s four
quadrants. The fourth quadrant must be avoided because it leads to intolerable systemic failures
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and can lead to the gross underestimation of the risk by ignoring swans in the form
of rare outliers with an intolerable negative impact.
A system in the first quadrant in Fig. 2.4 is very safe. It only experiences local
failures with limited impact because the PDF of the local impact has a thin left tail.
Unfortunately, it seems that today’s complex ICT systems are not in this quadrant.
The second quadrant is also a fairly safe place for a system. Global failures may
occur, but the global impact is tolerable due to the thin left tail of the PDF. Systems
in the third quadrant only experience local failures, but these can have a relatively
large impact because the PDF of the local impact has a thick left tail. Hence, rigorous
risk management is needed.
Systems in the fourth quadrantmust be avoided because they are vulnerable to gray
and black swans with an intolerable impact. While the probability of a single swan
is small, ICT systems in the fourth quadrant are usually vulnerable to many swans,
making it inevitable that one will occur sooner or later. As explained in Sects. 2.3 and
2.6, classical risk analysis cannot handle nonrecurrent swans in the fourth quadrant.
We want to develop and operate complex adaptive ICT systems where all failures
are local with limited impact, that is, we want the systems to fall in the first quadrant
in Fig. 2.4. However, since we will not succeed in limiting absolutely all failures
of complex national and international ICT infrastructures, these systems will more
likely end up in the second or third quadrant, which is also acceptable as long as we
avoid swans with an intolerable impact in the fourth quadrant.
2.9 Discussion and Summary
If we consider a complex adaptive ICT system over a period of, say, 20 years, then
normal incidents will occur repeatedly during the period. Hence, these recurrent
incidents should become less and less surprising to the system’s stakeholders. The
same is not true for gray and black swans. Because swans are so rare, they will not
occur multiple times over the considered period. Consequently, swans are, at best,
very hard to predict, since there is little or nothing in the system’s history to signal
their future occurrence. However, since complex ICT systems are vulnerable tomany
swans, the probability that at least one swan will occur is too large to be ignored.
Given a set of stakeholders, a complex ICT system is fragile to a particular type
of negative impact if a possible large impact is unacceptable to some stakeholders
in the set and robust if all possible impacts are acceptable to all stakeholders. It is
not enough for complex ICT systems to be robust, because internal and external
changes fragilize complex systems over time, making them increasingly vulnerable
to large-impact events, including swans. Since we cannot hope to predict all negative
events that can significantly impact complex ICT systems,wemust build systems that
limit the impact of incidents of unknown origin and learn from events with a small
negative impact how to limit the impact of all incidents. The resulting ICT systems
are anti-fragile when they manage to reduce and maintain acceptable impacts to all
stakeholders.
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Stochastic modeling is much used in many research areas, particularly in modern
financial theory. Financial models are very often based on PDFs with thin tails, lead-
ing to a gross underestimation of the risks associated with the economic processes
beingmodeled. To better understand the devastating consequences of using thewrong
stochastic models, the reader should consult the books of Pablo Triana [39] and
Benoit Mandelbrot and Richard Hudson [40]. Both argue that standard financial
models have led investors to take on huge hidden risks with ruinous consequences.
Together, Taleb [8–11], Triana, Mandelbrot, and Hudson illustrate the folly of trying
to predict extreme global behavior in complex adaptive systems of global importance.
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Chapter 3
The Need to Build Trust
An organization operating and managing a complex adaptive information and com-
munications technology (ICT) system is said to be anti-fragile when, over time, the
organization is able to protect the user population from serious consequences of sys-
tem failures and simultaneously provide digital services fulfilling the users’ changing
needs [41]. According to Chap.2, failures are inevitable in a complex ICT system.
Unless a user population has a high level of trust in the system, the population may
abandon the system after a failure. Hence, any anti-fragile organization running a
complex ICT system must maintain a high level of trust over time to keep their users
after inevitable system failures.
To better understand why it is critical for any anti-fragile organization to maintain
user trust, this chapter first defines the concept of trust and then develops a model
of a user population whose individuals influence each others’ levels of trust in an
ICT system, for example, an e-government platformwith digital services. The model
demonstrates that a population’s trust decreases rapidly when distrust within small
groups of individuals starts to spread. Further, it illustrates why it is hard to determine
which incidents will lead to widespread distrust and clarifies why it is very difficult
to create pervasive trust when there is much distrust. We find that a population’s trust
is fragile to incidents directly affecting a few individuals while widespread distrust
is robust against concentrated efforts to rebuild trust. Finally, the chapter discusses
approaches to limit the spread of distrust and maintain a high level of trust.
3.1 Defining Trust
Trust can be viewed as a computational constructwhose value depends on the context.
The value is likely to change over time. Here, an individual’s trust in an entity is
specified by three concepts: trust,mistrust, and distrust, viewed asmutually exclusive
states representing different degrees of trust. Mistrust represents a general sense of
unease toward an ICT system based on mostly unverified information, while users
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distrust a systembecause of negative experiences or reliable information fromexperts
about serious problems with the system. As an example, users distrust an Internet
banking system after suffering financial losses, but they only mistrust the system
after being told about security problems by family, friends, or co-workers.
Since most users do not fully understand how an ICT system operates or why
incidents occur, they will seek advice from others about what to believe about the
system; that is, their levels of trust are influenced by other stakeholders. Mistrust
is a less stable state than distrust. While users with mistrust are likely to develop
distrust when they receive additional negative information about a system or when
they become victims of actual incidents, users harboring distrust are less likely to
move back to a state of mistrust because they have already suffered harm caused by
the system.
An individual who trusts an entity has a positive expectation of the entity’s future
behavior [42, 43]. The individual will cooperate with the entity to reach a certain
goal, even though it is possible that the entity will misbehave and inflict costs or
damage on the individual. The entity gains the individual’s trust over time through
repeated actions benefiting the individual.
An individual harboring mistrust believes the uncertainty is too large to expect
a particular behavior from an entity. A citizen may, for example, believe in the
government’s sincere desire to deliver highly secure services on the Web, but has
little or no confidence in the government’s ability to actually deliver adequate security.
An individual distrusting an entity believes the entity will deliberately act against
him or her in a given situation. A citizen harboring distrust may think that the gov-
ernment intentionally overstates the security of its e-government services or uses
collected personal information to spy on individuals.
While a citizen’s trust in a system can be in one of only three states in this chapter,
the whole population has different degrees of trust, mistrust, and distrust at the same
time, measured by the fractions of individuals in each of the three states. Note that
the three fractions sum to one.
To illustrate a population’s mistrust and distrust of an ICT system, as well as
its owner, we consider a large identity management system that was never fully
implemented. A former UK government under Labour started to deploy a centralized
identity system, called the National Identity Scheme (NIS), to provide biometric
identity cards to all lawful residents aged 16 and over. Roughly £250 million were
spent developing NIS (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8707355.stm).
TheLondonSchool of Economics andPolitical Science started the Identity Project
to analyze NIS. Project members mistrusted the UK government, accusing it of not
understanding the political, social, and technological risks of establishing a national
ID system with a centralized database containing up to 50 data points per individual
[44].
Over the years, the Identity Project published reports and participated in the
national debate to convince politicians to scrap NIS. The lobby group NO2ID also
opposed the creation of NIS. Their briefing papers imply distrust of the UK gov-
ernment. In particular, NO2ID discussed how NIS could allow the government to
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manage society by spying on people, severely compromising their privacy and secu-
rity.
The UK Labour government allowed mistrust and distrust to grow by relegating,
ignoring, or attacking independent experts pointing out weaknesses in NIS [44, pp.
81–2], [45]. The predominantly negative press coverage of NIS helped spread mis-
trust and distrust when people started to discuss it. According to a study of UK news-
papers [45], NIS was portrayed as unsafe, lacking accountability, compulsory rather
than based on choice, universal, tough on immigration, and creating an imbalance
between liberty and security. In 2010, the new Conservative coalition government’s
Identity Documents Act abolished the identity cards and ordered the destruction of
all data in the associated National Identity Register.
3.2 Explanatory Trust Model
The following discrete-time model provides an explanation for how trust, mistrust,
and distrust change in a population due to incidents in a complex ICT system. Patches
on a square represent the modeled individuals. The square wraps around at the edges,
that is, the model has a doughnut shape. An individual’s state of trust is represented
by the color of the patch: Trust is green ( ), mistrust is yellow ( ), and distrust is
red ( ), as seen in Fig. 3.1. Each individual has eight neighbors. At each time step,
the state of an individual is updated based on the states of its neighbors.
Since it is not obvious how to update the patches, we study 14 sets of update rules
defined by the columns of Table3.1. Each set has two rules defining changes from
trust to mistrust and from mistrust to distrust, as well as two rules defining changes
in the opposite directions. The two first (last) rules induce a color change when the
number of green neighbors is no larger (no smaller) than a threshold. To clarify, the
four rules defined by the rightmost column in Table3.1 are as follows:
(i) A green patch changes to yellow when a maximum of four neighbors are green.
(ii) A yellow patch turns red when a maximum of three neighbors are green.
(iii) A red patch turns yellow when a minimum of seven neighbors are green.
(iv) A yellow patch turns green when a minimum of six neighbors are green.
The two first rules in a set repeatedly reduce a population’s trust as individuals
become increasingly surrounded by individuals with mistrust or distrust. The rules
create an escalating feedback loop producing increasingly more mistrusting and
distrusting individuals when the initial conditions are right. The two last rules create
a dampening feedback loop when the starting conditions are right, but this time to
increase the population’s trust.
All 14 rule sets defined by the columns in Table3.1 result in the same change
pattern: An individual with trust goes through a period of mistrust before developing
distrust and an individual with distrust develops mistrust before trust. Individuals
who have trusted an entity for a long time are reluctant to mistrust or distrust it.
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Fig. 3.1 Development of mistrust in a 100×100 population of patches. The initial mistrust is 27%
(yellow patches) at time step t = 0. The following snapshots show the formation and spreading of
distrust (red patches) over time. Rules (i)–(iv) were used. a t = 0, b t = 1, c t = 3, d t = 20,
e t = 40, f t = 60, g t = 80, h t = 100, i t = 165
Distrusting individuals are even more reluctant to ever again trust an entity that
has violated their trust and caused pain or damage. Finally, an individual harboring
mistrust develops distrust when surrounded by much mistrust.
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Table 3.1 Each column defines a set of four update rules
Changes Color-changing thresholds
Maximum number of green neighbors
→ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
→ 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3
Minimum number of green neighbors
→ 6 6 7 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 6 7 6 7
→ 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
The two first entries in a column define the maximum number of green neighbors causing changes
toward distrust, while the two last entries define the minimum number of green neighbors needed
to change away from distrust
3.3 Model Limitations
Since a model is a simplification of a real-world system, it is possible to create many
models emphasizing different aspects of the real system.Wehave introduced a simple
model of a population’s trust in a system. It is possible to add more functionality
to this model. As an example, we could equip the individuals with a memory of
past incidents. Furthermore, while all individuals react the same way in the current
model, it is possible to use different rules for different individuals. Finally, many
other update rules are possible.
Alternatively, we could define a trust model by a graph where the nodes represent
individuals and the edges connect nodes that influence each other. When the views
of experts and commentators are widely reported by the media, a few nodes have a
very large number of edges to neighboring nodes. While our model does not include
these “super-spreaders”directly, their combined influence is represented by the initial
pattern of mistrust. The more negative the media coverage, the higher the percentage
of initial mistrust.
The trustmodel is non-predictive, in the sense that it cannot forecast a population’s
trust in a real system. However, it offers an explanation of how the degree of trust
changes in a large community of users.
3.4 Trust Is Fragile
We first study how a high degree of trust can turn into a high degree of distrust.
We concentrate on system incidents reported in the media. While most incidents go
unnoticed by the media, a few incidents are widely reported. Not all reported events
are very serious from a technical point of view, but extensive media coverage can
still create mistrust among a significant fraction of users.
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The explanatory model was implemented in NetLogo [46] and the highlighted
rules (i)–(iv) were used to generate the figures. At the start of amodel run, a selectable
percentage of all individuals is yellow (mistrust) and the remaining percentage is
green (trust). The yellow patches are selected at random. Initially there is no distrust.
Figure3.1 shows snapshots of a model run with an initial mistrust of 27% in a
population of 10,000 patches. Figure3.1a depicts many small localized outbreaks of
mistrust at time step t = 0 due to widespread media coverage of an incident. Distrust
starts to occur already at time step t = 1. The distrust forms isolated islands that start
to combine as they become larger. The run ends when the patches’ color patterns no
longer change. At the end of the run in Fig. 3.1i, there is 100% distrust.
Figure3.2 plots the final fraction of distrust as a function of the initial fraction of
mistrust. Each column in the plot was averaged over 100 runs with the same initial
fraction of mistrust. As long as the initial density of mistrust is less than 15%, the
resulting fraction of distrust is less than 1%, on average. However, around 15%
of initial mistrust, there is a transition where increasing mistrust rapidly results in
very large fraction of distrust. An initial mistrust of 28% results in 99% distrust, on
average. Experimentswith the additional 13 leftmost rule sets in Table3.1 all revealed
similar sharp transitions to massive distrust starting at fairly low percentages (16–
33%) of initial mistrust. Since it is difficult to determine when these transitions occur
in real systems, it is hard to predict if an incident will lead to massive distrust.
The model indicates (but does not prove) that user trust in a complex ICT sys-
tem is fragile, because an incident affecting a few users can create massive distrust
when extensive media reporting creates enough initial mistrust. The UK Labour
government did not handle the media skillfully. Therefore, extensive negative press
helped create enough distrust to stop NIS. Of course, an incident affecting many
users directly can create enough initial mistrust without any help from the media.
According to the explanatory model, both cases result in pervasive mistrust.
Fig. 3.2 Average fraction of distrust as a function of the initial fraction of mistrust in a population
of 100 × 100 patches. A transition starts around 15%
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Next,wedeterminewhen themodelmoves fromahighpercentage of distrust to a high
percentage of trust. At the start of a model run, all the patches are red, that is, there
is 100% distrust. A selectable percentage of the red patches chosen at random then
change to green as the model starts to run. Figure3.3 plots the resulting percentage
of trust as a function of the initial percentage of green patches, again using the rules
(i)–(iv) detailed earlier. Each column of the plot is averaged over 100 runs. There is a
rapid transition around 80% initial trust. Below this transition, the model returns to
100% distrust. The plot demonstrates how hard it is to create widespread trust when
there is massive initial distrust.
Experiments with the 13 additional sets of rules in Table3.1 also showed similar
sharp transitions at large values (42–80%) of initial trust. The model again returns to
100% distrust below these transitions. The model implies that massive distrust in a
complex ICT system is robust to large efforts to create widespread trust. It will take
a sustained effort over a long period to rebuild trust. There is no guarantee that such
an effort will succeed. In fact, it may be close to impossible to rebuild widespread
trust in a system when there is massive distrust among the user population.
A few comments are needed to fully understand both the limitations and impli-
cations of all the reported experiments. While it is unlikely that a large population
has 100% trust or distrust in a real system, it is not unlikely that the population’s
trust varies sharply, as depicted in Figs. 3.2 and 3.3. However, the experiments do
not prove that such transitions exist, especially since we have only explored one of
many possible trust models and only deployed a tiny fraction of all possible update
rules.
Taken together, the reported experiments suggest that a long-term effort to limit
the formation of mistrust should already be started when a system is first created. The
effort should be intensified immediately after an incident to avoid a state of massive
distrust from which it is very hard to recover. A successful effort to build a good
Fig. 3.3 Average fraction of trust as a function of the initial fraction of trust in a population of
100 × 100 patches. A transition starts around 80%
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reputation and to reduce incident reporting translates into a smaller percentage of
initial mistrust in the model. As long as the percentage is below the transition point
to massive distrust (see Fig. 3.2), the mistrust will die out rather quickly, returning
the population to a high level of trust.
3.6 Maintaining Trust
Since it is very hard to recover from massive distrust, an anti-fragile organization
has to actively build and maintain its customers’ trust. This section first discusses the
Tylenol crisis in 1982 to illustrate that it is possible to avoid massive loss of trust,
even during very challenging situations. It then discusses specific approaches to build
and maintain a user population’s trust in an ICT system providing digital services,
especially an e-government platform delivering services to an entire nation.
The painkiller Tylenol provided about 15% of Johnson & Johnson’s corporate
profit during the first three quarters of 1982. Then somebody laced Tylenol capsules
with cyanide and killed seven people in the Chicago area. The company quickly
stopped Tylenol production and issued warnings to hospitals and distributors. It then
recalled about 30million Tylenol bottles from themarket and advertised in the media
to warn people not to use the product. Johnson& Johnson put public safety first, even
though the recall was very expensive. The company got much positive press for their
resolute handling of the crisis. While Johnson & Johnson’s share of the painkiller
market fell from around 35–8% after the killings, the company reintroduced the
product and rebounded in less than a year.
3.6.1 Prepare Alternative Services
Whether or not an ICT system is implemented in the cloud, there is always a possi-
bility of a rare, catastrophic incident taking down the system and all its services for a
long time. If there are no alternatives to the services offered by an organization, then
a long simultaneous failure of all services is intolerable to the organization, because
mistrust (followed by distrust) will spread among users, resulting in demands for
technical changes and even financial compensation. Consequently, it is a good idea
to have alternative solutions to the most important services to reduce the possibility
of mistrust and distrust spreading in the user population. A government could for
example run its services in a cloud and use another cloud in an emergency. Alter-
native services should run continuously. If services lie dormant much of the time,
there is a significant chance they will not work when needed. For example, it is not
uncommon for emergency power systems to not work because they have not been
tested for a long time.
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According to Geer [31], it is important to retain pre-Internet systems because they
have few external dependencies and avoid commonmode failureswith Internet-based
systems. The dismantling of old systems and procedures that have worked well for
decades may have serious unintended consequences. National institutions that no
longer accept communication on paper exclude a small but significant percentage
of the population. Furthermore, states relying solely on electronic voting cannot
fall back on traditional paper voting should the electronic voting solutions fail due
to technical problems or targeted attacks. Finally, citizens and first responders in
countries dismantling their fixed-line phone systems cannot communicate when the
mobile phone systems are down.Much of the costs companies and governments save
by eliminating redundant systems may be lost when swan incidents take down their
remaining unique systems. While it makes sense to eliminate a redundant system in
the short run, it can turn out to be a very bad decision in the long run.
3.6.2 Make Digital Services Voluntary
It may be tempting for an organization, especially a government, to “force” individ-
uals to use its digital services. A government can even create a legal obligation to use
e-government services to ensure large resource savings. However, the mandatory use
of digital services is likely to create mistrust or even distrust because users have little
or no control over an organization’s actions. Furthermore, some individuals lack the
computer skills needed to use the services and others have disabilities forcing them
to depend on the help from others. Consequently, it should be possible to opt out of
any service without undue difficulty to avoid mistrust and distrust among individ-
uals. In summary, an obligation to use a system leads to mistrust or even distrust,
while voluntary use ensures that nearly all new users will trust the system because
without trust they will not use it. Since a high fraction of initial trust makes it easier
to maintain the necessary trust over time, voluntary use is better than mandatory use.
3.6.3 Build a Good Track Record
It is counterproductive for an organization to ignore or hide the fact that events with a
negative impact are inevitable in ICT systems of high complexity. It is a particularly
bad policy to rely on spin control after incidents have occurred. An organization
should, instead, gain trust by creating a good track record from the start of a new
service. The dissemination of practical information to users via theWeb and the press
is a way to build trust.
An organization must demonstrate competence and quickly fix problems when
a large incident occurs. If the organization has a good track record, then users are
quite forgiving when they are convinced that an incident was caused by a technical
problem [42]. Since the loss of trust can be huge when users suspect malicious
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intent, an organization must clarify its intentions, especially how it will use and
not use personal information, to prevent the rapid deterioration of trust during an
incident.
3.7 Discussion and Summary
To build and maintain an anti-fragile ICT system, it is not enough to use the right
system design and the best information technologies; it is also necessary to create an
organization that learns from mistakes, values openness, and understands the impor-
tance of building andmaintaining trust relationships with its customers. If the overall
level of trust is high and a system failure is due to an understandable human error or
a technical glitch, then customers forgive readily, assuming the organization is open
about the cause of the failure and shows competence when rectifying the mistake.
An organization that downplays incidents, stonewalls journalists, attacks indepen-
dent commentators and security experts, and displays arrogance toward its customers
risks creating massive distrust in the user population. This chapter illustrates that the
organization may be unable to recover from such a position, even if it spends large
amounts of resources trying to rebuild trust.
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While it is impossible to predict all potential swan events that can severely impact
complex information and communications technology (ICT) systems, we know the
general reasons for extreme global behavior: single points of failure such as shared
resources, local failures initiating systemic failures due to chain reactions, scal-
ing effects, and cascading failures between system layers and different systems
[35, Chap.4]. Because the removal of single points of failure is a well-understood
problem [47], this chapter first introduces four design principles that together iso-
late local failures before they propagate and cause systemic failures. It then presents
one operational principle to quickly remove exploitable vulnerabilities. Finally, the
chapter discusses how a systemic failure can occur in a complex adaptive system even
when no parts fail, as well as the need to build models to understand such extreme
global behavior.
The current chapter defines and illustrates five principles needed to design and
operate anti-fragile ICT systems, while the following chapters discuss how these
principles can be implemented in different types of complex ICT systems. The prin-
ciples are rooted in the analysis in Chap.2, showing the need to isolate local failures
and use natural and induced failures to learn about vulnerabilities. The reader may
recognize some of the principles as software patterns described in books on software
design [35, 48]. Here, we use the term principle rather than pattern to emphasize
that these ideas or concepts can be found in many research fields, not only software
design [3, 4, 19, 35, 48, 49, 50].
4.1 Modularity
A complex adaptive ICT system with tightly interconnected units tends to exhibit
surprising and undesirable global behavior due to the many non-linear interactions
between the units [5, 6]. A local failure due to an internal error in a unit or abnormal
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Fig. 4.1 Because a system
of tightly interconnected
units facilitates systemic
failures, we need a system of
modules with weak links
(dashed lines) that break
when modules experience
local failures
interactions between several units could cause problems for other units and eventually
take down the whole system. The first step to avoid propagating local failures in
networked computer systems is to modularize the systems at both the hardware and
software levels [1, 3, 4]. Conceptually, we represent the modules of a system by
nodes in a hierarchical system graph (Figure4.1 illustrates one level of the graph),
where each module is a subgraph of tightly cohesive units.
We use the expressions strong connection and weak connection to describe the
varying levels of dependence between system modules. The terms dependency and
connection are used in much the same way in this book. A module A is strongly
connected with (or strongly dependent on) a module B if A’s functionality is badly
affected when B misbehaves or fails. The moduleA is weakly connected (or weakly
dependent) if A’s important functionality is preserved when B malfunctions or ter-
minates. When modules are weakly connected, a change to a module should not
necessitate changes to any other module. The modules must have well-defined inter-
faces and these interfaces must be the only way modules can interact with each
other. In particular, the internal state of a module must not be directly accessible to
another module, but only made available via an interaction mechanism that commu-
nicates state information. A communication protocol is an important example of an
interaction mechanism.
The system graphs in Fig. 4.1 illustrate the transition from a system of tightly
interconnected units to a system ofweakly connectedmodules. The units constituting
a module depend on the system level being studied. If we study a complete software
solution consisting of a set of well-defined software services, then a module is a
service and a unit is a collection of subroutines. In a distributed hardware system,
for example, a collection of network routers, a printed circuit board is a unit, while a
module is a collection of boards that constitute a cohesive part of a hardware device.
If we study interconnected systems, then a module is a whole system.
It is important to understand the difference between strong andweak dependencies
in modular systems. Strong dependencies were actually first defined in Sect. 2.7,
although the definition did not explicitly introduce the concept of strength. The
same section stated that the impact of recurrent incidents in a modular system can
be mitigated by introducing additional strong dependencies between the modules.
Unfortunately, we may introduce new positive feedback loops at the same time, thus
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increasing the probability of extreme global behavior in the form of nonrecurrent
swan incidents. The next section outlines how to avoid swans by limiting the strength
of dependencies in modular systems.
4.2 Weak Links
When the functionality of a moduleA at some system level depends on the function-
ality of another module B, there is a directed link from A to B in the system graph
to represent this dependency. In Fig. 4.1, each directed link signifies the relation
depends on. Different dependencies have varying strengths [5]. We can measure the
strength of a dependency by determining the damage a misbehaving module causes
in the dependent module.
The next step to prevent local failures from propagating is to ensure that the
incoming links to a misbehaving module break in such a way that there is little
or no damage to the dependent modules. These so-called weak links [49] enhance
robustness to propagating failures by restricting damage to a single module. The
weak links are represented by dashed lines in Fig. 4.1.
A weak link can be compared to a circuit breaker that protects an electrical sys-
tem against excessive current. The circuit breaker is an automatic electrical switch
designed to detect a fault condition and interrupt current flow. Unlike a fuse, which
operates once and then must be replaced, a circuit breaker can be reset to resume
normal operation. We are interested in weak links that can restore themselves after
they break. Chapter5 studies how to implement weak links with default fallback
responses.
It is necessary to determine the dependencies between modules at different levels
of a system [2]. Modules are weakly connected when they have weak links. If the
hierarchical system graph of weakly connected modules (see Fig. 4.1) is sparse and
of limited size, then the remaining fragility can be analyzed. A dense and large
graph of strong dependencies signals intolerable fragility because it becomes hard
to determine the cause(s) of an incident and, therefore, countermeasures to avoid
similar incidents in the future [4].
4.3 Redundancy
According to Taleb [10], redundancy is an inherent property of anti-fragile systems.
They do not make “efficiency” their primary goal. Since the goal of anti-fragile
systems is to thrive in randomness, the systems contain “inefficiencies” through lay-
ered redundancies. Computer systems enhance their robustness to module failures by
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Fig. 4.2 Transition from a lean system to a redundant system and then to a system with both
redundancy and diversity
deploying multiple copies of modules at the software and hardware levels. Figure4.2
illustrates the transition from a lean system to a redundant system. The redundancy
is obtained by introducing extra copies of each module.
Two examples illustrate the redundancy principle. First, when a virtual machine
fails in a cloud-based system, an identical instance is started automatically. Second,
a critically important system should have at least one secondary backup system that
runs in parallel with the primary system to ensure a safe fallback. Leading up to the
next principle, we note that the secondary system should differ from the primary
system to avoid both failing for the same reasons.
4.4 Diversity
A modular system has diversity [50] when it contains differently designed or imple-
mentedmoduleswith (nearly) the same functionality. Figure4.2 depicts the transition
from a redundant system to a system that is both redundant and diverse. Diversity
makes it less likely that many modules will fail at the same time. Only a diverse
system is highly robust to propagating failures; single modules remain fragile. Fail-
ures of fragile modules are warning signals of impending systemic instability. If a
computer system is a “monoculture,” where all computing devices are based on the
same hardware or run the same software [28, 29], then it is highly fragile, because
a local failure can propagate very easily. This is particularly true for infectious mal-
ware that can easily spread to many modules in a large software monoculture. The
use of software diversity to halt malware spreading is discussed in Part III.
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Fig. 4.3 How to use the fail fast principle in an ICT system
4.5 Fail Fast
To create complex adaptive systems that are anti-fragile to classes of negative events,
it is necessary to learn from problems and downright failures in the systems because
it is effectively impossible to predict all future incidents with a large negative impact.
Hence, a system should fail early when the impact is small and stakeholders should
learn from these incidents how to adapt the system to limit the impact of future
incidents.
When the four design principles of modularity, weak links, redundancy, and diver-
sity are used to avoid failure propagation, we can induce local failures (with only a
tiny probability of systemic failure) to detect vulnerabilities early and quickly learn
how to improve the ability to prevent propagating failures. The flow diagram in
Fig. 4.3 illustrates how the fail fast principle can be used in a system. Netflix pio-
neered the depicted technique in its cloud-based subscription service for films and
TV series (http://techblog.netflix.com). Chapter5 will discuss Netflix’s realizations
of the operational fail fast principle and the four outlined design principles.
4.6 Systemic Failure Without Failed Modules
A local failure can propagate over a system and cause a systemic failure. Although
there is a strong tendency to assume that a local failure is a well-defined event occur-
ring inside a single module, this is not necessarily true for complex adaptive systems.
Awell-functioning technical systemwith normally behaving stakeholders could drift
into a systemic failure in the form of a swan event without any well-defined initial
40 4 Principles Ensuring Anti-fragility
Fig. 4.4 A module in a complex adaptive system viewed as a black box with multiple inputs from
other modules and a single output connected to yet other modules
module failure. Swans are often caused by internal and external changes that affect
the global pattern of interactions between the modules, between the stakeholders,
and between the stakeholders and modules. The changes all seem reasonable when
studied in isolation. It is only the combination of the changes that causes a systemic
failure [18].
To better understand how a systemic failure can occur without anymodule failure,
we consider amodule as a black boxwithmultiple input links and a single output link
(see Fig. 4.4). A module receives inputs from other modules and generates an output
that becomes input to yet other modules. A module is designed to generate particular
output values from combinations of specified input values. If a module receives an
unknown or a partial combination of inputs that it was not designed to handle, it can
produce an extreme output value.When the extreme output becomes input to another
module, it can result in another extreme output. Hence, an unusual combination of
inputs to a module can cause more and more modules to generate extreme outputs,
leading to a systemic failure. This rare and extreme global behavior occurs despite
all modules correctly executing their designed input–output transformations, that is,
there are no module failures per se.
The reader should note that incomplete or extreme input combinations to mod-
ules could occur due to random noise or temporary faults in the communication
links. These transient failures can be hard to recreate and may even be completely
overlooked during an investigation to determine why a system misbehaved. This
is particularly true when multiple transient errors combine to create incomplete or
extreme input combinations.
Since classical risk analysis is based on the notion that a large failure is caused
by a chain of smaller events initiated by a well-defined starting event, the analysis
may not predict the above systemic failure. The classical approach to risk analysis
based on simple, or linear, cause and effect thinking only works satisfactorily when
the system’s parts are weakly connected with limited interaction. Complex adaptive
systems are often strongly connected with a great deal of interaction. To understand
the risks associated with complex systems, analysts must avoid thinking that restricts
failures to simple chains of events, because this approach ignores potential swans
and thus seriously underestimates the total risk taken by stakeholders [18].
The earlier stated principle of weak links is critical to avoid failure propagation
that is not initiated by a local failure in a single module but caused by an unusual
combination of inputs to one or more modules leading to extreme global behavior.
Consider a system monitoring its modules to break the output links, perhaps after
4.6 Systemic Failure Without Failed Modules 41
some delay, when the modules produce extreme output. The modules exist in a
(logical) hierarchy, where each module belongs to a particular level. A given module
may receive inputs from several modules at a lower level. Even if each of the lower-
level modules generates normal output, the combination of values taken as input
to the upper-level module may still cause this module to generate extreme output.
However, since the module is monitored and stopped when it generates extreme
output, a systemic failure is, most likely, avoided.
4.7 The Need for Models
While it is quite easy to understand the descriptions of the five principles, it is hard
to determine how to realize them in complex adaptive ICT systems to achieve anti-
fragility to a particular type of impact. Paraphrasing Yaneer Bar-Yam [51], we argue
that it is necessary to create system models, especially during the design phase, to
ensure anti-fragility.
The beginning of Chap.1 discussed the complexity of an ICT system consisting
of a large networked computer system and many stakeholders (see Fig. 1.1). The
complexity is due to the numerous interactions between the stakeholders and the
computer system, the large amounts of communications between the networked
subsystems, and the influence of changing security and privacy policies, as well
as threats such as equipment failure, extreme weather, and sabotage. An alternative
to this communication view of complexity is the behavioral complexity obtained
by viewing a complete ICT system as a black box and then studying the minimum
amount of information, measured in bits, needed to describe all possible input-output
relations.
Let us consider an ICT system with Nin input values and Nout output values.
The values can be in the form of vector or scalar values. We need a minimum of
A = log2 Nout bits to represent an output because all the 2A outputs must have
unique descriptions. Similarly, we need I = log2 Nin bits to uniquely label an input.
The labels allow us to order the inputs. Assume that we have an ordered list of 2I
entries, where the first entry contains the output corresponding to the first input, the
second entry contains the output corresponding to the second input, and so on. Since
we need A bits to specify an output, the total number of bits needed to completely
describe all input–output relations is 2I · A. This expression measures the behavioral
complexity of an ICT system.
The idea of classical software development is to build a system that realizes a
set of well-defined input–output relations. Before the system goes into production, it
must be tested. A complex adaptive ICT systemwith huge numbers of computational
devices and users has a huge number of possible inputs. If, for example, I = 200
bits, then the complexity is greater than 2200 ≈ 1060 bits, which is an enormous
number.
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Since it is clearly impossible to exhaustively test all inputs, theory is essential to
understand how to realize the five principles in complex adaptive systems.Models are
especially useful because they characterize global emergent behaviorswithout having
to test all possible inputs. For systems without adequate models, the limitations of
testing lead to significant uncertainty about the systems’ global behaviors, especially
their fragility to swans. While models help reduce the risk to stakeholders, complex
adaptive systems will always have hidden risks due to their highly non-linear and
time-varying relations between the inputs and outputs [7]. Hence, as first stated in
Sect. 2.5, there is no absolute guarantee that complex ICT systems are swan free.
In Chap.3, we built a model to understand how a user population’s trust in an
ICT system could change from pervasive trust to massive distrust. Because of the
great behavioral complexity, no effort was made to accurately model all aspects of
the trust relationship between users and system operators. Instead, we developed an
explanatory toy model. Although toy models cannot predict the detailed behavior of
systems, the models can be used to uncover fragility to particular types of impacts.
4.8 Discussion
The four design principles of modularity, weak links, redundancy, and diversity and
the fail fast operational principle are not new, since various descriptions can be
found in different research fields [3, 4, 19, 35, 48, 49, 50]. However, Taleb’s [8, 9,
10] conceptual foundation and the way the principles are melded in Part II outline a
novel strategy to design and operate anti-fragile ICT systems.
The reader may wonder if the five principles are sufficient to ensure anti-fragility
to any given class of impacts. At the time of this writing, in late 2015, the answer to
this question is not fully known. Most likely, the set of principles needed to design
and operate an anti-fragile system depends on the type of system and the class of
impacts considered. In Parts II and III, we argue that the five principles provide anti-
fragility to downtime and malware spreading. More work is required to determine
the need for additional principles. A short discussion of possible additional design
principles can be found in Chap.13.
Chapter3 argued that it is important to build trust between the owner and the users
of a system to avoid the formation of massive distrust in the user population after
an incident. It is of course possible to introduce an additional operational principle
highlighting the importance of building and maintaining trust. Since the rest of the
book concentrates on other aspects of anti-fragile systems, it does not contain an
explicit trust principle. However, the building of trust should permeate through all
work done to create and operate anti-fragile systems, because the loss of trust is an
inherent and general threat to all ICT systems that can cause user populations to
abandon systems altogether.
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What to learn from Part I
Part I modeled large ICT systems as complex adaptive systems and explained
that positive feedback loops cause extreme global behavior with an intolerable
impact. A complex system is fragile, robust, or anti-fragile to a particular class
of negative impacts. It is not enough to create a complex system that is robust
to a type of impact when the system is new. Because a complex system and
its environment change over time, a robust system becomes fragile. While risk
management methods can detect and mitigate many negative events, a complex
system has toomany interactions between its units andmodules for a risk analyst
to predict all incidents. It is particularly difficult for a group of stakeholders to
predict rare and large-impact incidents called gray swans. Even worse, black
swans may exist that are totally unpredictable to all stakeholders in the group.
It is necessary to build complex ICT systems that fail early when the impacts
are still small and to learn from the remaining small events how to maintain and
improve the systems. Four design principles, namely, modularity, weak links,
redundancy, and diversity, and one operational principle, fail fast, were intro-
duced to provide anti-fragility to different types of impact. The common goal
of the design principles is to prevent inevitable local failures from propagating
into global failures. The goal of the operational principle is to quickly determine
vulnerabilities and remove them before they can cause serious damage. Here,
a vulnerability can be a flaw in the design, a bug in the implementation, or a
mistake in the operation or management of a system.
Because there is no absolute guarantee that a systemic failure will never
occur, an owner or operator of a complex ICT system must build and maintain
a trust relationship with the customers, especially since it can be argued that
trust is fragile and distrust is robust. If a company allows distrust to grow, for
example, by relegating, ignoring, or attacking individuals pointing out system
weaknesses, then the company may not survive a failure, especially when it is
heavily reported in the press.
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To better understand how to achieve anti-fragility to downtime, the chapters of
Part II discuss how to realize the four design principles and the one operational prin-
ciple from Chap.4 in different types of systems. The current chapter focuses on how
to realize the principles in customer-facing web-scale solutions in the cloud. Much
of the discussion is based on design and operational patterns described by Nygard
[35] and Netflix’s realization of these patterns in its cloud-based streaming service.
YouTubevideos (http://youtube.com/watch?v=jCanhyFDopQ, https://youtube.com/
watch?v=dekV3Oq7pH8) document that the development teams at Netflix used the
principles described in Chap. 4 to build and operate an anti-fragile system.
5.1 Choice of System Realization
We initially consider the advantage of realizing aweb-scale solution in a public cloud
compared to a traditional private datacenter. For simplicity, we consider a generic
cloud infrastructure offering services to manage virtual machines, data storage, net-
working, and monitoring. The generic cloud platform is divided into regions, each
with multiple availability zones. The zones correspond to different datacenters. All
virtual machines run on commodity hardware. Failures happen routinely due to the
infrastructure’s huge number of servers, storage units, and network equipment [13,
14]. While a company or a government can build a private cloud infrastructure, it is
less expensive to use a public cloud, because its cost is divided among many cus-
tomers. The pay-as-you-go pricing model makes a public cloud especially attractive
to startup companies that want to compete with established companies having their
own infrastructures.
The architecture of a system models the major components and the important
relations between them [52]. Figure5.1a sketches the architecture of a web-scale
solution running in a private datacenter without cloud technologies. This server-side
application is said to be monolithic because it is built as one entity with a single
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 5.1 a Replicated monolithic application running on multiple servers in a private datacenter.
All application copies use the same database. b Identical application functionality realized by self-
contained services running on a cloud platform and storing data in databases replicated overmultiple
zones
executable [53, 54]. One or more load balancers (not shown) distribute requests
to replicated executables that run on multiple servers. All application copies use the
samedatabase. Figure5.1b sketches a service-oriented architecture (SOA)with layers
of self-contained services running on a cloud platform. Together, the services provide
the same functionality as the monolithic application. The services use individual
databases replicated inmultiple zones. Each service is scaled individually by running
multiple copies.
The availability of a web-scale solution is measured by the percentage of time
it is accessible to users. A high availability of 99.99%, referred to as four nines of
availability, corresponds to about 53min of downtime each year. A solution’s scala-
bility refers to the number of concurrent users who are having a positive experience
and its performance refers to the experience of individual users, often measured
by response time (latency) [14]. A customer-facing web-scale solution must have
high availability to avoid customer dissatisfaction, high scalability to support tens
of millions of customers, and good performance to quickly respond to the real-time
requests of each customer.
Monolithic (non-cloud) solutions with multiple load balancers and many servers
have good scalability up to a point, beyond which scalability becomes exceedingly
difficult. The strongly connected modules in the software layer and the high integra-
tion of subsystems in the hardware layer also ensure low-latency communication.
However, tight integration in both layers leads to propagating failures resulting in
insufficient availability. As we shall see, SOA in the cloud provides an efficient way
to leverage the redundancy and diversity needed to break the strong dependencies
in monolithic solutions. Furthermore, server virtualization on a massive hardware
platform supports almost unlimited (horizontal) scalability and the use of multiple
cloud regions facilitates low-latency service throughout the world.
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5.2 Modularity via Microservices
To achieve anti-fragility to downtime, it is not enough to move a monolithic solution
into a cloud. It is vital to build a cloud-native solution that takes full advantage of the
cloud’s properties [13, 14]. In particular, the choice of application architecture is vital
to achieve a high degree of anti-fragility to downtime. SOA introduces modularity
in the form of well-defined and self-contained services in the software layer. In the
hardware layer, the cloud supports modularity by having many availability zones and
by assigning multiple zones to each region, where the regions cover different parts
of the world.
Netflix’s streaming application is based on a fine-grained SOAwithmicroservices
running in theAmazonWebServices (AWS) cloud.Eachof themicroservices focuses
on doing one thing well. They are combined to provide the needed functionality. In
early 2014, theNetflix solution had roughly 600microservices running side by side in
each cloud region. The services are responsible for handling customer-facing requests
via a few edge services. The large geographical spread of AWS’s regions enables
Netflix to offer low-latency, high-throughput media streaming in many countries.
While there is no generally agreed upon definition of microservices, it is possible
to describe common properties [53, 54]. A microservice encapsulates a well-defined
functionality of value in a business context. The functionality fulfills a single pur-
pose. Amicroservice runs as a separate process with fast startup and shutdown times.
Services can be tested, upgraded, and replaced independently of each other. Finally, a
microservice manages its own data. Together, microservices separate the functional-
ity of a large application into highly independent chunks of code. They communicate
via a standardized set of simple protocols. The services can be written in different
languages and utilize different storage technologies. As we shall see, microservices
enhance fault tolerance, enable an application to scale, and allow a solution to evolve.
5.3 Weak Links via Circuit Breakers
Virtual machines running (micro-) services aremodules in the cloud’s software layer.
To stop and start the virtual machines without significantly degrading the user expe-
rience, they need to be autonomous and stateless. Application state must be stored
externally to the machines. If the application state is distributed over many storage
devices, then it is possible to upgrade these hardware devices without halting the
application.
Weak links are implemented using the circuit breaker pattern to ensure that the
services are weakly connected [35]. No service contacts another service directly;
instead, a service is called via a circuit breaker. The circuit breaker quickly detects
when a service develops a problemandopen s the circuit (breaks theweak link) to stop
the problem from propagating to other services and to provide calling services with
a default fallback response. The circuit closes after the problem is fixed. Because
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Fig. 5.2 State diagram for a
generic circuit breaker
the circuit breaker fails fast, it controls the failure mode, facilitating the graceful
degradation of a system’s functionality to limit the damage to users. Note that the
circuit breaker prevents any positive feedback loop from escalating a local failure
into a systemic failure.
Figure5.2 shows a state diagram of a generic circuit breaker. In the normal closed
state, the circuit breaker is closed and a calling service is allowed to connect to the
called service. If there is a failure, the circuit breaker records it. Once the number,
or frequency, of failures reaches a certain threshold, the circuit trips and opens the
circuit. When the circuit is open, all calls are stopped. After a certain time in the
open state, the circuit breaker moves to the half-open state, which allows the next
calling service to connect to the called service. If this trial call succeeds, then the
circuit breaker returns to the normal closed state. However, should the trial fail,
the circuit breaker returns to the open state until another timeout elapses. To learn
more about circuit breakers, the interested reader should study Netflix’s open source
implementation of the pattern (http://github.com/Netflix/Hystrix/wiki).
5.4 Redundancy Provided by the Cloud
The cloud supports redundancy at the virtual machine, zone, and region layers. At the
virtual machine layer, a web-scale solution runs redundant machines with timeout
and failover, as illustrated in Fig. 5.3.Multiple virtualmachines run the same (micro-)
service in a single availability zone. Figure5.3a depicts a service depending on one
of the redundant services. When the contacted redundant service times out, another
is queried. The arrows show the direction of the dependencies. Failure of an instance
is often due to power outage in the hosting rack, a disk failure, or a network partition
that cuts off access. When there is a software bug or network failure, all instances
are affected and a (non-personalized) default response is necessary to contain the
error. Careful analysis is needed to determine the appropriate response. Figure5.3b
illustrates the timeout with a default fallback response.
At the zone layer, failure in one zone should not affect the operation of other
zones.Multiple zones in a single region provide redundancy, as shown in Fig. 5.4. The
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5.3 a When a service instance times out, another instance is queried. b If all instances fail,
then there is a default response. The arrows show the direction of dependency
Fig. 5.4 Use of multiple
zones to isolate a zone failure
redundancy isolates the consequences of firmware failures, certain serious software
bugs, power failures, and severe network failures that take down a whole zone. A
web-scale solution should use multiple zones in each region. To compensate for a
failed zone, the solution could scale up the remaining zones or introduce a new zone.
Note that the load balancer is a single point of failure in Fig. 5.4.
A whole region could fail due to configuration issues, bugs in the infrastructure
code, bugs in the application code, and failures in the load balancer. A failed region
should not affect other regions. Figure5.5 depicts two regions, where a server for the
domain name system (DNS) splits the traffic load in two halves. A solution should
switch users to a new region when needed.
While the redundancy of executable code is important, the data replication
obtained by storing the same data on multiple storage devices is critical to achieve
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Fig. 5.5 Use of multiple
regions to isolate a region
failure
high availability. A cloud infrastructure with a highly redundant network and data
storage provides both high availability and extremely high durability, that is, only a
tiny probability of data loss. Netflix goes to great lengths to ensure the availability
and durability of its data. First, Netflix uses an Apache Cassandra database (http://
cassandra.apache.org) that stores data in three zones per region. Cassandra provides
NoSQL persistent data storage with eventual consistency [55]. It also supports asyn-
chronous cross-region replication.
Furthermore, Netflix stores backups in the Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3),
which is designed to provide 99.99% availability and 99.999999999% durability of
data objects over a given year, though there is no service-level agreement for dura-
bility. The S3 service redundantly stores data in multiple facilities and on multiple
devices within each facility. An application is first informed about successful stor-
age after the data are stored across all facilities (http://aws.amazon.com/s3/details).
Finally, Netflix copies data in S3 to a storage service run by another cloud provider.
5.5 Diversity Enabled by the Cloud
Two software programs are diverse if they have (nearly) the same functionality but
different designs or implementations, that is, different machine code [24, 56]. We
utilize software diversity to isolate failures by switching between diverse codes,
especially when introducing updated services.
Since a web-scale solution supports users throughout the world, there is no good
time to take down the whole system to upgrade its software. An alternative is to intro-
duce new code by keeping both old and new code running and switch user requests to
the new code. An early version of an updated service is called a canary, referring to a
canary in a coal mine. The stability of a canary cannot be fully evaluated before it is
exposed to a heavy traffic load in a production system. Figure5.6 illustrates a simple
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Fig. 5.6 A simple canary push
(a) (b)
Fig. 5.7 a Red–black push. b Fallback to the static version
canary push where a single instance of an updated service is put into production. If
a failure occurs, the system switches back to the old service.
It is possible to extend a simple canary push to include many instances of an
updated service. Figure5.7a illustrates a so-called red–black push where multiple
instances of an updated service are needed to carry the traffic load. Instances of the
old service are also running to ensure that the system handles peak load if there is a
problem with the new code. Note that the cloud facilitates this process because it is
easy to double the use of resources for a limited period, for example, a 24-h cycle.
Several versions of a service may contain a “time bomb” that only goes off after
a long period. There could be a software bug in both the red and black deployments
in Fig. 5.7a or there could be a problem with the data causing several versions of
the code to fail. As shown in Fig. 5.7b, it is possible to independently author a static
service with simple functionality that delivers a minimal solution when all recent
versions of the code fail.
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5.6 Fail Fast Using Software Tools
To protect and extend companies’ market share, web-scale solutions must support
rapid scaling and innovation. Since the rate, or frequency, of hardware failures
increases as more hardware is added and the rate of software failures increases
as the rate of change grows, frequent hardware and software failures are inevitable
in web-scale solutions. The engineers at Netflix do not wait for failures to happen.
Instead they use a collection of tools, called the Simian Army, to deliberately intro-
duce failures into their production system to quickly learn about vulnerabilities and
then make changes to ensure that the vulnerabilities do not cause systemic failures
(http://techblog.netflix.com/2011/07/netflix-simian-army.html).
The Chaos Monkey tool disables randomly selected virtual machines to make
sure the Netflix solution survives this common type of failure without any customer
impact. Latency Monkey introduces random latencies between services to simulate
network degradation and to ensure that services tolerate latency spikes and other
networking issues. The shutdown of a low-level dependency can lead to a longer
timeout at a higher layer, causing a cascading failure. Because there is no general
answer to this multi-level dependency problem, each case must be carefully studied.
Chaos Gorilla generates zone failures and Chaos Kong generates region failures to
test that the system survives such rare incidents with a huge impact.
Netflix’s preferred approach to failure detection supports Taleb’s [9] well-founded
claim that it is impossible to predict all rare incidents with a huge negative impact
in complex adaptive systems. Instead of trying to predict gray swans, Netflix simply
tests its system on a continuous basis to maintain isolation of local failures as the
system changes, especially to avoid propagating failures causing downtime. Netflix
engineers run the Simian Army tools during the business day to learn about vulner-
abilities in the system and to address any immediate problems. If appropriate, the
engineers build an automatic recovery mechanism to deal with a newly discovered
vulnerability, so that next time a failure occurs no user will notice.
Since silent failures inhibit learning, failures must be detected to prevent a system
from becoming increasingly fragile over time. It is necessary to monitor the system’s
behavior, especially behavioral changes due to system updates. Netflix has built a
telemetry system that monitors many different aspects of the system behavior. As an
example, a tool using telemetry data determineswhether a canary is doingwell. There
also exist monkeys to monitor the system, such as Security Monkey (http://techblog.
netflix.com/2014/06/announcing-security-monkey-aws-security.html) and Confor-
mity Monkey (http://techblog.netflix.com/2013/05/conformity-monkey-keeping-
your-cloud.html). This extensive monitoring allows Netflix to constantly adjust its
system to keep within the bounds of normal operation.
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5.7 Top–Down Design and Bottom–Up Tinkering
Before leaving Netflix, we consider the collective impact of the five principles.
The four design principles essentially prescribe a top–down (reductionist) design
approach breaking a new system down into modules and then adding weak links
between the modules, thus isolating the impact of local failures. Finally, redundancy
and diversity are added to further limit the impact of local failures.
A company C with a system of weakly connected modules that are constantly
monitored and tested according to the fail fast operational principle has a compet-
itive advantage over a company D with a system of strongly connected modules.
Company C can tinker with its system in a bottom–up manner without causing sys-
tem downtime due to the propagation of local failures. At Netflix, many engineering
teams constantly innovate their services without any central coordination of new
releases. The teams introduce new features and product enhancements rapidly and
frequently. It is hard for company D to maintain a similar high rate of innovation
because the many strong dependencies between the modules in their system require
the preparation of large coordinated software releases.
Together, the five principles facilitate local decisionmaking in highly independent
developer teams. These teams need not schedule common software releases as long
as they inform all affected teams about any increased use of computational resources
and changes to programming interfaces.
5.8 Discussion and Summary
Netflix’sweb-scale implementation of itsmedia streaming solutionwith anti-fragility
to downtime is evidence that the cloud facilitates the implementation of the design
principles of modularity, weak links, redundancy, and diversity and the fail fast oper-
ational principle presented in Chap. 4. The generality of the cloud-based realization
presented indicates that other large solutions can benefit fromNetflix’s approach. The
next chapters present more systems for which the cloud simplifies the creation of
anti-fragility to downtime. Part III shows that the principles also create anti-fragility
to malware spreading.
Although the cloud represents a golden opportunity to develop and operate anti-
fragile systems, it is not a panacea. A highly competent cloud provider must be
selected, preferably with cloud regions throughout the world. Since a major security
breach is unacceptable, it is particularly important that the cloud platform limit the
consequences of attacks. Finally, any anti-fragile application must be able to handle
a situation in which all datacenters in a region go down at the same time.
It is interesting to observe how the design and operational principles together
enable safe bottom–up tinkering without the central coordination of different
development teams. This advantage can accelerate innovation compared to more
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traditional software development methods requiring large coordinated software
releases.
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Chapter 6
Toward an Anti-fragile e-Government
System
Design is the process of defining a system’s components, interfaces, data formats, data
flows, and data storage solutions that together satisfy specified availability, perfor-
mance, and scalability requirements. Chapter 4 introduced four design principles—
modularity, weak links, redundancy, and diversity—and a single operational princi-
ple, fail fast, to achieve anti-fragility to a class of incidents. Chapter 5 showed how
Netflix implemented the five principles to implement a media streaming system with
anti-fragility to downtime. To investigate the generality of the five principles, the
following two chapters investigate the design of systems to determine how they can
be redesigned to achieve a degree of anti-fragility to downtime.
Here, we first study the Norwegian electronic government (e-government) system
Altinn as it appeared in 2012 to better understand why it is advantageous to base the
design of anti-fragile web-scale systems on fine-grained service-oriented architec-
tures (SOAs) in public clouds with scalable and distributed data storage. This study is
partly based on two analyses of Altinn commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of
Trade and Industry [57, 58]. Next, we consider the United Kingdom’s e-government
system to understand the need for user-focused and iterative development to support
both rapid change and high availability. Finally, we discuss whether a nation should
have a single e-government system running many services or multiple independent
and diverse systems running a few services each.
6.1 The Norwegian e-Government System
The Norwegian government has made a large and sustained effort to develop world-
leading e-government services for both citizens and companies [59]. Applications,
invoicing, appointments, and various types of reports are all handled electronically.
These digital services run on the Altinn platform. Sensitive personal information
such as tax data are sent over the Internet to personal computing devices, including
smartphones and tablets.
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Leading Norwegian politicians believe that most citizens prefer the new digital
services to the old paper-based services [60]. The Web will be the primary com-
munication channel between the Norwegian population and the public sector. While
it will still be possible for private citizens to call or visit public sector offices, the
government wants to minimize traditional person-to-person communications to free
up resources needed to bring more and better health care services to Norway’s aging
population [59, 60]. Hence, high availability is increasingly important to Altinn as
more services are added to the platform.
The 2012 version of the platform, denoted Altinn II, is depicted in Fig. 6.1a [57,
58]. A load balancer assigns requests to random servers that run user services. Note
that the load balancer is a single point of failure. As illustrated in Fig. 6.1b, each user
service is built on top of standardized components provided by the Altinn II platform.
Multiple user services utilize the same component. Each component is assigned to
a database. Altinn II allows government entities to develop and test their own user
services. Scaling takes place by adding more servers and databases.
Despite the Altinn organization’s best efforts, the platform’s availability has been
disappointingly low. The platform had to be taken offline for several days in 2011
and 2012 due to excessive network traffic when the Norwegian Tax Administration
published the yearly tax statements. The damage to user trust was particularly note-
worthy in 2012 because of the previous year’s downtime and becausemany taxpayers
were shown two individuals’ names and national ID (IDentity) numbers when they
tried to view their own tax statements. Due to some unknown failure, the names and
ID numbers were cached and transmitted by the load balancer in Fig. 6.1a. While
it can be argued that an ID number is not sensitive information, the national media
reported extensively on this “crisis” and a later survey showed that the Altinn organi-
zation lost significant trust among its users. The incidents confirm the need to build
and maintain trust, as discussed in Chap.3.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6.1 a Altinn II architecture. b Layers of components and user services
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The following analysis explains why the Altinn II platform must be redesigned
to achieve anti-fragility to downtime. First, since each component in Fig. 6.1b is
assigned a particular database, the speed at which a component can read or write data
is limited by the capacity of a single database. As the amount of users and services
increases, more processes will compete for access to each database because of the
fixed component–database assignments [57, 58]. This database bottleneck makes it
increasingly hard to scale the system by running more copies of the software on
additional hardware. After some years, the system must be redesigned to handle
more services and data.
Second, the Altinn II platform periodically runs batch jobs that lock up access
to the databases. There is evidence that as the amount of data increases, the batch
jobs will take longer to complete, further reducing the system’s performance. Finally,
Altinn II violates a fundamental tenet of SOA, namely, that user services should be
independent of each other. Since dependencies exist between different user services,
the failure of one service can negatively affect another. The dependencies also make
it hard to upgrade certain user services without taking down the whole system.
In conclusion, while the design of Altinn II is supposedly based on SOA, the real
design is database-centric with fragility to downtime due to the database bottleneck
and the strong dependencies between software modules. The single load balancer is
also problematic.A redesign based on the design principles ofmodularity,weak links,
redundancy, and diversity introduced in Chap.4 is needed to make the system robust
to downtime. The redesign should be carried out by teams experienced in developing,
operating, and maintaining web-scale systems, preferably using the development
and operations (DevOps) methodology [37, 38]. The teams need to choose highly
distributed and scalable data storage solutions to support additional user services
with very high availability requirements.
6.3 Better Testing
It is much more demanding to test a platform that supports many services of national
importance than to test a single enterprise application. The Altinn organization did
not have an adequate test environment and test procedures in 2012 [57, 58]. The
testing was inadequate in all phases of the development process and the ability to
rectify discovered errors was limited. While Altinn was responsible for testing the
components, the service owners were responsible for testing the services built on
top of the components. The testing tools available to the service owners were not
satisfactory. Because of insufficient testing, many bugs were not detected in the code
before it went into production. In addition, due to budgetary constraints, many known
defects in the production code were not rectified [57].
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DevOps teams creating a new solution must improve testing during development.
To learn from mistakes and achieve anti-fragility to downtime, the teams must also
realize the fail fast operational principle introduced in Chap.4.
6.4 Availability Requirements
A redesigned Altinn platform must satisfy well-defined availability, performance,
and scalability requirements [57, 58]. Since this part of the book is concerned with
anti-fragility to downtime, we only consider availability requirements. While the
following requirements are obvious consequences of the problems with the Altinn
II platform, they are valid for many types of platforms, including cloud computing
platforms, where stakeholders run their own services:
1. A failure in a (user) service must not affect other services.
2. It must be possible to upgrade a service without system downtime.
3. It must be possible to launch a new service without system downtime.
4. Failure in a component must only affect services that use the component.
5. Good development and testing tools must be available to all developers.
6.5 Fine-Grained SOA in a Public Cloud
Achieving high availability is increasingly difficult the more complex a system
becomes. Therefore, it is necessary to evolve a highly available web-scale solution,
such as an e-government platform with important services, from a smaller, highly
available system. Since no complex software system is perfect when first released,
updates are needed to satisfy the availability requirements. It is both easier and faster
to update the software when it is possible to change selected code modules without
having to prepare a major new software release with all the testing it entails. Not
all changes to a module lead to desired system behavior. Hence, weakly connected
modules, that is, weak links, are essential to limit the negative impact of unintended
behavior. Weak links let developers tinker with modules until the desired behavior
is achieved. Tinkering makes it easier and faster to make the right changes and to
avoid fragility to downtime at the same time.
The above discussion, aswell asNetflix’s experience discussed inChap. 5, demon-
strate that SOAwith well-defined and self-contained services is an appropriate archi-
tecture for achieving anti-fragility to downtime. Furthermore, itmakes sense to design
microservices with limited functionality because it is hard to create default fallback
responses for large services, each with much functionality [53, 54].
Since it is very expensive to acquire andmaintain the computing hardware needed
to support a web-scale solution, virtualization technology should be deployed to
achieve reasonable costs [13].Operating system-level virtualization supports a highly
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scalable system of many independent computing devices, making it possible to
allocate and use idle computing resources more efficiently than in a traditional dat-
acenter without virtualization technology. Rather than building and maintaining a
private cloud, a government should seriously consider using a public cloud because
its total cost is divided among many entities. We conclude the following:
• Toachieve anti-fragility to downtime, governments should base e-government plat-
forms and services on a fine-grained SOA in public clouds with highly redundant
and scalable data storage.
6.6 User-Focused and Iterative Development
The external Altinn evaluations [57, 58] indicate a need for more user-focused and
iterative development to adapt services to users’ needs and make the services easier
to use [37, 38]. The ability to quickly modify software is also important to mitigate
problems and achieve anti-fragility to downtime. In the United Kingdom, there is a
unit within the Cabinet Office, called the Government Digital Service (GDS), tasked
with transforming government digital services according to users’ needs (http://gds.
blog.gov.uk). TheGDSworkswith government departments to develop user services,
promotes open source development philosophies, and ensures that services are built
on open standards and application programming interfaces. The reader can findmore
information aboutGDS’s developmentmethodology in theDigital byDefault Service
Standard and its accompanying manual (http://gov.uk/service-manual).
The GDS utilizes the DevOps methodology to break down the traditional silos
of development, quality assurance, and operations. The goal is to foster an attitude
of shared ownership and collaboration, resulting in common working practices in
designing and operating a software solution (http://infoq.com/news/2015/03/gds-
uk-gov-devops). GDS has successfully moved the Web presence of all UK govern-
ment departments to gov.uk [61]. This Web platform publishes government infor-
mation and provides access to online services. To build e-government services that
citizens will use, the GDS has found that developers first need to thoroughly under-
stand the users’ needs. Rather than make assumptions, developers must analyze real
data from similar services and interview future users to determine their needs. To
maintain usability, developers need to revisit services and make alterations as users’
needs change over time.
Any service should be designed around the identified users’ needs. According to
the GDS, developers should start small and iterate often. Frequent iterations reduce
the probability of big failures and turn small failures into lessons. It is essential to
release prototype solutions early, test them with real users, and move from alpha to
beta releases while adding features and refinements based on user feedback.
Viewing e-government infrastructures as complex adaptive systemspartly explains
the GDS’s success with the DevOps methodology. Since it is very hard to predict the
long-term global behavior of complex systems, iterative and test-driven approaches
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are needed to ensure the sufficient availability, scalability, and performance of new
services. Experience with Altinn shows that insufficient testing leads to undetected
errors, causing trust-reducing incidents [57]. Even worse, shortcomings of the under-
lying platform architecture go undetected, making it increasingly difficult and costly
to satisfy the design requirements as the numbers of users and services grow.
6.7 Single Versus Multiple Systems
Should a nation have a single e-government platform running many services or mul-
tiple diverse and independent platforms running a few services each? The following
answer builds on arguments first presented in an earlier paper [34]. In all the cases
discussed, the services access sensitive personal information, including financial and
medical data.
6.7.1 Systems with Strongly Connected Modules
We first consider e-government systems with strongly connected modules. Each
system runs in a traditional datacenter without cloud technologies. We compare a
scenario in which a nation employs a single system providing many services with
a scenario in which the same nation uses multiple diverse systems providing a few
services each. As long as no swan events cause prolonged downtime, the single sys-
tem exploits economies of scale. Additionally, users enjoy a high degree of usability
because the single system lets them authenticate with numerous services using the
same authentication technique. Finally, a common user interface design for all ser-
vices further enhances usability and helps attract many users.
Deploying diverse e-government systems increases the overall burden of sys-
tem management. The user experience suffers because users must relate to multiple
authentication techniques and user interface designs. Consequently, the number of
citizens using the online services can decrease. Therefore, a single system is the
preferred scenario, barring any black or gray swans.
The situation changes radically when a swan occurs that leads to prolonged down-
time. Suddenly, the government is in trouble with millions of citizens, who all want
to knowwhat happened and what the government is going to do about the intolerable
situation. Because no alternative to the single system exists, it can take a long time
before financial and medical information becomes available again. The delay can
cause intolerable problems for all users dependent on the information. Therefore,
in a swan-prone world, multiple diverse e-government systems are significantly less
risky to major stakeholders than a single centralized system, as long as we com-
pare e-government systems with strongly connected modules that run in traditional
datacenters.
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The choice between building a single or multiple e-government systems with
strongly connected modules is essentially the choice between accepting rare,
catastrophic events and more frequent, less serious incidents. A nation should, there-
fore, employ a single strongly connected system only after a thorough and compre-
hensive risk analysis concludes that all major stakeholders can tolerate swans. If a
single system is the solution, the system owner can improve resistance to swans by
removing single points of failure and decreasing susceptibility to cascade failures.
However, it will be very expensive to obtain the system redundancy and diversity
needed to significantly reduce the probability of swans.
While the risk of swans ismitigatedbydeployingmultiple independent anddiverse
e-government systems running a few services each, it may also be necessary to
have two systems delivering the same critically important service. The experience of
the Norwegian Food Safety Authority demonstrates the advantage of an alternative
solution when a system goes down. The Authority provides a service on the Altinn
II platform to allow Norwegian fish exporters obtain export licenses. The Authority
produces export licenses for fish worth about 60 billion Norwegian kroner (NOK)
in a year. When Altinn went down for several days in 2012, the Authority used an
alternative service to produce export licenses, thus protecting the Norwegian fishing
industry from large financial losses.
6.7.2 Cloud-Based Systems of Weakly Connected Modules
The main advantage of the cloud is that an application owner can achieve the
redundancy and diversity of multiple independent implementations in traditional
datacenters without actually having to develop and maintain multiple diverse appli-
cations. Large public clouds, such asGoogleAppEngine,AmazonWebServices, and
Microsoft Azure, are highly geographically distributed infrastructures with regions
on different continents, each with multiple zones (datacenters). As demonstrated by
Netflix, a cloud-native solution that takes full advantage of a cloud’s services can
create a single application with very high uptime. Hence, there is much less need
to implement multiple independent and diverse versions of an application when it is
possible to make a cloud-native application.
While a single cloud platform provides the needed uptime for most services,
governmental e-voting services that allow citizens to vote over the Internet during
general elections may be an exception to the rule of using only one cloud platform.
Since there are indications that citizens are particularly sensitive to failures in vot-
ing systems, a government should have an independent voting alternative in case
a cloud-based e-voting service has a major outage. In Norway, citizens in certain
municipalities have been allowed to vote over the Internet for multiple weeks during
elections [7, 43]. The long voting period was selected to reduce the impact of shorter
outages because citizens could easily vote later. Furthermore, any citizen could cast a
paper vote on the traditional election day, invalidating any earlier cast e-vote. Hence,
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e-voting did not replace paper-based voting; it only provides an additional means of
voting.
To conclude, it is necessary to have multiple and diverse e-government platforms
running relatively few services each when each platform solution is strongly con-
nected and run in a traditional datacenter. When a cloud-native solution provides
the e-government services, one solution is enough, unless we are talking about very
critical e-government services such as e-voting for national elections. In this case,
the most critical services need to have independent backup solutions [43, 62]. The
reader should keep in mind that no solution can scale forever; scaling will eventually
introduce fragility to downtime because the inevitable increase in complexity will
introduce unforeseen and fragilizing dependencies [2].
6.8 Discussion and Summary
An information and communications technology (ICT) system’s mean time to repair
(MTTR) is the average time from when a failure occurs until it is repaired and the
mean time between failures (MTBF) is the average time between two consecutive
failures. While operators of traditional monolithic ICT systems typically try to min-
imize the MTTR or maximize the MTBF, this is both difficult and costly because
the strong dependencies between system modules facilitate local failure propagation
leading to expensive systemic failures. There is a need for a better way to build and
operate complex adaptive ICT systems with a degree of anti-fragility to downtime.
The increasing popularity of cloud computing and theDevOpsmethodology facil-
itate the realization of SOA with microservices that model software applications as
sets of independently deployable and scalable services with well-defined interfaces
[53, 54]. Circuit breakers remove much of the problem of cascading failures and
the use of microservices with limited functionality makes it possible to ensure the
graceful degradation of an application’s functionality. The limited functionality of
each service facilitates the development of automated fallback responses in the case
of local failures. When a local failure affects a service, other services depending on
this malfunctioning service receive a standardized response. This architectural style
also supports the development and management of services by multiple teams using
different programming languages; continuous deployment, enabling rapid innova-
tion; and highly redundant and scalable data storage, making data loss extremely
unlikely.
While traditional monolithic solutions struggle to achieve high availability, the
success of Netflix and other organizations such as Nike and the British newspaper
The Guardian show that SOAwithmicroservices is well suited to ICT infrastructures
requiring high availability. However, it is too early to conclude that this architectural
style is the future of huge enterprise and governmental solutions because serious
weaknesses may first emerge only after solutions have been in production for years.
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For now, we conclude that cloud-based solutions with SOA and microservices can
achieve anti-fragility to downtime. At the same time, it seems more difficult and
much more expensive to build monolithic applications outside the cloud with anti-
fragility to downtime.
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While Netflix has demonstrated how to apply the five design and operational prin-
ciples to develop and maintain anti-fragile software applications in the cloud, it is
less clear whether the cloud facilitates the creation of anti-fragile telecom systems,
because nobody has built such a system. Since we need to understand what makes a
system fragile to downtime before we can make it anti-fragile, this chapter initially
studies the properties of Norwegian telecom infrastructures resulting in fragility to
unplanned downtime.
We first introduce three general concepts causing fragility to downtime. Next, we
use the concepts to describe examples of Norwegian telecom systems’ past fragility
to downtime. Then, we create toymodels to determine indicators of fragility to future
downtime at different levels of the systems.While the models cannot predict extreme
global behaviors leading to downtime in the systems, they have enough explanatory
power to clarify existing vulnerabilities.
Armedwith an understanding of properties thatmake telecom infrastructures frag-
ile to downtime, we consider how to build and maintain anti-fragile telecom systems
with much of the functionality, but not all, implemented in the cloud.We first discuss
how the four design principles of modularity, weak links, redundancy, and diversity
make telecom infrastructures more robust to downtime, before discussing how the
fail fast operational principle makes the infrastructures anti-fragile to downtime.
As the complexity of a system increases, unintended dependencies occur and new
levels and patterns emerge, changing the global behavior in unpredictable ways [2].
In particular, new dependencies can create positive feedback loops, making extreme
global behaviormore likely. Hence, whenever possible, we should remove fragilizing
dependencies between modules rather than add new structures and functionality to
combat fragility to downtime. The chapter’s last part pays special attention to the
removal of strong dependencies.
Since a large effort, far beyond the scope of this book, is needed to ensure highly
anti-fragile infrastructures to all types of negative impacts, this chapter only points the
way toward anti-fragility to downtime. The question of how to use cloud computing in
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telecom systems is an active research area [63, 64]. Because there is no commercially
available cloud-based telecom solution, the current chapter is more speculative than
Chap.5 analyzing Netflix’s media streaming solution.
7.1 Anti-principles Causing Fragility to Downtime
To guide our search for fragility, we exploit so-called anti-principles describing how
not to design systems. While the existence of black swans make it impossible to pre-
cisely quantify a complex system’s degree of anti-fragility to a class of impacts, we
can easily detect when a system is fragile to a particular class using anti-principles [7,
10, 34]. The following three anti-principles outline how to create fragility to down-
time. The author discusses these anti-principles in an earlier paper [7]. The current
versions are slightly modified to emphasize downtime in telecom infrastructures.
Uniqueness A system is unique when its key services are not provided by another
system. A unique infrastructure with strong dependencies between modules and
little redundancy and diversity—the extreme case being a traditional monoculture
[28, 29]—is particularly fragile to downtime because local failures spread easily
and its many users cannot switch to an alternative infrastructure during an outage.
Connectedness A system is connected when its normal operation depends on the
normal operation of another system. If an infrastructure is connected to another
infrastructure, then the large overall complexity of the infrastructures causes
fragility to downtime.
Closed Asystem is closedwhen stakeholders donot share technical and legal infor-
mation. If only a small group of experts have deep knowledge of an infrastructure,
they have a tendency to develop similar mental models for how the infrastructure
works during discussions. This propensity toward groupthink is especially strong
when most group members belong to the same organizational culture. A uni-
form group cut off from external expertise with different perspectives overlooks
possible rare events causing downtime.
Similar to the design and operational principles discussed in Chap. 4, the reader
may recognize some of the anti-principles as anti-patterns described in the literature
on software design. Here, we use the term anti-principle rather than anti-pattern to
emphasize that these general concepts are also valid outside the area of software
design.
7.2 Past Fragility to Downtime
We apply the anti-principles to study past downtime incidents in Norwegian telecom
systems. The major stakeholders did not predict the coincidences that resulted in
the outages. Instead, the outages were analyzed by the stakeholders after the fact.
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Since knowing the impact of an incident influences how the incident is assessed,
it is necessary to be careful when stating the results of a study. Humans have a
tendency to concoct explanations for events after they have occurred, making them
seem less surprising and more predictable than they really were. This hindsight bias
misleads stakeholders into simplifying the causes of an accident, highlighting a single
element as the cause and potentially overlooking multiple contributing factors [6, 9,
17, 18, 36].
First, we consider the anti-principle of uniqueness. Mobile phone networks are
essentially unique infrastructures because the users of one network cannot generally
connect to another network when their network experiences problems. If an entire
network goes down, millions of mobile phones become useless as communication
devices. The largest mobile phone network in Norway went down for about 11h on
June 10, 2011 [65, 66]. The restart of a central node with upgraded software initiated
a signal storm that exceeded the network’s signalling capacity. The outage affected
nearly 3 million customers, or approximately 60% of all Norwegians. According to
top management, the incident was not supposed to happen because earlier restarts
of the same node had not caused any problems. The management’s surprise and the
rare, highly negative outcome of a common operation qualify the signal storm as a
black swan incident, at least to top management.
On June 17, 2011, parts of the same mobile phone network went down again due
to a new signal storm [67, 68]. According to the Norwegian Post and Telecommuni-
cations Authority (NPTA), both signal storms were caused by insufficiently under-
stood dependencies between central nodes in the network combined with insufficient
capacity to handle the increasing signal traffic from the many new smartphones. The
difficulty in pinpointing the causes of the extreme behavior became evident when,
more than a month later, careful technical analyses of the events finally revealed that
the signal storms were primarily due to a programming error and not insufficient
signal capacity to serve new smartphones [69]. However, the network owner also
discussed the need to change the system design and to increase the signal traffic
capacity.
The network owner’s difficulty in determining the causes of the downtime illus-
trates that the mobile phone network is indeed a complex adaptive system prone
to surprising global behavior. The NPTA publicly stated that the owner needed to
improve the network’s risk management. While better risk management can assess
and mitigate more incidents, perhaps providing longer periods of stable network
operation, large-impact incidents will still occur because the network has too many
dynamic interactions for humans to reliably foresee rare and extreme behavior. The
fundamental problem is not bad risk management but that the four design principles,
especially the principles of modularity and weak links, were not fully adhered to
when the system was created. Hence, a major outage affecting many customers was
bound to happen sooner or later due to the system’s uniqueness.
Second, we consider the anti-principle of connectedness. All mobile phone net-
works in Norway are connected to the national power grid. The normal operation of
each network depends on a nearly continuous supply of electricity. In late Decem-
ber 2011, the networks went down in a large area of Norway when a storm with
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hurricane-force winds damaged many power lines, leaving more than 700 base sta-
tions belonging to the different networkswithout electrical power [70].While the base
stations had backup batteries, most lasted a maximum of only four hours. Because
landline phone and fixed Internet access were also disrupted in the same area, most
people were without communication capabilities following the storm. Although both
the power and phone companies worked hard to repair the extensive damage, it took
more than a week to restore services to all customers. The problem in 2011 was
that the telecom systems were too dependent on the power grid, that is, the telecom
system and the power grid were strongly connected systems.
Third, we consider the anti-principle of being closed. The telecom networks’
strong dependence on the nearly continuous delivery of electrical power came as
a surprise to leading Norwegian politicians. Their initial response was to severely
criticize the mobile phone companies. According to the NPTA’s director general, the
people of Norway had come to depend more on the mobile phone systems than the
agency had realized before the storm. The fact that both leading politicians and the
NPTAwere surprised indicates that the consequences of the telecom systems’ strong
dependencies on the power grid were not fully understood. It is reasonable to suspect
that this surprise was due to insufficient information sharing between the network
owners and the NPTA, obscuring the fragility to downtime.
The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection reports that Norway’s largest
network owner does not provide major stakeholders, including the Directorate itself,
with enough information about changes in the telecom infrastructure [71]. It seems
that the ownermakesmajor changes to its infrastructure without informing important
stakeholders such as the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, the National Air
Navigation service, or the police. Therefore, it has been hard for these institutions to
determine the level of exposure they face by using the telecom infrastructure. More
publicly available information is needed to discuss and understand the real dangers
associated with the use of the telecom infrastructures.
The discussed incidents show that the Norwegian telecom systems were fragile
to downtime in 2011 due to the anti-principles of uniqueness, connectedness, and,
most likely, being closed.
7.3 Indicators of Fragility to Future Downtime
We now turn our attention to properties of telecom infrastructures that indicate
fragility to future outages. First, consider the building blocks of the single generic
telecom infrastructure in Fig. 7.1 [72]. While the model is quite coarse, it is adequate
for our purpose. The model contains one transport network and multiple access
networks [71]. The transport network is the backbone of the telecom infrastructure
and moves data over long distances. The access networks give users access to the
infrastructure. Some of the access networks consist of one or a few base stations,
serving wireless terminals in the vicinity, while others consist of local broadband
networks, connecting, for example, homes and offices.
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Fig. 7.1 Hierarchy of networks and systems in a generic telecom infrastructure
Entities owning and operating a transport network and/or access networks are
called operators. These operators each have a technical information and administra-
tive system consisting of three smaller systems. Together with the transport network,
the three systems constitute the network core. The operations support system (OSS)
in Fig. 7.1 configures and provisions the core network nodes. Factors impacting the
configuration are the number of subscribers, peak hour call rates, the nature of the
services, and geographical preferences. The OSS system also collects network sta-
tistics, monitors alarms, and logs various actions of network nodes. The subscriber
database contains information on all customers and the charging system calculates
the costs chargeable to the customers. Because the subsystems in the network core are
needed to set up and take down all user communications, we arrive at the following
conclusion:
• A unique technical information and administrative system in the network core
indicates fragility to future downtime.
From Sect. 2.7, a system X depends on a system Y if a failure in Y negatively
affects the functionality ofX . The details of the dependencies between different tele-
com infrastructures are generally unknown to analysts without close ties to operators,
but themain dependencies between access and transport operators are usually known.
Figure7.2 depicts publicly known dependencies between Norwegian operators early
in 2014 [72]. The arrows show the direction of these high-level dependencies.
Two systems are interdependent when each is dependent on the other. There
are interdependencies between the three transport operators in Fig. 7.2. Dependent
and interdependent infrastructures allow cascading failures to pass infrastructure
boundaries [6]. Figure7.2 illustrates that it is important to prevent a failure in a single
infrastructure from spreading to other infrastructures. Furthermore, since most of the
dependency paths in the figure end up in the transport network of the largest operator
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Fig. 7.2 Access and transport operators in Norway. The arrows show the dependencies between
the operators. There are interdependencies between the transport operators
(Telenor), fragility to downtime in this transport network is especially serious. If
the transport network has an outage, then the outage will spread to nearly all other
infrastructures. We therefore note the following:
• A unique transport network connecting multiple operators signals fragility to
downtime.
To illustrate the fragility of transport networks, we consider the transport network
ofNorway’s largest operator.While the network’s full topology is not publicly known,
it includes “self-healing” rings. Figure7.3 shows a particularly simple ring with two
transmission paths between network nodes. If there is a break in one line, the other
line may still be available, providing the second is not in close proximity to the first
and also damaged. For best protection against failure, different physical routes are
used for the two lines. All data are transmitted on the working or active line, while
the protection line is on standby. When the active line fails, the two network nodes
affected immediately switch to the protection line.
Even a self-healing ring fails, however. OnMay 23, 2011, both transmission lines
of a ring in the largest operator’s transmission network failed [73]. Due to roadwork,
one line was temporarily moved aboveground by installing a temporary cable. An
excavator broke this cable by accident. About seven minutes later, a falling tree cut
the other line somewhere else in the country, causing an outage affecting mobile
phone customers in large parts of Norway for about three and a half hours. Air traffic
Fig. 7.3 Conceptual
self-healing ring
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was also affected because a regional flight control center lost its phone connections.
The incident shows that having only two cables transporting the major part of the
telecom traffic between different geographical parts of a country is unsafe, especially
when both cables are aboveground.
7.4 Robust Access Networks
Using the above understanding of fragility to downtime in telecom infrastructures,we
now consider how to make future infrastructures robust to downtime. The expected
seamless integration of Wi-Fi and mobile network technologies and the emerg-
ing Internet of Things will lead to a massive increase in the number of mobile
and stationary devices connecting wirelessly to telecom networks. Many believe
that machine-to-machine communications supporting smart grids, smart homes and
cities, and electronic health will be particularly important. All the new devices and
new data-hungry services will lead to a huge increase in wireless data traffic. Exam-
ples of devices are notebooks,mobile phones, tablets, televisions, kitchen appliances,
smartwatches, 3D glasses, drones, robots, sensors, and actuators, while examples
of services involve high-definition video available anywhere, continuous real-time
interactions between individuals, and medical sensors monitoring people’s health.
To fulfill future communication needs in a power- and frequency-efficient manner,
the deployment of multiple layers of radio coverage is most likely necessary where
traditional macrocell towers provide a blanket of coverage while, under the blanket,
thousands of small cells provide high data rates in areas such as malls, airports,
arenas, public plazas, urban parks, and business districts [63]. Because most devices
will be close to base stations, it is possible to provide high data rates while keeping
the signal power low. The use of small low-power cells enables the increased reuse of
frequencies across cells. Today’s national telecom infrastructure with many access
networks already has thousands of expensive base stations. In fact, the base stations
constitute a large percentage of the total cost of current telecom networks. One
attractive possibility to limit the costs of even more base stations is to move much of
the stations’ functionality to the cloud.
High-speed links between the base stations and the cloud are needed to satisfy the
stringent delay requirements enabling radio signal processing in the cloud. Data from
multiple base stations can be used to alleviate the increased multi-cell interference
due to reduced cell size by dynamically adjusting the radio signaling according to
channel conditions. To further limit processing delays, use of a highly distributed
cloud architecturewith local access network clouds is possible, as depicted in Fig. 7.4,
where each access network cloud consists of a cluster of commodity and special-
purpose hardware. Hence, the access networks will become much more intelligent
than they are today.
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Fig. 7.4 Possible architecture of cloud-based telecom infrastructure
Flexibility in howmuch processing is done in the access network clouds is needed
to support varying types of services and link delays. The upper layers of the base
stations’ radio protocol stack can most easily be moved to the cloud, such as admis-
sion/congestion control and radio resource management algorithms. If low-delay
links are available, then lower-layer functions, for example, parts of the physical and
medium access control layers, can also be moved to the cloud [63, 64].
By moving most of the base stations’ functionality from the cell sites to access
network clouds, a provider no longer needs to build enough processing capacity into
every base station to handle peak traffic conditions [63, 64]. Instead, the provider
can allocate processing resources to the parts of the access networks where they are
most needed at any given time. For example, in the evening hours, the processing
resources can be adjusted according to shifting service demands as phone users move
from a city’s business district and to its suburbs.
When there are low-delay links between the base stations and the clouds, each base
station is reduced to a radio and an antenna array. While today’s access networks
are costly and time-consuming to upgrade, future generations of access networks
would simply be software upgrades in the cloud. Using the four design principles
of modules, weak links, redundancy, and diversity together with the implementation
ideas introduced by Netflix, it is possible to develop cloud-based implementations of
base station functionality that are robust to downtime. Cloud implementations will
isolate local failures to break any positive feedback loops, as discussed in Chap.5.
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7.5 Robust Network Core
There are at least threeways tomake a network core (see Fig. 7.1) robust to unplanned
downtime. First, telecom operators should realize the functionality of nodes in the
network core in a transport network cloud, as shown in Fig. 7.4. Again, the design
principles of modules, weak links, redundancy, and diversity make it possible to
isolate local failures. Furthermore, cloud implementation allows operators to upgrade
software without taking down and restarting nodes. This advantage is important,
since it takes a long time to restart central nodes in today’s systems. The cloud also
increases the programmability and controllability of the network core because good
development and monitoring tools exist for the cloud. Operators may use a private
cloud to control its hardware layer. To reduce costs, several operators could share a
community cloud infrastructure.
Second, to reduce the chance of a major outage, operators should improve the
redundancy of the transmission paths in their transport networks. A risk analysis
[74] from 2012 of the largest transport network in Norway recommends additional
redundant paths to avoid incidents similar to the outage of May 23, 2011, described
at the end of Sect. 7.3.
Third, to make it harder for local failures to spread, operators could deploy equip-
ment from different vendors to increase the hardware and software diversity of the
nodes in the network core [72]. However, the advantage of added vendor diver-
sity must be weighed against the extra resources needed to operate and maintain a
diverse system. In particular, the use of equipment from different vendors could lead
to compatibility issues.
7.6 Reduced Dependency on the Power Grid
TheDecember storm discussed in the second half of Sect. 7.2 revealed theNorwegian
telecom infrastructures’ strong dependence on the national power grid [70]. Strong
winds damaged many power lines, causing more than 700 base stations to go down
after their backup batteries were quickly depleted. To reduce the dependency on
a nearly continuous supply of electricity, the NPTA required network operators to
improve their backup power solutions to ensure that the 1,000 base stations covering
the most critical areas of Norway have backup power for at least 72h [70]. All other
base stations were required to have at least six hours of backup power. In addition,
the operators were told to prepare more resources and develop better contingency
plans to enable local crews to quickly repair damaged power lines and base stations.
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7.7 Reduced Dependency on One Infrastructure
In general, a unique complex system should not implement a service of critical
national importance when the impact of a black or gray swan is intolerable [7].
The impact of extreme global behavior is reduced by realizing a critically important
service using two different systems. It is vital that a failure in one system does not
cause a failure in the other. It is not sufficient to deploy two identical systems because
they obviously have common vulnerabilities; the systems must have diverse designs
or implementations. Of course, simultaneously targeted attacks can still bring down
both systems, but diversity is likely to make such attacks costly and difficult to
successfully carry out.
After the 2011 outages discussed earlier, customers wondered why they were not
switched to another networkwhen their homenetworkwent down.The simple answer
is that none of the networks had the capacity to service a huge number of additional
users. The network infrastructure needed large and expensive changes to facilitate
such a switch. However, it is economically viable to give a limited group of people
with important responsibilities during a crisis access to several operators’ networks,
either by giving them phones with multiple subscriber identity module (SIM) cards
or by adding functionality to switch the group members between networks.
To further reduce the impact of outages in commercial telecom networks, emer-
gency services in Norway have their own telecom network, called the Norwegian
Public Safety Network. This network covers all populated areas of Norway. While
current commercial networks are based on the same technology (LTE), the emer-
gency network is based on another technology (TETRA), especially developed for
emergency communication. None of its roughly 2,000 base stations have less than
eight hours of backup power and 15% of the stations have 48h worth (http://dinkom.
no/en). The emergency network only supports low-speed data communication.
7.8 Anti-fragility to Downtime
While implementations of the four design principles make cloud-based telecom
infrastructures robust to downtime, the operational principle must be implemented
to make the systems anti-fragile to downtime, that is, robustness must be maintained
over time by learning from small incidents.
The stakeholders of telecom infrastructures may balk at the idea of deliberately
introducing failures to quickly detect vulnerabilities. Granted, it may be a bad idea
to induce failures in today’s infrastructures. However, if a telecom infrastructure is
designed and implemented in the cloud according to the four design principles, then
it should be possible to induce local failures without creating a significant danger
of systemic failure causing prolonged downtime. Cloud implementation then makes
it possible to quickly discover vulnerabilities in administrative systems, in nodes in
the network core, and in the base station functionality.
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When infrastructures are able to confine the impact of local failures, operators can
constantly adjust their systems to keep themwithin the bounds of normal operations.
The adjustments involve tinkering with selected parts and processes of the systems.
Not all tinkering will have the desired effect, because it is hard to foresee the con-
sequences of changes to complex systems, especially large telecom infrastructures.
To react quickly to unusual behavior, it is necessary to monitor an infrastructure.
It is not enough to just monitor each part of the infrastructure. Because a system’s
complexity first and foremost stems from the many interactions between its parts, a
global view of the system’s behavior is necessary. A system must be monitored at
all times, especially when it experiences problems.
Because failures will occur in complex systems no matter how many resources
are used on high-quality risk analysis, reactive measurements are needed to limit the
impact of surprising incidents. In practice, there is a trade-off between proactive and
reactive measures to reduce downtime. A risk analysis [74] of Norwegian telecom
networks using Internet protocol version 4 (IPv4) suggests that sometimes it is better
to improve operations, maintenance, and the ability to quickly react to problems
than to make specific parts of the incumbent network infrastructure more robust to
downtime. These actions will benefit all Norwegian providers (see Fig. 7.2), while
physical changes will mostly provide local or regional benefits.
7.9 Discussion and Summary
Although we do not have any general method to measure an information and com-
munications technology (ICT) system’s degree of anti-fragility to downtime, it is
possible to determinewhen a system is fragile to outages. Here, we applied three anti-
principles to determine fragilities to downtime. These anti-principles were selected
because they proved useful during the investigation. While we have only applied the
anti-principles to telecom systems in Norway, it is not hard to apply them to other
types of ICT systems. Experience with anti-principles indicates that many systems
are fragile to downtime.Manymore anti-principles exist (http://sourcemaking.com).
Additional work is needed to determine other anti-principles that reveal fragility in
ICT systems.
We should move as much functionality of a telecom infrastructure as possible to
the cloud and apply the five design and operational principles to create anti-fragility
to downtime.A service-oriented architecture (SOA)withmicroservices ismost likely
a good way to achieve anti-fragility in practice. There is no need to use public cloud
infrastructures. A better solution is to use private, specialized clouds with, perhaps,
custom hardware for signal processing, in addition to commodity hardware. The
important point is that the amount of custom hardware can be reduced significantly
compared to today’s telecom systems.
Due the diverse expertise and huge amount of work required, it is outside the
scope of this book to determine and analyze all aspects of telecom systems leading
to fragility to downtime. In particular, we mention the need to study the protocols
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of telecom systems. Future systems are likely to use IPv6, which has known vulner-
abilities, including fragility to denial-of-service attacks denying regular customers
access to telecom services. The creation of anti-fragile protocols is an interesting
research topic.
What to learn from Part II
Part II has studied the fragility, robustness, and anti-fragility of Netflix’s media
streaming solution, the Norwegian e-government system Altinn, and Norway’s
telecom infrastructure. The case studies provide strong evidence that careful
application of the five design and operational principles introduced in Chap.4
can provide anti-fragility to downtime, that is, the principles lead to systems
with less downtime than today’s strongly connected, highly optimized systems
with little ability to handle unforeseen events. Furthermore, the cloud facilitates
the realization of these principles, although the principles are also believed to be
valid for non-cloud systems. While the five principles are easy to understand at
an abstract level, the case studies demonstrate that the challenge is to determine
how to implement the principles in real systems.
Anti-fragile software solutions in the cloud should be based on SOA with
microservices, preferably implemented and operated by development and opera-
tions (DevOps) teams with “skin in the game.” SOA and microservices together
model a software solution as a set of independently deployable and scalable
services with well-defined interfaces. This architecture style supports the devel-
opment and management of services by multiple, largely independent teams
using different programming languages, continuous deployment, and highly
redundant and scalable data storage. The use ofmicroservices with limited func-
tionality makes it possible to ensure the graceful degradation of an application’s
functionality. Each service’s limited functionality facilitates the development of
automated fallback responses in the case of local failures. When a local fail-
ure affects a service, other services depending on this malfunctioning service
receive a standardized response.
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Robustness to Malware Spreading
While many networked computing systems are vulnerable to self-propagating
malicious software, or malware, large enterprises use automated patching and hard-
ening to make their systems highly immune to malware infections. Still, persis-
tent human attackers compromise enterprise networks utilizing advanced tools,
customized malware, and zero-day exploits that anti-malware technology and patch-
ing cannot detect and mitigate [75, 76]. The three chapters in Part III study how
the diversity and fail fast principles from Chap.4 can be exploited to achieve anti-
fragility tomalware spreading in networked systems. The current chapter investigates
software diversity’s ability tomake systems robust to the spreading of infectiousmal-
ware and argues that diversity increases the time needed to compromise enterprise
systems, thus increasing the probability of early detection and mitigation. The two
next chapters extend the results in this chapter to achieve anti-fragility to malware
spreading.
8.1 Introduction
We view a computing system as a collection of interconnected computing devices
and consider the devices at the operating system (OS) and application levels. Com-
pilers with “diversity engines” generate the devices’ binary images, producing many
different executable images from a much smaller set of OS and application source
codes [24]. Many techniques to diversify binary images exist [77]. A transforma-
tion can be as simple as adding no-operation instructions (NOPs) to an image. The
insertion of NOPs is always possible and allows us to produce infinitely many binary
variants. Conceptually, a program’s binary images are divided into classes such that
all members of the same class share at least one exploitable vulnerability, while
members of different classes have no common exploitable vulnerabilities. Assuming
that the classes are roughly equally large, the number of classes measures the pro-
gram’s diversity with the convention that a network with only a single type, that is,
a software monoculture, has no diversity [50].
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Using well-established network models from network science [23], we combine
software diversity and computer “immunization” to halt multiple simultaneous out-
breaks of infectious malware with sparse and inhomogeneous spreading patterns,
represented by synthetic and empirical networks. We establish an explanatory epi-
demiological model of variable diversity, determine a general lower bound on the
diversity needed, evaluate the halting technique’s performance forworst-case spread-
ing over sparse and dense homogeneous networks, consider diversity’s ability to slow
down persistent threats, and discuss independent research on software diversity.
This chapter proposes and analyzes a halting technique for malware with known
static spreading mechanisms. The technique assumes that a small percentage of the
nodes can be immunized, that is, made resistant to the malware. In practice, immu-
nization, or hardening, includes the removal of non-essential software programs,
the secure configuration of remaining programs, constant patching, and the use of
firewalls and intrusion prevention systems. The author first presented the halting
technique in [56]. Chapter 10 generalizes the halting technique to malware with
unknown and time-varying spreading mechanisms.
8.2 Explanatory Epidemiological Model
Different malware strains exploit vulnerabilities in OSs and application software
to infect computing devices. An exploitable vulnerability is a mistake in the soft-
ware that enables malware to gain access to a device and its information. Examples
of exploitable vulnerabilities are buffer overflows and malformed URLs (see [24,
78, 79] for more information on vulnerabilities). Infectious malware can spread to
new vulnerable devices via network shares, removable media, Internet protocol (IP)
attacks, email messages, instant messaging, and peer-to-peer networks.
8.2.1 Epidemiological Model
We model the spreading of infectious malware over networked computing devices
by a simple graph (no self-loops or parallel edges) with N nodes of L types, 1 ≤
L ≤ N , as depicted in Fig. 8.1. There are roughly N/L nodes of each type uniformly
distributed over the graph. The node types represent different binary codes at the
OS or application level of the computing devices; that is, nodes of the same type
share an exploitable vulnerability while nodes of different types have no common
exploitable vulnerabilities. The edges represent communications between nodes. A
good measure of the model’s diversity is the number of node types L (see [50] for a
thorough discussion of diversity). Two nodes are neighbors if they share an edge. A
node’s degree k is the number of neighbors and 〈k〉 denotes the nodes’ average degree.
A network is homogeneous when all nodes have degrees k ≈ 〈k〉 and inhomogeneous
when a small fraction of nodes, called hubs, have k  〈k〉.
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Fig. 8.1 A network with N = 8 nodes, L = 4 node types of different colors, and average degree
〈k〉 = 2.5. Stars represent the infected seeds. There is S = 1 seed per node type. Only the orange
seed will infect a neighbor
The malware’s different spreading mechanisms determine the topologies of the
spreading networks.Malware utilizing random scanning to target IP addresses spread
over nearly fully connected homogeneous networks, while malware utilizing topo-
logical scanning travel over inhomogeneous networks [80]. Topological scanning
relies on information contained in infected hosts to locate new targets, including
routing tables, email addresses, and Uniform Resource Locators (URLs). The result-
ing virtual spreading networks are different from the physical networks of wired
and wireless communication links. We study multiple malware, or multimalware,
outbreaks because the deployment of several malware types is an obvious strategy to
counter software diversity. Allmalware types are assumed to have the same spreading
mechanism.
Our discrete-time model contains L types of infectious malware, that is, one
malware type per node type. Each malware type exploits a particular vulnerability
to infect a single node type. Initially, S nodes of each type are infected. These L · S
nodes are called seeds (see Fig. 8.1). The infection probability determines the rate at
which a sick node infects a susceptible neighbor of the same type during a time step.
To study worst-case spreading, we set the infection probability to one to ensure that
all nodes reachable from the seeds are infected. No infected node recovers.
8.2.2 Non-predictive Model
It is hard to estimate the actual spreading of malware in a networked computing
system because it is influenced by many factors, including router policies, the choice
of communication protocols, available bandwidth, traffic loads, firewall rules, anti-
malware signature sets, intrusion detection, the level of software patching, and the
misconfiguration of system parts. Rather than trying to incorporate all these fac-
tors, the epidemiological model displays very fast worst-case spreading where an
infectious node always infects all of its neighbors of the same type. While this model
cannot predict actual spreading in a network, it can explain the usefulness of software
diversity. Because actual malware is likely to spread less, it is reasonable to believe
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that the model’s malware halting translates into malware halting in real systems. This
view is supported by independent research discussed later in the chapter.
8.3 Malware-Halting Technique
The following proposed malware-halting technique immunizes hubs if they exist and
increases the diversity L to limit the fraction of infected nodes:
1. If the spreading network is inhomogeneous, immunize enough large-degree nodes
to create a homogeneous subnet when the immunized nodes and their adjacent
edges are removed.
2. Ensure that the node diversity of the homogeneous subnet is large enough to halt
multiple simultaneous malware outbreaks.
Table8.1 outlines how to halt multimalware outbreaks on sparse (small 〈k〉) or
dense (large 〈k〉) networks with homogeneous or inhomogeneous topologies. Lim-
ited true diversity (small L) is obtained by deploying instances of different OSs
and applications with similar functionality. Michael Franz [24] argues that much
greater artificial diversity (large L) is available when users download software from
application stores utilizing compiler-generated diversity to produce many classes
of executable binary images. While true diversity is costly because the installation
of different software forces users to learn new functionality, the cost of artificial
diversity is reasonable, since the functionality is not changed.
An example illustrates the halting technique on a sparse and inhomogeneous
networkwith hubs. Figure8.2a shows a synthetic networkwith 300 nodes. The nodes
are circles with areas proportional to their degrees, thus highlighting the hubs. The
spreading network is a software monoculture with one node type (L = 1) [28, 29].
All nodes are red to illustrate that a single seed (S = 1) infects all nodes. Figure8.2b
shows the same network, but now with randomly distributed orange and yellow node
types (L = 2). Eight white hubs are made immune to two malware types attacking
the nodes. There is little malware spreading in this immunized “polyculture.” For a
particular selection of two seeds of different types, Fig. 8.2b shows that the malware
spreading is reduced from 300 nodes to only three red nodes; that is, the halting
technique decreases the percentage of infected nodes from 100 to 1%.
The simple illustrative spreading network in Fig. 8.2 has no loops and the hubs
are connected in a small subnetwork. During the following analysis, we consider
networks with loops and make no assumptions about how the hubs are connected.
Table 8.1 Malware halting on spreading networks with different topologies
Malware halting on different network topologies
Sparse and homogeneous Sparse and inhomogeneous Dense and homogeneous
Utilize small true or artificial
diversity
Use hub immunization and
small true or artificial diversity
Deploy large artificial diversity
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Fig. 8.2 a Monoculture
with 300 infected nodes
whose areas are proportional
to their edge degrees. b The
same network as in (a) but
with white immunized hubs
and orange and yellow node
types. Two malware types,
each with a single randomly
selected seed, only manage
to infect one additional node
8.4 Halting Technique Analysis
The epidemiological model represents the spreading phase of multimalware out-
breaks. The following approximate analysis of this phase establishes a lower bound
on the diversity L needed by the halting technique summarized by Table8.1.
We first clarify why hubs should be immunized in an inhomogeneous spreading
network. When the infection probability is small and the malware spreading origi-
nates from a single randomly selected seed, a strategically placed node in the “core”
of a monoculture contributes more to the spreading than a hub on the network’s
periphery does [81]. However, we study polycultures with a maximum infection
probability equal to one and multiple widespread seeds per node type. Consider a
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hub with a large degree D on the periphery of a network. Since the S seeds with the
same type as the hub are uniformly distributed over the network, one of the hub’s
neighbors could be a seed. When this seed infects the hub, the hub will again infect
roughly D/L of its neighbors of the same type. We want to prevent this peripheral
hub infection because D tends to be much larger than L and because any of the
D/L infectious nodes can cause extensive malware spreading when the infection
probability is one.
Since different malware spreading mechanisms result in distinct spreading pat-
terns, it is essential to analyze malware outbreaks on spreading networks with arbi-
trary degree distributions. Let the nodes in a network be numbered from one to N
and let node i have degree ki , i = 1, . . . , N . We consider the ensemble of ran-
dom networks with an arbitrary but fixed degree sequence {ki } generated by the
so-called configuration model (see [23, Sect. 13.2] for details). All networks have a





network has L node types, with (approximately) N/L nodes of each type.
A single-type component is a subset of nodes of the same type such that there is a
path between any pair of nodes in the set and such that it is not possible to add another
node of the same type to the set while preserving this property. The two orange nodes
in Fig. 8.1 constitute the largest single-type component. A single-type component is
a giant component when its size is proportional to N/L . If a single-type component
contains a seed, then all its nodes will be infected.
We study single-type components in a network to limit the overall fraction of
infected nodes. Let this fraction be averaged over many model runs, where each run
has L · S randomly selected seeds. The underlying network topology is the same for
all malware types, since they are assumed to have the same spreadingmechanism and
the nodes of different types are uniformly distributed over the network. A particular
malware type only infects a single type of nodes. Hence, malware of different types
infects distinct subsets of nodes. Because each subset has N/L nodes, all subsets
have the same fraction of infected nodes when averaged over many model runs.
Consequently, the average fraction of infected nodes over all types can be analyzed
by considering a monoculture subgraph, defined by all the nodes of an arbitrary but
fixed type and the edges connecting these nodes. All other nodes and their adjacent
edges can be ignored.
To limit the average fraction of infected nodes, we want to choose the diversity L
such that the monoculture subgraph does not have a giant component. This subgraph
has a mean degree 〈k〉/L and a mean-squared degree 〈k2〉/L2 for large N . Because
the subgraph is contained in a random network generated by the configurationmodel,
the subgraph has a giant component if and only if 〈k2〉/L2 > 2〈k〉/L in the limit
for large N [23, p. 456]. To prevent the formation of a giant component, we need






8.4 Halting Technique Analysis 87
The right-hand side of inequality (8.1) is large for inhomogeneous networks
because k2i is much larger than ki for hubs. However, hub immunization reduces
the lower bound. When the nodes with the largest degrees in the original network
are immunized, we obtain a new network with N ′ < N susceptible nodes and
smaller node degrees d j , j = 1, . . . , N ′. The new network is obtained by ignoring
all immunized hubs and their adjacent edges because they no longer contribute to
malware spreading. This network “pruning” affects the previously discussed mono-
culture subgraph. The new mean-squared degree 〈d2〉 = 1/N ′ ∑ j d2j and mean
degree 〈d〉 = 1/N ′ ∑ j d j should be substituted for 〈k2〉 and 〈k〉 in inequality (8.1)
to determine the minimum needed diversity L .
Whether or not hubs in the original network are immunized to obtain a new
network, the S seeds in amonoculture subgraph can spreadover atmost S components
of this subgraph. These components are small in graphs without a giant component
[23], leading to a small fraction of infected nodes. Inequality (8.1) shows a trade-off
between the required number of node types L and the number of immunized hubs. If
it is possible to generatemany node types, then the fraction of immunized hubs can be
reduced, making it possible to halt malware outbreaks on very large inhomogeneous
networks.
8.5 Halting Technique Performance
We have seen that the hubs in a spreading network with inhomogeneous topology
can be immunized to obtain a homogeneous network. If the hubs are not known,
then acquaintance immunization can be used to protect most hubs [25]. Acquain-
tance immunization will be discussed in Chap. 9. Here, we apply themalware-halting
technique to synthetic and empirical spreading networks with homogeneous topolo-
gies. Each network represents the worst-case spreading of S malware outbreaks per
node type. While inequality (8.1) is only strictly valid for random networks in the
limit of large N , the following NetLogo [46] simulations show that the lower bound
determines the needed diversity.
8.5.1 Sparse and Homogeneous Networks
Wireless devices, particularly smartphones, can communicate via short-range wire-
less links such asWi-Fi and Bluetooth links. In our first epidemiological simulations,
different malware types copy themselves to new devices by openingwireless connec-
tions. Sparse and homogeneous proximity networks represent the spreading patterns.
The NetLogo model generates a proximity network with an average node degree 〈k〉
by first placing N nodes uniformly at random on a square. An edge is then added
between a randomly chosen node and its closest neighbor in Euclidean distance.
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Table 8.2 The minimum number of node types needed to halt malware outbreaks on homogeneous
proximity networks with 5,000 nodes and an increasing average node degree
Proximity networks
Average node degree 〈k〉 5 6 7 8
Minimum needed node types L 3 4 4 5
Fraction of infected nodes 3.4% 3.6% 4.6% 4.8%
Each fraction of infected nodes is averaged over 500 networks with uniform random distribution of
node types and seeds
More edges are similarly added until the network has the desired average degree 〈k〉.
Self-loops and multiple edges between nodes are not allowed. Note that although
handheld devices move over time, we only model short-term malware spreading
assuming static networks. Wireless sensor networks stay fixed for long periods.
Table8.2 lists the lower boundson theneededdiversity L , obtained from inequality
(8.1), for proximity networks with 5,000 nodes and an increasing average degree 〈k〉.
Each fraction of infected nodes is averaged over 500 networks with the same average
degree and uniform distribution of node types, including S = 10 seeds per type. Only
connected networks were evaluated, that is, networks with isolated subgraphs were
ignored. The lower bound on the diversity L was the same for all evaluated networks
with a given average degree.
While the deterministic epidemiological model causes all nodes to become
infected in a monoculture (L = 1), less than 5% of the nodes became infected in the
diverse proximity networks, according to Table8.2. Previously published simulation
results and mathematical analyses of other network models confirm that small true
or artificial diversity is sufficient to halt multimalware outbreaks on homogeneous
and sparse networks [82].
We also analyze malware halting on a sparse network where the nodes represent
email addresses and the links represent e-mail exchanges between the addresses. The
network has 1,133 nodes and 5,451 edges. The largest node has degree 71 and the
average degree is 9.62. While the network is slightly inhomogeneous, we forgo the
immunization of large-degree nodes. The lower bound on the diversity is L ≥ 10.
Since the network is small, we assume only S = 1 seed per node type.
Ignoring the fact that email malware needs help from unknowing users to prop-
agate, the simulations determined the fraction of infected nodes averaged over
5,000 random configurations of node types and seeds for increasing diversity
L = 10, 11, . . . , 16. The fraction of infected nodes decreases from 8 to 4% when
the diversity increases from 10 to 16. The additional decrease in the fraction of
infected nodes is relatively small for diversity above the lower bound in inequality
(8.1). Earlier reported simulation results for other networks [82] show similar mod-
est reductions in the fraction of infected nodes for diversities beyond the minimum
required value.
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8.5.2 Dense and Homogeneous Networks
Consider the casewhere L types of random scanningmalware spread over a complete
network with N nodes of degree k = N −1. There are L node types and N/L nodes
per type. The types are uniformly distributed over the nodes of the network. Assume
one seed per node type. Each seed has edges to the other N/L −1 nodes of the same
type. Together, the N/L single-type nodes form a star graph with the seed in the
center. Since the seed will always infect all the peripheral nodes in the star graph, it
does not help to increase the number of node types L as long as there is one seed
per node type. All N nodes will still be infected. The only way to halt multimalware
outbreaks is to use many more nodes types than there are malware types.
If there are M malware types, then M · N/L nodes will be infected. Hence, the
diversity L needs to be proportional to N and the number of malware types M must
bemuch smaller than N to prevent a large infection. This observation is in accordance
with the diversity bound in inequality (8.1), which is equal to L ≥ (N − 1)/2 for
k = N − 1. More generally, consider an arbitrary path consisting of m edges in a
dense network. The path’s nodes are all of the same type with probability L−m for
m ≤ N/L .Wemust have diversity L ≈ N to ensure that this probability is very small
even for very short paths. As stated in Table8.1, large artificial diversity is needed to
halt malware spreading over homogeneous dense networks with many nodes.
Since it is not completely clear how much artificial diversity is obtainable with
compilers utilizing diversification techniques [24], we cannot conclude that the halt-
ing technique is applicable tomultimalware outbreaks with dense spreading patterns.
However, Todd Jackson [83] and his colleagues convincingly argue that applica-
tion stores can produce massive-scale software diversity. Furthermore, as we tran-
sition from Internet protocol version 4 (IPv4) to IPv6, topological scanning may
become more popular than random scanning due to the huge number of unused IPv6
addresses.
8.6 Persistent Targeted Attacks
The term advanced persistent threats refers to attackers employing more or less
advanced techniques to first learn about and then compromise selected computer
systems without being detected, at least not for a long time [75, 76]. Examples of
persistent threats are state-sponsored attacks on foreign commercial and governmen-
tal enterprises to steal industrial and military secrets. The attacks are often initiated
by well-timed, socially engineered spear-phishing emails delivering trojans to indi-
viduals with access to sensitive information. Malicious email is leveraged because
most enterprises allow email to enter their networks.
Persistent attackers frequently exploit OS or application vulnerabilities in the
targeted systems. An attacker first develops a payload to exploit one or more vulner-
abilities. Next, an automated tool such as a PDF or Microsoft document delivers the
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payload to a fewusers of a system.The payload installs a backdoor or provides remote
system access, allowing the attacker to establish a presence inside the trusted system
boundary. Finally, the attacker violates the confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of the system to achieve his or her goals.
We shall see that large software diversity increases the time persistent attackers
need to compromise systems, thus providing defenders with more time to detect the
probing of their system defenses, collect information about the attackers, and deploy
countermeasures to prevent major system breaches. As before, we divide the binary
files implementing the functionality of a particular program into L roughly equally
large classes such that all members of the same class share at least one exploitable
vulnerability, while members of different classes have no common exploitable vul-
nerability. If a user and an attacker download the same program from an application
store [24, 83], then the two downloaded files share an exploitable vulnerability with
probability 1/L . When the diversity L is large, the probability of a common vulner-
ability is small and attackers can no longer reliably analyze their own downloaded
programfiles to exploit vulnerabilities in users’ programfiles. (Note that the diversity
L must be large even if the lower bound in inequality (8.1) is small.)
Directed attacks against specific computers running known programs become
more difficult, as long as the attacker has noway of determiningwhich specific binary
is running on what computer. Since it is necessary to create security patches tailored
to the different binary versions of the same program [24, 83], it becomes impossible
for an attacker to reverse-engineer software patches by comparing a particular patch
to the corresponding code on a user’s computer because the patch and code are both
unknown to the attacker.
8.7 Related Work
Miguel Garcia [78] and his colleagues have studied true diversity at the OS level
by considering exploitable OS vulnerabilities published over a period of roughly 15
years. The authors carefully analyzed vulnerabilities in 11 different OSs to determine
how many of these vulnerabilities occur in more than one OS. More than 50% of the
55 studied OS pairs have at most one remotely exploitable common vulnerability.
The low numbers of shared vulnerabilities for different OS combinations strongly
indicate that true diversity is obtainable with off-the-shelf OSs. The authors also
provide a good overview of related research on software diversity.
Jin Han [79] and his colleagues have shown that true diversity is available at
the application level with off-the-shelf software. The authors analyzed over 6,000
application vulnerabilities published in 2007. About 98.6% of the studied applica-
tions have substitutes, that is, applications that offer similar functionality, and the
majority of the applications either do not have the same vulnerability or cannot be
compromised with the same exploit code. Nearly half of the applications are offi-
cially supported to run on multiple OSs. Although the different OS distributions of
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the same application are likely to suffer from the same vulnerability, the attack code
is different in most cases.
Work by Konstantinos Kravvaritis [84] and his colleagues supports the need for
more software diversity in real networked systems. The authors reasonably assume
that binary files with the same name are realizations of a single program; that is, the
files may be different at the binary level but their functionality is identical. A client–
server application collected executable program and library files from individuals
who installed the client application on their computers. The client calculated the
MD5 hash of each collected file and sent the hash to the server. Since the hash is
unique for each different input file, the server could determine whether or not binary
files with the same name were identical.
Kravvaritis [84] and his colleagues defined three metrics to measure the diversity
of binary files with the same name. One metric, which estimates the probability of a
successful targeted attack, is given bym/n, wherem is the number of instances of the
most frequent binary variant of a program and n is the total number of instances. The
server collected 1,309,834 binary instances of 205,221 files with different names.
For more than half of the files analyzed, the estimated chance of a successful attack
is in excess of 50%. The values of all three metrics indicate that the diversity of
current software platforms is too low to significantly slow down targeted attacks.
Hence, there is a real need for the large compiler-generated diversity discussed in
this chapter.
Research by Pu Wang [85] and colleagues confirms that the number of giant
components with nodes of the same type determines the extent to which malware of
different types spread over diverse networks. The authors study the calling patterns
of 6.2 million mobile phone subscribers to determine possible spreading patterns of
malware attacking smartphone OSs. When a smartphone OS’s market share is small,
there is no giant component of the call network connecting most phones with this
OS. Although the call network is connected, a subgraph of smartphones sharing the
same OS is fragmented into many small and disjoint components [85]. The lack of
large components on which different types of malware can spread explains the low
observed saturation of malware in real mobile phone networks. Nevertheless, future
malware epidemics are possible because two OS families currently dominate the
smartphone market and more and more people buy smartphones.
Juan Caballero [86] and his colleagues have shown that the judicious use of
true diversity improves the robustness of the Internet routing infrastructure against
software vulnerabilities facilitating denial-of-service attacks, remote execution of
system-level commands without authentication, and unauthorized privileged access.
While the use of different software implementations from different code bases on
different routers increases the network’s overall robustness, it also increases the
complexity and costs of network deployment and management. Artificial diversity,
as suggested by Franz [24], is an interesting alternative to true diversity because the
complexity and costs are much reduced.
Graph coloring is the assignment of colors to the nodes in a graph subject to
a constraint [86]. Not surprisingly, a good coloring algorithm needs fewer colors
to obtain adequate true diversity on a network compared to just distributing colors
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uniformly over the network devices, as done here. Because the best coloring algo-
rithms necessitate central coordination to install the correct software on the different
devices, these algorithms are best suited to slow-changing infrastructures managed
by skilled personnel. Coloring algorithms are less useful when general users man-
age computing devices. The advantage of deploying application stores incorporating
compilers with diversity engines is that adequate diversity is achieved with very little
involvement from device owners.
8.8 Summary
While the Internet’s numerous networks are diverse due to distinct configurations,
firewall rules, anti-malware signature sets, intrusion detection, and router policies,
many networks still have limited internal diversity, making them vulnerable to seri-
ous malware spreading. The multimalware-halting technique presented can halt out-
breaks on these networks.
Advanced persistent threats represent a serious challenge to defenders of net-
worked systems with very sensitive information. Our analysis shows that software
diversity makes it harder to infect computing devices in these systems. Eventually,
large-scale experiments will be needed to determine how to best deploy software
diversity to make systems more robust to malware.
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Chapter 9
Robustness to Malware Reinfections
In Chap.8, we analyzed a deterministic epidemiological model where an infected
node immediately contaminated all its neighbors of the same type. The spreading
process was completely determined by the spreading network’s topology, the config-
uration of node types, and the selection of initially infected nodes or seeds. Because
no node recovered from an infection, there were no long-term dynamics. The spread-
ing simply stopped when all reachable nodes were infected. Here, we study a sto-
chastic epidemiological model of multimalware outbreaks where arbitrary but fixed
probabilities determinewhether nodes are infected. Furthermore, nodes recover from
infectionswith given probabilities, only to be reinfected later. An incident from 2007,
where the sameworm repeatedly infected the internal networks of aNorwegian bank,
illustrates how reinfections can occur in real networks.
The stochastic epidemiological model is first used to determine how to immunize
unknown hubs on diverse inhomogeneous spreading networks. A simple solution
is obtained by generalizing the acquaintance immunization strategy for monocul-
ture networks [25]. Next, the model is analyzed to determine the software diversity
required to halt multimalware spreading in homogeneous spreading networks where
nodes can be infected multiple times by the same malware. The analysis produces
a lower bound on the diversity needed to ensure that, with a high probability, the
malware outbreaks do not spread far but, instead, die out quickly. The lower bound
is obtained by modifying a “classical” result from network science [87]. A reader
unfamiliar with differential equations can skip the development of the bound, since
it is not needed to understand the remaining chapters.
9.1 Malware Attack on a Norwegian Bank
In March 2007, Viking.gt, a worm well known to anti-malware software vendors at
the time, attacked office computers belonging to a large bank in Norway. The worm,
most likely residing on an external game site, entered the bank’s internal networks
via a computer at a branch office and cascaded across roughly 1,000 servers and
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11,000 office PCs in 190 branch offices. This cascade failure occurred because the
anti-malware software running on the bank’s computers did not stop infections, even
though the anti-malware software was updated with an appropriate signature for the
worm. During the attack, branch offices could not assist their customers with many
tasks and some offices closed.
About 200 individuals worked two shifts to remove the worm. Because the
worm disabled the machines’ automatic software update mechanism, the worm had
to be manually removed from each machine. The vendor’s initial upgrade to the
anti-malware software was flawed, allowing infected machines to reinfect cleaned
machines over internal networks. The bank decided to close all connections to the
Internet to protect their internal systems from further external infection. It then took
days to remove the malware from the internal networks.
The next section presents a malware spreading model that allows malware to rein-
fect nodes. This stochastic model is a generalization of the deterministic explanatory
model in Chap.8.
9.2 Stochastic Epidemiological Model
Let a networked computer system be infected by different types of malware. The
malware’s spreading network is modeled as an undirected graph with M edges and
N nodes of different types. The node types represent machines with distinct software
at the operating system or application layer and the edges represent virtual commu-
nication lines. There is at most one edge between two nodes and no edge connects a
node to itself. If there is an edge between two nodes, then these nodes are neighbors.
The degree k of a node is the number of neighbors. The nodes’ average degree is
〈k〉 = (2M)/N .
As noted in Chap.8, the topology of the spreading network depends on the soft-
ware layer and the vulnerabilities exploited to spread the malware. We discriminate
between an inhomogeneous network containing a few nodes, the hubs, with a very
large degree k  〈k〉 and a homogeneous network where all nodes have a degree
k ≈ 〈k〉. Any spreading network has L different node types l = 1, 2, . . . , L for
1 ≤ L  N . Each node type occurs Nl times. A node chosen uniformly at random
is of type l with probability Nl/N for N = ∑l Nl . When Nl = N/L , the diversity is
equal to the number of node types L with the convention that a monoculture network
with only one type has no diversity [50].
A node of arbitrary type l is either susceptible to an infection or it is infected. If
an infection is removed from the node, then it immediately becomes susceptible to a
new infection. There are L types of malware, where each type of malware infects a
particular software platform, that is, node type. Because there are L nodes types with
L corresponding malware types, the complete spreading network can be viewed as
L disjoint subnet monocultures, each containing a single node type.
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Multiple simultaneous malware epidemics are modeled by L susceptible–
infected–susceptible (SIS) models [23, 87] operating on the same network topology
but affecting L disjoint subnet monocultures. Initially, all the nodes are susceptible.
At time step t = 0, the model selects uniformly at random S (≥1) nodes of each type
l and infects them. These L · S initially infected nodes are the seeds. For each time
step t = 1, 2, 3, . . ., any infected node of type l infects any susceptible neighbor of
type l with infection probability pl , 0 < pl ≤ 1. At the same time, any infected node
of type l recovers with recovery probability ql , 0 ≤ ql ≤ 1.
If ql > 0 for some l, then a node can repeat the SIS life cycle many times. The
result is a stochastic model with long-term dynamics, where it is assumed that the
infections and recoveries are updated in a random asynchronous order. When pl = 1
and ql = 0 for all l, the SIS models become L susceptible–infected (SI) models.
The overall spreading model is deterministic in this case, since malware infects
all reachable nodes with 100% probability. Consequently, the spreading process is
completely determined by the network’s topology, the configuration of node types,
and the selection of seeds. Because no node recovers from an infection, there are
no long-term dynamics. The spreading simply stops when all reachable nodes are
infected. This special case of L deterministic SI models was first presented in Chap.8
for Nl = N/L .
9.3 How to Immunize Unknown Hubs
While we may not know the degrees of many nodes in inhomogeneous spreading
networks, it is still possible to immunize hubs in advance of malware outbreaks. The
acquaintance immunization strategy [25] provides an elegant solution to the prob-
lem of immunizing unknown hubs in a monoculture (L = 1): Choose a set of nodes
uniformly at random and immunize one arbitrary neighbor per node. While the orig-
inal set of nodes is unlikely to contain the relatively few hubs in an inhomogeneous
network, the randomly selected neighbors are much more likely to be hubs, since
many edges are adjacent to high-degree nodes.
We can generalize acquaintance immunization to diverse networks. Assume that
it is possible to estimate the number of nodes Nl of each type l in a diverse network,
perhaps by estimating the total size of the network and then determining the per-
centages of different node types in a small part of the network. For some fraction
0 < f < 1, choose a set of f · Nl nodes of type l uniformly at random such that each
node has at least one neighbor of the same type, l = 1, 2, . . . , L . Immunize one ran-
domly selected neighbor of type l per node in the set.When the number of immunized
neighbors f · Nl of each type l is large enough, most hubs are immunized [25].
To illustrate acquaintance immunization on diverse spreading networks, we con-
sider an inhomogeneous networkwith dominant hubs. The network has 10,670 nodes
and 22,002 edges. The largest hub has degree 2,312, which is nearly 11% of the total
number of edges. The L = 7 node types have different colors and the size of a
node is proportional to its degree; that is, hubs are larger than low-degree nodes.
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Fig. 9.1 Acquaintance
immunization of a network
with enlarged hubs at the
top. Only immunized nodes
and susceptible hubs are
shown. Note that most hubs
are immunized
A node turns pink when it is immunized. Let the fraction of immunized neighbors be
f = 0.04 (4%). Figure9.1 shows only the immunized pink nodes and the remaining
susceptible multicolored hubs after acquaintance immunization. No edges or sus-
ceptible low-degree nodes are shown. Note that most of the 216 enlarged hubs are
immunized. Assume S = 20 seeds per node type for a total of 7 ·20 = 140 seeds. Let
pl = 0.06 and ql = 0.04.When acquaintance immunization is performed in advance,
the fraction of infected nodes goes to zero after only a few hundred time steps.
9.4 Lower Bound on Required Diversity
In this section we determine a lower bound on the node diversity L needed to make it
very likely that newmalware outbreakswill die out before they spread tomany nodes.
We assume that all hubs are immunized, even though acquaintance immunization
may miss a few. Because the hubs and their adjacent edges do not partake in the
transmission of malware, we model the spreading network after hub immunization
as a random homogeneous network with N nodes, average degree z = 〈k〉, and
Nl = N/L nodes of each type, l = 1, 2, . . . , L . The spreading network has a
fixed but arbitrary (thin-tailed) degree distribution. Note that modeling the remaining
spreading network after hub immunization as a random network is an approximation
chosen because random networks are malleable to analysis [23].
The average fraction of infected nodes of type l, denoted hl , is estimated by
considering the subset of N/L nodes of type l. To estimate hl , we extend an analytical
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technique for random networks viewed as homogeneous monocultures (L = 1) [23,
87]. Each malware outbreak in a network with L > 1 node types operates on a
subgraph with N/L nodes of the same type. On average, a node has z/L neighbors
in the subgraph because the probability that a node is of type l is Nl/N = 1/L .
Let the spreading rate be ρl = (pl z)/(ql L) for ql > 0, l = 1, 2, . . . , L , and view
hl = hl(t) as a continuous-time variable. Representing the expected change in the





hl(1 − hl) − qlhl
and imposing the stationary condition dhl/dt = 0, we find that the average fraction
of infected nodes saturates at hl = 1− 1/ρl for ρl > 1. The fraction hl goes to zero
in finite time when ρl < 1. For a fixed infection probability pl , recovery probability
ql , and average degree z, the spreading rate ρl = (pl z)/(ql L) < 1 when the number
of node types L > (pl z)/ql . Consequently, hl goes to zero.
Since we need hl to go to zero for all l, the needed node diversity is lower
bounded by







where z = 〈k〉 is the average node degree of the remaining spreading network after
hub immunization. The largest spreading rate essentially determines the required
diversity L .
It is possible to estimate the lower bound in inequality (9.1) for real malware
types by estimating the infection probabilities pl and recovery probabilities ql . How-
ever, the inequality is first and foremost important because it shows that multiple
simultaneous malware outbreaks with the ability to reinfect nodes will die out before
they can spread far when the software diversity is large enough, given that hubs are
immunized.
9.5 Discussion and Summary
A combination of acquaintance immunization and node diversity prevents malware
with the ability to reinfect nodes from creating long-lasting epidemics. Through
immunization of most of the hubs and a sufficient increase in node diversity, malware
outbreaks are likely to die out quickly. Hence, acquaintance immunization and node
diversity together provide robustness to malware reinfection.
As first stated in Sect. 8.7, graph coloring algorithms can be used to ensure that no
(or very few) pairs of neighboring nodes have the same color or node type. Coloring
algorithms exploit the topology of static spreading networks to reduce the number of
node types needed to preventmalware propagation, compared to our simple approach
of just randomly assigning node types. Why, then, are we using this simple approach
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in both the previous and current chapters when it does not minimize the number of
different colors needed to prevent malware spreading? There are two main reasons.
First, while coloring algorithms need central processing to assign node types,
our simple scheme requires no central control. We cannot use algorithms requiring
central control to assign node types because of their limited scalability. Our goal is
a malware-halting technique that scales to millions of nodes. Second, the topologies
of the malware spreading networks are not known and, even if they were, networks
will vary over time, making it necessary to constantly rerun the coloring algorithms
to reassign node types. Hence, we do not let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
Instead of trying to come up with sophisticated solutions to make highly complex
networks more or less immune to malware spreading, we fight complexity with sim-
plicity [88]. The next chapter suggests and analyzes a simple scalable technique
providing anti-fragility to malware with unknown and changing spreading patterns.
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Chapter 10
Anti-fragility to Malware Spreading
To achieve anti-fragility to malware spreading, this chapter applies the fail fast prin-
ciple from Chap.4 to the robust malware-halting technique developed in the two
previous chapters. According to the fail fast principle, it is necessary to learn from
failures in complex adaptive systems when the impact of the failures are still small.
In the case of infectious malware epidemics, once malware is detected on a node in a
networked system, other nodes infected by the same malware should be healed and
susceptible nodes should be protected from future infections of this malware.
The two previous chapters showed how software diversity and hub immunization
could halt malicious software or malware from spreading. This chapter combines
compiler-generated software diversity [24, 56, 89], hub immunization, and imperfect
malware detection/removal to achieve anti-fragility to the spreading of various types
ofmalware in networked computing systems. The cloud is used to efficiently combine
these techniques. The suggested malware-halting technique scales to huge networks
because it does not require any tightly coupled interactions or adaptations between
groups of devices. The average fraction of infected nodes is reduced compared to
the examples in Chap.8. The technique is of practical interest because malware is an
omnipresent and serious security threat [21, 22]. The ideas in this chapter were first
presented in [90].
We again study infectiousmalware, that is, computerwormswith different spread-
ing mechanisms. E-mail malware spreading via address lists and mobile phone mal-
ware propagating over short-rangewireless links generate patterns of infected devices
defined by sparse graphs [85], while malware scanning Internet protocol version 4
(IPv4) addresses at random produce dense graphs. We concentrate on sparse spread-
ing networks in this chapter. Rather than trying to accurately model the spreading
of real malware instances, we again analyze worst-case spreading where the first
attempt to infect a susceptible device always succeeds.
Non-infectious malware strains, such as trojans, spyware, adware, and ran-
somware, mistakenly downloaded by computer users are viewed as infectious mal-
ware with limited spreading ability. We measure malware spreading in a networked
computing system by the fraction of infected devices. A system is fragile to malware
when small outbreaks of different malware strains spread to a large fraction of the
© The Author(s) 2016
K.J. Hole, Anti-fragile ICT Systems, Simula SpringerBriefs on Computing 1,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-30070-2_10
99
100 10 Anti-fragility to Malware Spreading
devices. If the malware strains only spread to a small fraction of the devices, then
the system is robust. A system under repeated attacks from malware is anti-fragile
if it first learns to reduce the fraction of infected devices and then manages to keep
the fraction small when the malware’s spreading mechanism changes.
To achieve anti-fragility in practice, it is advantageous to build on existing and
planned automated software mechanisms. We combine compiler-generated diver-
sity, software downloads from application stores, hub immunization, and imperfect
malware detection/removal to achieve anti-fragility to malware spreading. An agent-
based model randomly adds software diversity to a software monoculture to create
a software polyculture with a much reduced fraction of infected devices. The model
demonstrates that periodically removing executable code, including unknown mal-
ware, from devices and installing new diverse code drastically increase robustness
to malware spreading. If imperfect malware detection is added, the model gains a
degree of anti-fragility because it can more quickly remove malware and update
vulnerable code to keep the fraction of infected devices very small, even when the
malware strains have unknown and time-varying spreading.
10.1 System Model
As in the two previous chapters, we study a network of interconnected computing
devices and consider the devices at the operating system (OS) and application levels.
Application stores in the cloud, such as Google Play and iOS App Store, utilize
compilers with “diversity engines” to generate binary images for a huge number of
devices, producing many different executable images from a much smaller set of
OSs and application source codes [24, 89]. As in earlier chapters, we assume that a
program’s many binary images can be divided into classes such that all members of
the same class have a common exploitable vulnerability, while members of different
classes have no common exploitable vulnerabilities.
The number of classes measures the program’s diversity, assuming roughly
equally large classes. Since compiler-driven diversity promises to provide large diver-
sity [24, 77], we forgo any notion of central control over the assignment of software
diversity to computing platforms and make no attempt to minimize the use of diver-
sity. This allows us to study the benefit of software diversity in systems with millions
of devices. Cloud-based compilations of source codes allow application stores to
support large numbers of download requests each day.
A significant fraction of all malware infections is not discovered by traditional
signature-based malware detection because modern malware utilizes time-varying
code obfuscation to avoid detection based on fixed byte patterns [21]. Emerging
cloud-based anti-malware solutions promise to improve automated malware detec-
tion [22, 91, 92]. Servers in the cloud deploy heuristic, behavioral, and signature-
based techniques to detect different types of malware by processing data collected
by clients running on user devices. A cloud solution can also incorporate knowledge
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from other sources, such as malware honeypots, that is, computers capturing mal-
ware.
Despite the protection promised by cloud anti-malware, it is nearly impossible to
keep all computing devices in a networked system free frommalware at all times. The
difficulty of detecting encrypted malicious traffic and the successful use of rootkits
to hide malware suggest that automated malware detection will remain imperfect for
the foreseeable future [21]. A more realistic goal is to provide a form of “community
immunity,” where most devices are protected against malware because there is little
opportunity for outbreaks to spread. Whereas community immunity usually entails
the immunization of nearly all entities in a population, we mainly deploy compiler-
generated software diversity to reduce malware spreading. Our goal is not to force
the fraction of infected devices to zero but, rather, to keep it very low over time.
We study consecutive outbreaks of different malware types, called multimalware
outbreaks, because the deployment of multiple malware types is an obvious strategy
to counter software diversity. Devices are assumed to automatically remove exe-
cutable code, including unknown malware, and immediately download new diverse
code from application stores on a semi-regular basis. The introduction of imper-
fect malware detection allows devices to also initiate unscheduled code removal and
updates when infections are detected. In severe but rare cases, trained personnel must
take a device offline towipe its entirememory before installing the new software. The
following model assumes that the self-repairing and diversity-enhancing approach
removes all malware. Because it is hard to remove advanced malware, especially
rootkits, from real systems, it is possible to adjust how often the model successful
carries out code removals and updates.
10.1.1 Model Description
We model multimalware spreading over networked computing devices by a simple
graph (no self-loops or parallel edges) with N nodes and a maximum of L node types
for L  N . At time step t = 0, 1, . . . , the graph contains D = D(t) of the L node
types, where D(0) = 1. The D active node types represent classes of binary codes at
the OS or application level of the devices’ computing platforms; that is, nodes of the
same type share an exploitable vulnerability while nodes of different types have
no common exploitable vulnerabilities. The edges represent virtual communica-
tion lines. The number of active node types D measures the model’s time-varying
diversity.
Two nodes are neighbors if there is an edge between them. A node’s degree k
is the number of neighbors and 〈k〉 is the average degree over all nodes. All nodes
change type with probability p at each time step to model the automated removal of
executable code (including unknownmalware), followed by immediate downloads of
new diverse code from application stores. One of the L possible node types is selected
with probability 1/L , thus changing the initial monoculture into a polyculture with
diversity L .
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Initially, all nodes are susceptible to malware infections. There is one malware
type per node type. All malware types have the same spreading mechanism.Whereas
epidemiological models in the literature tend tomodel a single malware outbreak, we
model systems with many outbreaks. One malware outbreak occurs with probability
q at each time step. An outbreak initially infects a single susceptible node selected
uniformly at random. A newly sick node infects all its susceptible neighbors of the
same type during the next time step. Infected nodes change type with probability
r at each time step to model the varying degree of imperfect malware detection
followed by immediate malware removal and the installation of new diverse code.
Any infected node becomes susceptible when it changes type.
It is possible to switch off automated malware detection by setting r = 0. We
can also set p = 0 to disable automated software downloads. A small fraction of
nodes can be immunized, that is, made resistant to malware infections. Immunized
nodes do not change type or transmit infections to neighbors. As stated in Chap.8,
automated immunization or hardening includes the removal of non-essential software
programs, the secure configuration of remaining programs, constant patching, and the
use of firewalls and intrusion prevention systems. Other mitigation techniques, such
as control-flow integrity [93], that induce code overhead and performance penalties
can also be used on selected devices.
10.1.2 Model Limitations
As first observed in Chap.8, it is hard to predict how malware will spread over a
networked computing system because the propagation depends on the malware’s
spreading mechanism, the network topology, changing traffic loads, routing and fil-
tering policies, the choice of communication protocols, and network failures and
misconfigurations. Rather than trying to generate accurate spreading patterns under
various network conditions, the model displays very fast worst-case malware spread-
ing in which an infectious node immediately infects all its neighbors of the same
type.
Although the model cannot predict spreading in a real networked system, it can
demonstrate the usefulness of combining software diversity and imperfect malware
detection to halt malware spreading. Compared to themodel, actual malware is likely
to spread slower, because the first attempt to infect a susceptible computing device
will not always succeed and not all susceptible devices will be infected because
some are unreachable in practice. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that modeled
malware halting translates into halting in real systems.
We only study sparse spreading patterns with an average degree 〈k〉 much lower
than the number of nodes N . Whereas nodes and edges can be deleted during amodel
run and new nodes and edges added to simulate changes in the malware’s spreading
mechanism, nodes cannot change position after they have been created.
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10.2 Anti-fragility on Static Graphs
Aworst-case spreading pattern given by a network with average degree 〈k〉 is homo-
geneous when all nodes have degrees k ≈ 〈k〉. To keep the analysis manageable,
we first study static spreading patterns represented by homogeneous networks and
determine when the system model is anti-fragile to spreading.
Consider a homogeneous networkwith a single node type at time t = 0, D(0) = 1.
If this monoculture is connected, then it is extremely fragile to malware spreading
since a single sick node will infect all nodes as long as no node changes type. The
model avoids fragile monocultures by allowing nodes to change type. Each time a
node changes type, it selects a particular type with probability 1/L . Consequently,
the number of node types D(t) will grow toward the maximum value L . The phase
where D(t) changes from one to L will be simulated later. Here, we assume that
D(t) = L , where t > t ′ for a small finite time t ′, and study the model after the
fraction of infected nodes starts to fluctuate around a small time-averaged value f .
We need to determine an expression for the time-averaged fraction f of infected
nodes. Let Q denote the set of susceptible nodes that are infected during T time
steps.We first estimate the expected number of infected nodes in Q, denoted E{|Q|}.
During each time step, there is a probability q that a single susceptible node is seeded
with an infection. The probability that no neighboring node has the same type as
this seed is approximately (1 − 1/L)〈k〉. If we choose a large diversity L > 〈k〉
such that this probability is large, then an infection will most likely spread at most
from the seed to the nearest neighbors of the same type. Ignoring further spreading,
each seed infects, on average, 〈k〉/L < 1 of its neighbors. Over T time steps, the
expected number of seeds is T · q and about T · q · 〈k〉/L susceptible neighbors will
be infected, since the average fraction f of infected nodes is small. The expected
number of susceptible nodes becoming infected during the period T is thus estimated
by E{|Q|} ≈ T · q · (1 + 〈k〉/L).
Next, we determine the expected number of infected nodes that become suscepti-
ble during T time steps. All N nodes in a network change type with probability p to
model periodic downloads of diverse software. Let P denote the set of infected nodes
that change type (and become susceptible) due to periodic software downloads. We
need to determine the expected size of P , denoted E{|P|}. The expected number of
type changes over a period T is p · N · T . Since the fraction of infected nodes is f ,
the expected number of infected nodes that change type is E{|P|} = f · p · N · T .
The remaining infected nodes at a time step detect their infections with probabil-
ity r . Let R be the set of infected nodes that change type (and become susceptible) due
to malware detection followed by an immediate software download. We also need to
determine the expected size E{|R|}. The expected number of infected nodes is f ·N ·T
and the expected number of infected nodes changing type is E{|R|} = r · f · N · T .
Over T time steps, the two sets P and R overlap. The total number of unique
nodes changing type and becoming susceptible is given by the union P ∪ R. The
expected size is of this union is E{|P ∪ R|} = E{|P|} + E{|R|} − E{|P ∩ R|} =
p f N T + r f N T − pr f N T = f N T (p + r − pr). The expected number of nodes
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changing type and becoming susceptible must be equal to the expected number of
new infected nodes to maintain a stable time-averaged fraction f of infected nodes.
Hence, the relation E{|P ∪ R|} = E{|Q|} results in the approximation
f ≈ q [1 + 〈k〉/L]
(p + r − pr)N (10.1)
for homogeneous networks with diversity L > 〈k〉.
Equation (10.1) shows that it is possible to maintain a small fraction f of infected
nodes, even if malware detection is switched off (r = 0), by adjusting the software
download probability p. Note that this property is based on the assumption that
malware is removed during the software update process. Let p and r be small such
that the value of pr is negligible compared to p + r . When malware detection is
switched on (r > 0), the fraction of infected nodes reduces further for a fixed
probability p. Hence, anti-fragile systems using imperfect detection and removal
of new malware further reduce the fraction of infected devices, compared to robust
systems that merely remove old code and download new diverse code periodically.
10.2.1 Simulations of Anti-fragility on Static Networks
To validate Eq. (10.1), we consider smartphones and other handheld computing
devices that communicate via short-rangeWi-Fi and Bluetooth links [85]. Infectious
malware types can copy themselves to new devices by opening wireless connec-
tions. Malware can also propagate directly between Wi-Fi access points via wireless
connections [94]. We represent the worst-case spreading patterns by homogeneous
proximity networks. The system model was programmed in NetLogo [46] and gen-
erates a proximity network with average node degree 〈k〉 by first placing N nodes
uniformly at random on a square. An edge is then added between a randomly cho-
sen node and its closest neighbor in Euclidean distance. More edges are similarly
added until the network has the desired average degree. Self-loops andmultiple edges
between nodes are not allowed.
Simulationswere run on networkswith N = 5,000 nodes, L = 20 node types, and
different average degrees 〈k〉. The outbreak probability was q = 10−2, the software
download probability p = 10−5, and the malware detection probability r = 10−3.
Table10.1 lists the observed average, minimum, and maximum fraction of infected
nodes over 100 runs, where each value was averaged over the last 10,000 time steps
of a run. The table also reports an estimate of the average fraction obtained from
Eq. (10.1). The good agreement between the simulated and calculated values shows
that the expression can provide good estimates of the average fraction of infected
nodes. Other model runs with different parameter values confirm the agreement
between simulated and calculated values.
10.2 Anti-fragility on Static Graphs 105
Table 10.1 The estimated average fractions of infected nodes in proximity networks with 5,000
nodes and increasing average node degree
Proximity networks
Average degree 5 6 7 8
Estimated frac. 0.25% 0.26% 0.27% 0.28%
Simulated frac. 0.26% 0.27% 0.28% 0.30%
(max., min.) (+0.09,−0.08) (+0.08,−0.1) (+0.11,−0.07) (+0.16,−0.11)
The corresponding simulated fractions are averaged over 100 runs, with the largest observed devi-
ations shown in parentheses
10.2.2 Anti-fragility on Large Static Networks
Since there is agreement between the average fractions of infected nodes obtained
from the simulations and from Eq. (10.1), we use the equation to study anti-fragility
to malware spreading on very large homogeneous networks. The required frequency
of software download p and the frequency of malware detection r decrease as the
size of a network grows, because p + r is proportional to 1/N . Hence, anti-fragility
to malware occurs on large model networks for practical download and detection fre-
quencies.
Consider a homogeneous network with 100 million nodes, that is, N = 108, and
average degree 〈k〉  L . For outbreak frequency q = 10−2 and an average fraction of
infected nodes f = 10−3, we have from Eq. (10.1) that p + r ≈ q/( f N ) = 10−7. If
each time step in the model is one second long, then there is a new malware outbreak
every 100 seconds, on average. The fraction of infected nodes is maintained when
the download frequency is p ≈ 10−7 without malware detection (r = 0), that is, each
device has to download and install new software after about 116 days. If malware
detection is added to our example, then the average fraction of infected devices is
reduced. For r = 10−4 and p = 10−7, we have f ≈ 10−6. The calculations illustrate
that anti-fragility to malware spreading scales to very large homogeneous networks.
10.3 Anti-fragility on Time-Varying Graphs
Wenow consider amodified systemmodel with an unknown and time-varyingworst-
case spreading pattern that remains sparse over time. Even if the spreading mecha-
nism varies, the spreading is mostly limited to the neighbors of the nodes seeded with
infections as long as the spreading pattern remains homogeneous and the diversity
remains much larger than the changing average degree.
We therefore study inhomogeneous spreading patterns containing a small fraction
of nodes, called hubs, with degree kh much larger than the time-varying average
degree. A hub and its kh neighbors form a star graph with the hub at the center. If
all kh + 1 nodes have a uniform distribution of L node types, then there are roughly
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kh/L neighbors of the same type as the hub. A susceptible hub is infected each time
one of the neighbors of the same type is infected. A reinfected hub again infects all
susceptible neighbors of the same type, ensuring a total of kh/L infected neighbors.
Since a hub’s kh neighbors constitute a significant fraction of all nodes in a worst-
case spreading pattern, we may very well have kh 	 L . This is why hubs are
referred to as super-spreaders, even in software polycultures. Note that malware
does not need to be infectious for a hub to be a super-spreader; for example, a hub
can be a popular website infected by malware that is inadvertently downloaded by
many users accessing the site. While the non-infectious malware does not spread any
further after the downloads, the number of infected devices kh/L is still large.
Similarly, if the hubs’ neighbors tend to have small degrees, most of the spreading
of infectious malware will also be confined to the hubs’ neighbors. Even when a hub
regularly changes type, there will still be roughly kh/L neighbors of the same type as
long as all nodes have a uniform distribution of types. Over time, a hub that changes
type will reinfect many neighbors as long as at least a few neighbors of different
types are infected.
If hubs are connected in a small subnetwork and several hubs have the same type,
then a large fraction of all nodes in a worst-case spreading network is infected very
quickly. Hence, we need to “neutralize” hubs, especially tightly connected hubs, to
make the actual spreading pattern more homogeneous such that, for any susceptible
node of degree k, the expected number of neighbors of the same type is negligible
(k/L  1).
The following three malware simulations with different spreading patterns show
that hubs can be immunized to gain anti-fragility to multimalware spreading. Rather
than presenting plots averaged over many runs to obtain smooth curves, the figures
plot single runs to better demonstrate howanti-fragile systemswould actually behave.
10.3.1 Simulations of Anti-fragility
In the first simulation, theNetLogomodel generates a time-varying spreading pattern.
A model run starts with a proximity network with 2,000 nodes, average degree
〈k〉 = 4, maximum degree 10, and diversity D(0) = 1. Initially, malware detection
is turned off (r = 0). The fraction of infected nodes plotted in Fig. 10.1 reduces from
about 91 to 8% as the model changes from a fragile monoculture to a more robust
polyculture with diversity L = 5. When malware detection is turned on (r = 10−2),
the fraction reduces further to 0.1%. The plot confirms the advantage of introducing
software diversity and applying imperfect malware detection.
Next, 75% of the nodes and their adjacent edges are deleted and the network is
regrown using the preferential attachment technique [95], with each new node con-
nected to three existing nodes. The new nodes have a uniform distribution of node
types. This simulated change in spreading mechanism causes the original homoge-
neous spreading pattern to change into an inhomogeneous spreading pattern. The
new spreading pattern has an average degree 〈k〉 = 4.8 and a maximum degree 33.
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Fig. 10.1 The fraction of infected nodes in a changing network with 2,000 nodes, outbreak prob-
ability q = 10−2, download probability p = 10−3, and diversity L = 5. The plot illustrates
the effects of increasing diversity, malware detection, a change in spreading mechanism, and hub
immunization
The fraction of infected nodes increases to roughly 45% because the diversity L
is not large enough to prevent spreading from the new hubs, even though malware
detection is still on. The sharp increase in the fraction of infected nodes illustrates that
the malware halting is fragile to changes in the spreading pattern when the diversity
is too small.
Finally, the 61 nodeswith the largest degrees are immunized.When these hubs and
their adjacent edges are ignored because they no longer contribute tomalware spread-
ing, the remaining spreading pattern has average degree 〈k〉 = 3.8 and maximum
degree 14. The fraction of infected nodes reduces to roughly 0.6%, demonstrating
the need to immunize super-spreaders in real networks to obtain more homogeneous
spreading patterns.
In the second simulation, the NetLogo model starts with an inhomogeneous email
networkwith 1,133 nodes, average degree 〈k〉 = 9.6,maximumdegree 71, and diver-
sity L = 8. The largest hubs are immunized before the model run starts. As shown
in Fig. 10.2, the fraction of infected nodes reduces to roughly 1% as the monocul-
ture turns into a polyculture. The model then erases 75% of all nodes as before and
creates an inhomogeneous network with 2,000 nodes. No new nodes are immunized
and their types are uniformly distributed. The new subgraph of susceptible nodes has
average degree 〈k〉 = 4.7 and maximum degree 44. Unlike in the first simulation,
there is no large change in the fraction of infected nodes in Fig. 10.2 because the
diversity, the remaining immunized nodes, and the malware detection probability
(r = 10−2) together prevent significant spreading. The plot shows that the malware
halting can be made robust to changes in the spreading pattern.
In the third simulation, theNetLogomodel utilizes a static inhomogeneous spread-
ing pattern with 10,670 nodes, 36 hubs that form a small connected subgraph, and
many nodes with a low degree k ≈ 〈k〉 = 4.1. The hubs’ degrees range from
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Fig. 10.2 The fraction of infected nodes in a time-varying e-mail networkwith outbreak probability
q = 10−2, download probability p = 10−3, malware detection probability r = 10−2, and diversity
L = 8. Note that there is no visible change in the fraction when the spreading network changes
2,312 down to 102. In a real network, any immunization of hubs is likely to be
imperfect because some infected hubs are not detected or because some hardened
hubs still become infected. The model utilizes acquaintance immunization to simu-
late imperfect cloud-based detection and immunization of infected hubs [25]. This
immunization technique chooses a set of nodes uniformly at random and immunizes
one arbitrary neighbor per node.While the original set of nodes is unlikely to contain
the few hubs in the network, the randomly selected neighbors are much more likely
to be hubs, since many edges are adjacent to high-degree nodes.
Figure10.3 plots the fraction of infected nodes. The fraction decreases as the
diversity grows to L = 14 but stabilizes around 11% because the hubs are not
immunized. When acquaintance immunization selects 2% of the nodes, all but three
Fig. 10.3 The fraction of infected nodes in a static networkwith 10,670 nodes, outbreak probability
q = 10−1, download probability p = 10−3, malware detection probability r = 10−3, and diversity
L = 14
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of the hubs are immunized. The fraction of infected nodes reduces to about 0.1%.
Figure10.3 illustrates that imperfect detection and immunization of hubs reduce the
fraction of infected nodes, even when the spreading pattern contains a subnetwork
of tightly connected hubs.
Additional simulations with varying parameter values confirm the model behav-
ior reported. In particular, simulations using acquaintance immunization confirm
the adequacy of imperfect hub immunization. The additional simulations further
strengthen the claim that compiler-generated software diversity, periodic down-
loads of software from application stores, and imperfect malware detection/removal
together provide a networked computing system with a degree of anti-fragility to
multimalware spreading.
10.4 Discussion
Theanti-fragilemalware-halting technique scales to largenetworked systemsbecause
compiler-generated software diversity and malware detection can be implemented
as cloud services. While empirical work is needed to determine the real-world per-
formance of the combined services, it is encouraging that there exist commercial
anti-malware solutions running in the cloud. According to Franz’s research group
[24, 89], it is cost-effective to compile diverse software in the cloud. Furthermore, the
impact of software diversity on the runtime performance is small and it is possible
to securely patch diverse software. Still, challenges remain.
While acquaintance immunization is useful for simulating imperfect detection
and immunization of hubs, the strategy is not the best choice for real networked sys-
tems, because many potential super-spreaders, such as popular websites, are known.
The challenge is to ensure that the owners of potential super-spreaders harden their
systems. Users could be warned to stay away from infected websites, making it nec-
essary for owners to remove the malware and harden the systems to get their users
back. At the time of this writing, Google informs users and webmasters of unsafe
websites (http://google.com/transparencyreport/safebrowsing).
Netflix’s decision to induce failures in their production system to repeatedly
increase robustness to downtime raises the question of whether to use infectious
“goodware” to improve the detection of susceptible devices and speed up the learn-
ing process leading to anti-fragility to malware spreading. While ethical questions
are associated with this approach, it is worth investigating.
Although users today regularly download software from application stores, more
work is needed to create self-repairing (up to a point) devices that remove malware
and install diverse software in a way acceptable to users.
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What to learn from Part III
Part III analyzed how to prevent infectious malware from spreading over huge
networks of computing devices. Through a series of analyses, we developed
a malware-halting technique that stops frequent multimalware outbreaks with
an unknown and time-varying spreading mechanism. The technique combines
application stores with compiler-generated software diversity, imperfect mal-
ware detection, and the semi-periodic reinstallation of software on devices. If
compiler-generated software diversity and malware detection are realized in the
cloud, then the malware-halting technique scales to huge networks, because it
does not require any tightly coupled interactions or adaptations between groups
of computing devices.
More efficient malware-halting techniques exist that require less software
diversity to halt malware outbreaks on spreading networks with known and
unchanging topologies. The problemwith these techniques is that the topologies
of spreading networks are rarely known in practice. Furthermore, the topologies
change over time as the malware writers change the spreading mechanisms.
Finally, the previously known techniques require a high degree of central con-
trol, limiting the ability to scale to millions of devices. To ensure scaling, we
relinquished central control and made a strategical decision to not let the perfect
be the enemy of the good. Hence, instead of trying to minimize the needed soft-
ware diversity, we focused on creating a simple technique that takes advantage
of existing and proposed technologies to halt frequent multimalware outbreaks
with unknown and changing spreading mechanisms.
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The HTM Learning Algorithm
According to the fail fast principle in Chap.4, we need to learn from systems’ abnor-
mal behavior and downright failures to achieve anti-fragility to classes of negative
events. The earlier we can detect problems, the smaller the negative consequences
are and the faster we can start learning how to improve the systems. Since humans are
not good at detecting anomalies, especially in streaming data from large cloud appli-
cations, a form of automatic anomaly detection is needed. There are many ways to
detect anomalies, depending on which complex adaptive system we consider. For
example, Internet banking solutions employ a rich set of heuristics to detect fraud
[26]. This first chapter of Part IV introduces a general learning algorithm based on
Hawkins’s developing theory of how the brain learns, called hierarchical temporal
memory (HTM) [27, 96]. The HTM learning algorithm, or just HTM, is used in the
next chapter to detect anomalies in a system’s behavior. HTMwas earlier referred to
as the cortical learning algorithm.
The underlying basis for theHTM learning algorithm is not easy to understand and
the algorithm itself is still being developed. To grasp HTM’s novelty and importance,
the current chapter first discusses the approach to learning taken by traditional artifi-
cial intelligence (AI) research, as well as efforts to “train” artificial neural networks
to realize particular input–output mappings defined by data “training sets.” Second,
the chapter outlines why HTM is an improvement over these earlier approaches.
Finally, it provides a fairly detailed description of the HTM learning algorithm (with
some algorithmic details left out to ease understanding).
While Hawkins’ general theory on how the brain works is very interesting, this
chapter only provides enough information to understand the major steps of the HTM
learning algorithm. The reader wanting to know more about the theory behind HTM
should study Hawkins’ book On Intelligence written with Sandra Blakeslee [27].
More technical information on HTM is given in a white paper [96] by Numenta
(http://numenta.com), which was set up to develop the algorithm for both commer-
cial and scientific use. An open source project, called the Numenta platform for intel-
ligent computing (NuPIC) (http://numenta.org), provides HTM program code and
documentation. YouTube (see also http://numenta.com/learn) has a growing number
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of talks by Hawkins and others at Numenta on different aspects of HTM. Ryan Price
[97] and Michael Galetzka [98] have studied the capabilities and performance of
HTM. This chapter is mainly based on information provided by the above sources.
11.1 The Problem with Classical AI Research
Learning to recognize known patterns and predict future patterns remains a major
challenge for AI, because any autonomous agent needs these abilities to operate suc-
cessfully in a changing environment. Decades of classical AI research, as well as all
the work carried in the 1980s and early 1990s to train artificial neural networks, have
not been able to replicate human learning [99, 100, 101]. Themainmistake, according
to Hawkins [27], was not understanding how the human brain learns and, instead,
treating the brain as a computer that could be programmed to produce intelligent
behavior. The goal of classical AI was to develop algorithms that would first match
and then later surpass human intelligence. Unfortunately, the programs developed
were only good at the particular task for which they were designed. The programs
did not have the ability to generalize or to show flexibility in the face of changing
circumstances. Finally, there were significant unsolved problems on how to represent
knowledge in computers.
The author of this book was among the many postdoctoral researchers in the
early 1990s developing algorithms to train simple models of neural networks. After
much work by many scientists, it became evident that, while these trainable neural
network models could learn relatively small problem instances, they did not scale to
handle large instances due to an exponential increase in training time and a limited
ability to generalize to new circumstances. More recent deep learning algorithms for
multilayer neural networks solve larger problem instances and have many interesting
applications [102]. However, as for the earlier learning algorithms, deep learning still
requires custom training in batch mode for specific tasks and does not continuously
learn like the brain.
The limited success of classical AI and neural network research has made many
scientists suspect that the brain does not run a large collection of specialized learn-
ing algorithms. Other scientists still believe that specialized learning algorithms are
needed to achieve a high degree of intelligence. Only future research will show who
is correct.
11.2 An Alternative Approach to Learning
Hawkins [27] believes the best way to understand how the brain learns is to use its
biology as guidance while thinking about learning as an algorithmic problem with a
solution implementable on computers, perhaps in the cloud, or, even better, in silicon.
Not everybody agrees that the brain is an algorithmic machine (or Turing machine)
11.2 An Alternative Approach to Learning 115
[103]. Some scientists and philosophers believe the brain to be a different type of
machine based on quantum effects [104, 105, 106]. Here, we do not discuss whether
the brain is a quantum computer, since HTM learning is purely algorithmic.
Hawkins has based HTM on a 1978 hypothesis by Vernon Mountcastle [107]. It
states that the neocortex uses essentially the same learning algorithm to process the
signals from all of the body’s sensory organs. HTM is a general learning algorithm
and a memory system storing invariant representations of physical structures and
abstract concepts. While a traditional specialized AI learning algorithm must be
programmed in great detail, HTM is self-learning. Furthermore, whereas artificial
neural networks must be trained offline using particular training sets, HTM learns in
real time as the data come in. Finally, unlike artificial neural networks, which require
retraining when the world changes, HTM is able to forget old representations and
learn new representations in real time.
HTM is based on the assumption that the world has structure and is therefore
predictable. Theworld is not chaotic andnot homogeneous but complex.The complex
but structured behavior of the world allows HTM to learn by creating invariant
representations of common patterns reported by the senses. The patterns occur in
sequences, enabling HTM to predict future behavior based on earlier experienced
behavior. Here, a sequence is a set of patterns that generally accompany each other
but not always in a fixed order. The important point is that patterns of a sequence
follow each other in time, although the order may vary. HTM is adaptable, allowing it
to learn changes in the environment. Old memories are removed and new memories
are formed.While HTMmodels the processing of sensory streams for human vision,
touch, hearing, and language, it can also be exposed to non-human sensory input
streams such as web traffic, data from cloud computing infrastructures, financial
market data, and weather data [96].
11.3 The Brain’s Neocortex
To understand how the HTM learning algorithm works, it is advantageous to first
study its biological basis [27, 96]. HTM is modeled after the structure and operation
of the neocortex, or just cortex, in the brain. The cortex is responsible for learning. It is
a sheet of neural tissue approximately 1,000cm2 in area and 2.5mm thick. The cortex
looks like a dinner napkin wrapped around the older areas of the brain. The cortex
contains at least 30 billion nerve cells, or neurons. It consists of six layers formed
by variations in the density of cell bodies, cell types, and cell connections. There are
five layers of cells and one non-cellular layer. During early development, the cortex
divides itself into dozens of functional areas, or regions, based on experience and
needs. The function of a region is determined by the information that flows into it.
Note that a region comprises all six layers of the cortex. In the following, we consider
three important aspects of the neocortex and its neurons.
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11.3.1 Communication
Classical artificial neural networks model the function of a neuron as a weighted
summation of inputs followed by a non-linear operation on the sum. We now know
fromneuroscience that cortical neurons carry outmuchmore complex operations. An
important reason why HTM improves on previous attempts to train neural networks
is that HTM utilizes a radically different neuron model, heavily inspired by cortical
neurons. The neurons in the cortex communicate with each other via electrical and
chemical signals. The signals are the basis of memory and learning in the cortex.
As depicted in Fig. 11.1, a typical neuron consists of the cell body, or soma, many
dendrites, and a single axon. The branch-like dendrites receive incoming signals from
other neurons and the axon and its terminal branches transmit outgoing signals to
other neurons. Some axons are coated with myelin, a fatty substance that insulates
the axon and increases the speed of communication. Signals pass between neurons
at connections called synapses. Note from Fig. 11.1 that neurons do not touch. There
is a microscopic gap, denoted the synaptic cleft (see inset), between the axon of one
neuron and the dendrite of another.
The signaling occurs roughly as follows: When neuron A receives a chemical
signal from another neuron, neuron A becomes electrically charged relative to the
surrounding fluid outside its membrane. The electrical charge travels down the axon,
away from A’s soma, until it reaches a synapse. Inside the synapse is a group of
storage sites, denoted vesicles, containing chemicals manufactured by the soma.
When the electrical charge arrives at the synapse, it causes these vesicles to fuse with
the synapse’s cell membrane, spilling molecules, called neurotransmitters, into the
Fig. 11.1 Signal propagating down an axon to the dendrites of the next cells (figure from http://
urbanchildinstitute.org/why-0-3/baby-and-brain)
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synaptic cleft. The neurotransmitters move across the synaptic cleft to one of neuron
B’s dendrites,where they bindwith receptor sites in the dendrite’smembrane.Neuron
B develops an electrical charge, the charge travels down its axon, and the described
process repeats itself.
While some cortical regions receive input directly from the body’s sensory organs,
other regions receive input only after it has passed through intermediate regions. The
regions are connected via large bundles of axons or fibers. Information flows in
parallel over these fibers at all times. The regions process a continuous stream of
signals that create patterns in space and time inside the neocortex. The cortex does
not experience the world directly; it only has access to patterns coming from the
sensory organs. These patterns all have the same format inside the brain, allowing
the cortex’s different regions to use the same learning algorithm.
11.3.2 Memory
The cortex is not some kind of parallel computer that makes many computations
on input patterns to create output patterns. Instead, the cortex rapidly retrieves out-
puts from its huge memory. All memories in the cortex are stored in the synaptic
connections between neurons. While both the cortex and computers have memories,
there are large differences: The cortex stores sequences of patterns, it recalls patterns
auto-associatively, and it stores invariant patterns in hierarchies.
In more detail, the memory of the cortex automatically stores sequences of pat-
terns. Memory recall almost always follows a path of association. Auto-associativity
simplymeans that patterns are associatedwith themselves. An auto-associativemem-
ory can retrieve a complete pattern from a partial or noisy input sequence. This is true
for both spatial and temporal patterns. The cortex is constantly completing patterns
from noisy and partial inputs.
Regions are connected in hierarchies. Regions at a low level of a hierarchy store
simple physical and abstract objects. These objects are combined into larger objects
in higher regions. Simple objects can be a part of many hierarchies. Each region
forms invariant representations of objects. The invariant representations allow the
cortex to recognize faces and physical objects, although the light, viewing angle, and
surroundings change all the time. The higher layers of the cortex combine information
from the lower layers to understand multi-sensory inputs over time, for example, a
film with both sound and moving images.
11.3.3 Predictions
The cortex combines the invariant representations with new inputs to make predic-
tions about everything a human sees, feels, and hears. According to Hawkins [27],
prediction is the primary function of the cortex and the basis for intelligence. We are
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interested in the cortex’s ability to predict, because an anomaly is detected when a
prediction is violated. The reader should know that a great deal of information also
flows downward in the hierarchies of the cortex. While these feedback connections
are crucial to understanding how the brain creates behavior, they do not play an
important role in the current version of HTM and will not be discussed here.
11.4 Overview of HTM
The HTM learning algorithm models how learning occurs in a single layer of the
cortex. Input to the algorithm is a continuous stream of input patterns from some
kind of system. HTM builds sparse, invariant representations of pattern sequences
representing repeated structures in the input stream. The algorithm learns which
patterns are likely to follow each other, thus learning to predict future patterns. When
the HTM receives a novel pattern, it will try to match it to stored patterns. Because
inputs never repeat in exactly the same way, invariance of the stored sequences is
vital to the ability to recognize inputs.
Time plays a crucial role in HTM. Predictions can only be made on the basis of a
sequence of earlier received patterns. Sometimes it is enough to know the previous
patternmost recently receivedwhile at other times it is also necessary to knowpatterns
received earlier. The ability to predict using variable-length sequences of patterns is
due to the variable order memory of HTM. Note that HTM does not understand
the meaning of patterns; it only knows what patterns are likely to follow particular
observed patterns.
11.4.1 Sparse Distributed Representation
HTM generates internal sparse distributed representations (SDRs) of the input pat-
terns. An SDR is given by a binary vector with a fixed number of bits. Different
vector lengths are possible. A vector can contain 2,048 bits, only 2% of which are
ones, called active bits. The zero bits are the inactive bits. The individual bits in an
SDR have semantic meaning, unlike, for example, the dense eight-bit ASCII code,
where all bit patterns are used and the characters are assigned bit patterns randomly.
In an SDR, two inputs with similar semantic meaning must have similar binary
vector representations, that is, they must have many equal bits when the vectors
are compared position by position. This happens naturally for visually similar black
and white pictures, while the binary representations of natural numbers with nearly
the same values may not have a single bit in common, for example, 7 = 01112 and
8 = 10002. The SDR property is vital to HTM’s ability to learn [27]. It is therefore
often necessary to recode input data to HTM to ensure that vectors sharing active bits
have similar semantic meaning. If the encoded input vectors are dense, then HTM
creates a sparse representation.
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Ahmad and Hawkins [108] have developed exact bounds on HTM’s level of fault
tolerance and robustness to noise. The bounds show that the use of SDRs makes it
easy to construct HTM systems that are very robust to perturbations.
11.4.2 Proximal Dendrite Segments
HTMarranges artificial cells in 2,048 columns,with 32 cells in each column.Concep-
tually, the columns are arranged in a two-dimensional array, as illustrated in Fig. 11.2.
Note that only a small part of the array is shown. Figure11.3 illustrates how all the
cells in a column share a single proximal dendrite segment receiving feed-forward
input. Each column has potential connections to a random selection of the bits in an
input vector to HTM. These bits are called the potential bits or the potential pool.
The status of the connections is determined by the synapses in Fig. 11.3.
HTM uses the concept of permanence to change the connectedness of synapses.
Permanence is a scalar value ranging from zero to one. It is assigned to a synapse
to represent the degree of connectedness between the axon and the dendrite. A per-
manence value of zero represents a potential synapse that is not valid and has not
progressed toward becoming a valid synapse. A permanence value above a thresh-
old (typically 0.2) represents a synapse that has just connected but could easily be
unconnected. A high permanence value, for example, 0.9, represents a synapse that is
connected and cannot easily be unconnected.When a synapse’s permanence is above
a threshold, it is connected with weight one. Below the threshold, it is unconnected
with weight zero. Note that there is no individual weighting of synaptic connections
as in classical neural networks. Instead, HTM has the ability to create and remove
these connections. According to Hawkins [27], HTM achieves a higher information
Fig. 11.2 HTM contains columns of cells with active cells shown in gray. When there is no prior
state, all or none of the cells in a column are active
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Fig. 11.3 The cells in a
column share a proximal
dendrite, with synapses
represented by small black
circles. A solid circle
represents a valid synapse
connection with a
permanence value above the
connection threshold and an
empty circle represents a
potential synapse connection
with a permanence value
below the connection
threshold. Feed-forward
input activates a column after
a local inhibition step if
enough valid synapses are
connected to active input bits
storage capacity by forming and removing synaptic connections than changing the
weights of permanent connections.
Each column determines its activation from the input vector by summing the
input bits in positions with permanence larger than the threshold. The sum of the
bits in these positions constitutes the overlap score. The higher the score, that is,
the more active ones, the more overlap between the input and the pattern represented
by the column. Columns with the greatest overlap (strongest activations) inhibit,
or deactivate, columns with weaker activations. The inhibition function achieves a
relatively constant percentage of (about 2%, or 40) active columns, even when the
number of input bits that are active varies significantly. The result is an SDR of the
input encoded by which columns are active and inactive after inhibition.
11.4.3 Distal Dendrite Segments
In addition to the single proximal dendrite segment, a cell has about 130 distal
dendrite segments, eachwith roughly 40 synapses. The distal segments receive lateral
input from nearby cells. Figure11.4 shows the distal dendrites and illustrates the
cell’s states. The set of potential synapses connects to a subset of other cells within a
neighborhood defined by a “learning radius.” A dendrite segment forms connections
to cells that were active together at an earlier time, thus remembering the activation
state of other cells in the neighborhood. If the same cellular activation pattern is
encountered again by one of its segments, that is, the number of active synapses on
any segment is above a threshold, the cell will enter a predictive state indicating that
feed-forward input is expected to result in column activation soon.
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Fig. 11.4 Each distal dendrite segment of a cell has synapse connections to other cells within the
neighborhood. A solid gray circle represents a valid synapse connection to another cell and an
empty circle represents a potential synapse connection. The cell enters a predictive state if at least
one of its dendrite segments is connected to enough active cells. A cell’s binary-valued predictive
state is not propagated. Column activation due to feed-forward input via the proximal dendrite is
shown in black in the bottom left. The binary-valued active state is the feed-forward output of the
cell and is also propagated to other cells via lateral connections depicted in the upper left
A cell is active due to feed-forward input via the proximal dendrite or lateral
connections via the distal dendrite segments. The former is called the active state
and the latter is called the predictive state (see Fig. 11.4). Only the feed-forward
active state is connected to other cells in the region. The predictive state is internal
to the cell and is not propagated. The complete output of HTM is a binary vector
representing the active states of all cells.
11.5 The Three Steps of HTM
At each discrete time instance, HTM carries out three steps on the new input. The
following descriptions of the steps, detailed in the next sections, are taken from [96]:
Step 1 Create an SDR of the input by activating whole columns.
Step 2 Place the input in context by selecting among cells in active columns.
Step 3 Predict future patterns from learned transitions between SDRs.
11.5.1 Make an SDR of the Input
The first step determines the active columns of cells in HTM (see Fig. 11.2). Each
column is connected to a subset of the input bits via the synapses on a proximal den-
drite. Subsets for different columnsmay overlap but they are not equal. Consequently,
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different input patterns result in different levels of activation of the columns. The
columns with the strongest activation inhibit columns with weaker activation. The
size of the inhibition area around a column is adjustable and can span from very
small to the entire region. The inhibition mechanism ensures a sparse representation
of the input. If only a few input bits change, some columns will receive a fewmore or
a few less active one inputs, but the set of active columns is not likely to changemuch.
Therefore, similar input patterns will map to a relatively stable set of active
columns.
HTM learns by forming and unforming connections between cells. Learning
occurs by updating the permanence values of the synapses. Only the active columns
increment the permanence value of synapses connected to active bits and decrement
otherwise. Columns that do not become active for a long period do not learning
anything. To not waste columns, the overlap scores of these columns are “boosted”
to ensure that all columns partake in the learning of patterns.
11.5.2 Represent the Input in Context of Previous Inputs
Cells can be in one of three states. If a cell is active due to feed-forward input, then
it is in the active state. If the cell is active due to lateral connections to other nearby
cells, however, then it is in the predictive state; otherwise it is in the inactive state.
The second step converts the columnar representation of the input into a new
representation that includes the past context. The new representation is formed by
activating a subset of the cellswithin each column, typically only one cell per column.
The rule used to activate cells is as follows: When a column becomes active, HTM
checks all the cells in the column. If one or more cells in the column are already
in the predictive state, only those cells become active. If no cells in the column are
in the predictive state, then all the cells become active. The rule can be understood
as follows: If an input pattern is expected, then HTM confirms that expectation by
activating only the cells in the predictive state. If the input pattern is unexpected,
then HTM activates all the cells in the column to signal that the input occurred
unexpectedly.
By selecting different active cells in each active column, HTM can represent the
exact same input differently in different contexts. Figure11.5 illustrates how HTM
can represent the sequence AB as part of two larger sequences CABF and HABG. The
same columns have active cells in both cases but the active cells differ. If there is
no prior state and therefore no context or prediction, all the cells in a column will
become active when the column becomes active. This scenario occurs especially
when HTM first starts processing input (see Fig. 11.2).
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Fig. 11.5 The sequence AB
is part of two larger
sequences. The same active
columns represent AB in
both cases but the active cells
differ because the larger
sequences are different
11.5.3 Make Prediction from Current and Previous Inputs
The third and final step makes a prediction of likely new input. The prediction is
based on the representation formed in the second step, which includes context from
all previous input patterns. When HTMmakes a prediction, all cells that are likely to
become active due to future feed-forward input are changed to the predictive state.
Because the representations are sparse, multiple predictions can be made at the same
time instance. Together the cells in the predictive state represent HTM’s prediction(s)
for the next input.
The predictive state of any cell in HTM is determined by its distal segments.
A segment connects to cells via synapses on distal dendrites. If enough of these
cells are active, then the segment becomes active (see Fig. 11.4). A cell switches to
the predictive state when it has at least one active segment. However, a cell that is
already active from the second step does not switch to the predictive state. Learning
occurs by adjusting the permanence values of the synapses on active segments at
every time step. The permanence of a synapse is only updated when a predicted
cell actually becomes active during the next time instance. The permanence of a
synapse connecting to an active cell is increased while the permanence of a synapse
to an inactive cell is decreased. (Note that the full update rules are significantly more
complicated than those presented here. See [96] for a more detailed description of
the rules.)
To apply the HTM learning algorithm to a particular data source, Numenta uses
optimization techniques to choose optional HTM components, select parameter
values, and determine which data fields to include (http://youtube.com/watch?v=
xYPKjKQ4YZ0).
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11.6 Discussion and Summary
Classical AI solutions are task specific and brittle; they can only do one major thing
and they fail too easily. Hawkins [27] and Numenta [96] have developed and imple-
mented a general learning algorithm, the HTM learning algorithm, that overcomes
the weaknesses of the classical solutions [108]. HTM’s general learning rules are to
train on every input; if a pattern is repeated, then reinforce it; and if a pattern is not
repeated, then forget it.
When a new input vector arrives, it leads to a sparse set of active cell columns.
One or more of the cells in each column become active; these cells, in turn, cause
other cells to enter a predictive state through learned lateral connections between
cells in different columns. The cells activated by the lateral connections constitute
a prediction of what is likely to happen next. When the next input vector arrives, it
selects another sparse set of active columns. If a newly active column is unexpected—
meaning that it was not predicted by any cells—it will activate all the cells in the
column. If a newly active column has one or more predicted cells, only those cells
will become active. The output vector contains the feed-forward output of all cells.
While the current HTM realization has hundreds of millions of synapses (300
million using the numbers in this chapter), the brain has trillions of synapses, mak-
ing it clear that the HTM implementation is only simulating a tiny part of the brain.
In the future, it should be possible to connect HTMs together in hierarchies to obtain
more brain-like simulations. At the time of this writing, Hawkins and Numenta are
working to introduce motor control into HTM and refining the functionality accord-
ing to the behavior of the cortex. In the next chapter, we consider how to use HTM
to detect anomalies in cloud-based systems.
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Chapter 12
Anomaly Detection with HTM
We model information and communications technology (ICT) systems as complex
adaptive systems. Since we cannot hope to predict all future incidents in complex
systems, real-timemonitoring is needed to detect local failures before they propagate
into global failures with an intolerable impact. In particular, monitoring is required
to determine the consequences of injecting artificial errors into production systems
and to learn how to avoid or limit the impact of future incidents.
In Part II we argued that anti-fragile ICT solutions in the cloud should have a
service-oriented architecture with microservices, preferably created by development
andoperations (DevOps) teams. Sincemicroservices dependonmuch fewer variables
than a complete system, it is possible to monitor and diagnose microservice failures.
However, the ability to monitor these services does not come for free [53]. DevOps
teams need monitoring and logging setups for each type of microservice showing the
up/down status, current throughput and latency, and details on circuit breaker status.
In this chapter, we discuss what an anomaly means and how the hierarchical
temporal memory (HTM) learning algorithm detects anomalies in data streams. The
HTM algorithm can be applied to many different types of data streams. Grok is an
application that Numenta built on top of the Numenta Platform for Intelligent Com-
puting (NuPIC) implementation of HTM (http://numenta.org/nupic.html) to detect
anomalies in metric data provided by the AmazonWeb Services (AWS) cloud. Here,
we examine how Grok detects and displays anomalies in AWS streaming data. We
then study how HTM detects rogue human behavior. The chapter is mostly based
on information provided by Numenta [109, 110], including talks by Ahmad (http://
youtube.com/watch?v=nVCKjZWYavM) and Purdy (http://youtube.com/watch?v=
I5lSEHvngaI).
12.1 Anomalies
Complex ICT systems generate much data about their own operations. Cloud solu-
tions are no exception. In fact, cloud providers offer services that allow solution own-
ers to easily access operational data from their own cloud applications. The Internet
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of Things will likely lead to a huge increase in sensors generating continuous data
streams about the status of both natural and man-made systems. The many data
streams from current and future systems will make it impossible to analyze all the
data in detail. One interesting alternative is to look for anomalies in the streams to
detect the beginning of failures. There is evidence that it is possible to detect the
beginning of large failures in different types of complex adaptive systems before the
impact becomes intolerable [111, 112].
Anomalies are data patterns that do not conform to expected behavior [113].Adata
stream of patterns can have several types of anomalies. A spatial (static) anomaly
is a single pattern or set of relatively closely spaced patterns in the data stream
that deviates from what is standard, normal, or expected. A temporal anomaly is a
set of surprising transitions between patterns. Note that it is the temporal sequence
that is surprising, not the individual patterns themselves. If the patterns in a stream
are highly random, then it is hard or even impossible to detect spatial and temporal
anomalies. However, it is possible to detect a change in the distribution of the random
data, denoted a distribution anomaly. All three types of anomalies are temporary
anomalies. When a surprising change first appears, then it is an anomaly. If it appears
multiple times, then it is the “new normal” and ceases to be an anomaly.
12.2 HTM Anomaly Score
The Grok application built on top of HTM detects spatial, temporal, and distribu-
tion anomalies. Since HTM is an online continuous learning system, it will detect
temporary anomalies and quickly learn when they are the new normal. HTM works
for both numerical and categorical input data. The two data types can be mixed in
an input stream to HTM because they are both converted to a sparse distributed
representation (SDR).
HTM calculates an anomaly score for each new pattern it receives [109]. If a
received pattern was predicted, then the anomaly score is zero. If the pattern was
not predicted at all, then the score is one. A partially predicted pattern has a score
between zero and one. The actual score depends on the “similarity” between the
actual received pattern and the predicted pattern. The similarity is determined by the
SDR. The larger the overlap between actual and predicted bits in column space, the
smaller the anomaly score.
If none of the cells in a column were predicted, then all the cells are made active.
This process is referred to as bursting. It occurs when there is no context, that is,
when HTM is learning a new transition. At each time instance, the anomaly score
is simply the fraction given by the number of bursting columns divided by the total
number of active columns. In the beginning of the training, the anomaly score will
be high because most patterns will be new. As HTM learns, the anomaly score will
diminish until there is a change in the pattern stream.
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Fig. 12.1 Normal
distribution of anomaly




12.3 HTM Anomaly Probabilities
There are cases where the anomaly score is all that is needed to detect anomalies,
but there are also cases where the anomaly score produces too many false positives
because the metric data are very noisy. To deal with noise, we compute anomaly
probabilities. The anomaly probability values are calculated relative to historical
metric data rather than being absolute measurements of anomalous behavior. In
other words, the goal is to detect changes in the anomaly score itself.
To determine anomaly probabilities, we consider a window of previous calculated
anomaly scores and compute estimates of the expectation and standard deviation of
the values, assuming normally distributed scores. Figure12.1 depicts the right half of
a normal distribution of possible score values.When a new anomaly score arrives, we
estimate how likely the value is using the normal distribution based on the window
of previous values. A new value on the x-axis under the central area of the curve in
Fig. 12.1 is a typical value that we should expect to see often. Typical values of the
anomaly score indicate that the system is operating as desired.
To detect anomalies, we look for values associated with the right tail of the com-
puted normal distribution. Values falling in the beginning of the tail in Fig. 12.1 are
somewhat unusual, while values further out in the tail represent anomalous behavior.
Because the distribution of the anomaly scores can change over time, the estimates
of the expectation and standard deviation of the normal distribution are recalculated
as the window slides over the previously received scores.
12.4 Grok the Cloud
The word grok was coined by Robert A. Heinlein in his 1961 science fiction novel
Stranger in a Strange Land. To grok means to understand so thoroughly that the
observer becomes a part of the observed. Numenta has built an application called
Grok on top of the NuPIC implementation of HTM to detect anomalies in metric
data from the AWS cloud. The application utilizes HTM to learn streaming metrics
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Fig. 12.2 While the blue
curve showing CPU
utilization looks normal to
humans, Grok detected an
anomaly (picture from [109])
from virtual machine clusters and to identify anomalies in these metrics. Grok builds
a separate model for each monitored AWS metric. The metric values are combined
with timestamps to allow Grok to learn patterns related to the time of day or the
day of the week. To reduce the number of false positives, Grok calculates anomaly
probabilities.
Figure12.2 shows a part of the Grok user interface. The blue graph with the black
background shows the CPU utilization of a virtual machine in the AWS cloud. The
corresponding anomaly score is shown directly below. Grok uses color-coded bars
to depict anomaly scores. The color and height of a bar have the same meaning,
making it easier to see anomalies. The three types of anomaly probabilities, typical,
somewhat unusual, and anomalies (see Fig. 12.1), are used to color the bars. Red
represents an anomaly, a highly improbable score with a probability around 0.001%.
Yellow and green represent progressively more common scores.
The example in Fig. 12.2 illustrates that Grok can detect anomalies that are hard
for a human to see in a raw metric stream. When it is not obvious why Grok flagged
an anomaly, an operator can view the anomaly scores of other AWS metrics to gain
more insight. Since Grok builds an independent model for each monitored metric
stream, a system operator can obtain several independent confirmations that a virtual
machine has unusual behavior.
In the next example, a load balancer distributes requests from many clients over
a set of servers. The load balancer produces a fairly unpredictable or noisy met-
ric stream showing the latency in serving web pages to clients. The blue curve in
Fig. 12.3 represents the metric values fed into Grok, while the green, yellow, and
red bars represent the anomaly scores colored according to the calculated anomaly
probabilities. The example illustrates that Grok can find anomalies in noisy data.
In Chap.5, we discussed how software engineers induced artificial failures into
Netflix’smedia streaming system to discover vulnerabilities early,when their impacts
are small. Early vulnerability detection allows engineers to improve systems and
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Fig. 12.3 An anomalous
pattern detected within a
noisy metric stream from a
load balancer (picture from
[109])
Fig. 12.4 A process to
detect and mitigate the
impact of induced (and
natural) failures in virtual
machines (VMs)
avoid failures with intolerable impacts. The flow diagram in Fig. 12.4 illustrates how
Grok can be integrated into a process to detect and mitigate the impact of induced
(and natural) failures in applications running in the AWS cloud. How the learn-
ing/mitigation step will be carried out depends on the application being monitored.
Today, this step is carried out by humans. In the future, it may be possible to automate
at least part of the step.
12.5 Rogue Behavior
Numenta has developed an application for rogue behavior detection (RBD) based
on HTM [110]. Using human- and machine-generated data, the RBD application
automatically models an individual’s behavior and identifies irregular actions. This
anomaly detection of irregular human behavior is useful for ICT security, device
access control, and fraud detection.
The RBD application has several attractive properties due to HTM. First, it is not
necessary to divide employees into classes and define what normal behavior is for
each class. Furthermore, there is no need for a separate training period or retraining,
since employee behavior changes over time. The application learns continuously in
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Fig. 12.5 An employee
anomaly (picture from [110])
real time and builds a separate model for each monitored individual, thus achieving
high-precision anomaly detection for all individuals. The same high-quality detection
is generally not possible with class-based monitoring. Finally, real-time anomaly
detection enables quick corrective actions to avoid or at least reduce the negative
consequences of illegal actions.
Figure12.5 shows part of the user interface for the RBD application. The senior
analyst monitored, Diana Lucero, is part of an experiment to test the application.
She exhibits unusual behavior at 11a.m. Drilling down to see the anomaly scores
for the individual metric streams, we find spikes in both the file activity and CPU
usage. Further investigation finds that the RBD application reacted because the ana-
lyst generated and stored a large .zip file containing intellectual property. The early
detection of this activity made it possible to stop the analyst from transmitting the
file to a third party.
12.6 Detecting the Beginning of Swans
In this book, we have assumed that there is no fundamental difference between
frequent incidents with a tolerable impact and rare incidents with an intolerable
impact, called swans. Most swans simply start out as local incidents that do not stop
but propagate due to positive feedback loops. According to Sect. 2.3, to predict any
future incident, we must describe the event, estimate its probability, and calculate
the impact. In Chap. 2, we argued that humans have limited ability to predict swans.
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It is unlikely that a group of stakeholders will predict all potential swans in a complex
adaptive ICT system, even if they use significant resources in classical risk analysis.
At the time of this writing, the detection of catastrophic events in real time is an
active area of research [111, 112]. Because global or emergent failures very often start
out as local failures in complex ICT systems, it is possible to detect the beginning of
a swan in real time, even though we may not immediately understand the underlying
reasons for its occurrence. HTM detects unlikely behavior by observing the fraction
of bursting cell columns. Because HTM can be applied to different data streams, it
can detect the beginning of swans in different types of complex ICT systems. It is still
essential to realize the four design principles in Chap. 4 to avoid positive feedback
loops that quickly propagate local failures into global failures before countermeasures
can be introduced.
12.7 Discussion and Summary
Government agencies regulate many complex adaptive ICT systems of national
importance. Unfortunately, it is very hard for a regulator to gain an adequate under-
standing of a complex ICT system without being closely involved in its design and
daily operation. A regulator can set all kinds of non-functional requirements but
cannot discover system fragilities or request useful improvements from afar. Regu-
lation and compliance really only make sense for relatively simple systems that have
one best method of working [18]. There will always be a significant gap between a
regulator’s understanding of a complex ICT system and the way it really operates.
This gap must be filled by other stakeholders. This is particularly true for complex
ICT systems with microservice architectures.
For a system to achieve anti-fragility to a class of negative events, stakeholders
must monitor the operation of the microservices, especially their outputs, and detect
anomalies. While information technology (IT) departments know how to monitor
monolithic applications with single executables, it is more challenging to monitor
applications of microservices running in clouds and communicating over network
connections. Since a solutionmay fail even though all its microservices work accord-
ing to their specifications (see Sect. 4.6), it may be necessary to trace the communi-
cation between services to understand why a particular service received input values
for which it was not designed. Furthermore, there are many network connections
where latency could cause intermediate problems. Hence, sophisticated monitoring
of a large number of microservices and their communications is needed to detect
anomalies, determine failures, and create anti-fragile solutions.
A comprehensive comparison of different techniques to detect anomalies in
streaming data is outside the scope of this book. We have only illustrated how HTM
detects anomalies in two domains. However, the performance results of Price [97],
Galetzka [98], and Numenta [109, 110] strongly indicate that HTM is a good choice
for anomaly detection in streaming data. In 2015, Numenta published source code
and test data to compare the performance of anomaly detection algorithms. The initial
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results show that the HTM algorithm detects anomalies earlier than other popular
algorithms (http://github.com/Numenta/NAB). If we have good anomaly detectors
connected to a complex adaptive ICT system, then we can detect anomalies before
the whole system breaks down. We have seen that HTM is able to detect changes
before it is obvious to a human that a new problem is brewing.
A reader interested in more information about anomaly detection with HTM, as
well as more examples detecting sudden, slow, and subtle anomalies, should study
Numenta’s two white papers [109, 110]. At the time of this writing, is also possible
to use Grock for IT analytics and Grok for stocks on the Web.
What to learn from Part IV
Part IV introduced a novel learning algorithm based on Hawkins’ HTM theory.
HTM explains how the neocortex learns by modeling and processing data from
the body’s sensory organs. We concentrated on understanding how the HTM
learning algorithm can detect anomalies in complex adaptive ICT systems.
While most anomaly detection techniques are created to determine anomalies
in data stored in databases, HTM finds anomalies in real-time streaming data.
There is no need to store huge amounts of data since HTM builds models rep-
resenting the properties of the data.
The ability to process streaming data makes the HTM learning algorithm
ideal for applications running on cloud platforms since leading cloud providers
offer services that stream metrics about an application’s state. HTM’s ability to
process streaming data from a huge number of sensors also makes the algorithm
perfect for monitoring the Internet of Things. While the current version of HTM
is implemented in software, a hardware implementation is needed to seriously
scale the algorithm’s operation.
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Summary and Future Work
We have come to the end of the book, which has investigated different aspects
of anti-fragile information and communications technology (ICT) systems. Taleb
[10] introduced the concept of anti-fragility to show that it is not enough for large
natural or man-made systems to be robust to predictable events with a large impact.
In an unpredictable world, systems must be able to handle randomness, volatility,
and unforeseen large-impact events. Learning from artificial and real incidents is
necessary to remove vulnerabilities and prevent systems from developing fragilities
over time. This chapter summarizes the book’s main insights into the development
and operation of anti-fragile ICT systems, discusses the design of future systems,
and outlines the need for anti-fragile processes, especially to handle attacks on the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of ICT systems.
13.1 Achieving Anti-fragility
While many commentators find Taleb’s concept of anti-fragility both interesting and
useful, other commentators believe it is very similar to the well-known concepts of
robustness and resilience. To determine whether Taleb’s work [10] really brings any
new insight into the development and operation of large ICT systems, the author has
investigated different aspects of anti-fragility. The main insights are summarized in
the following.
Stakeholders of complex adaptive ICT systems must embrace hardware and soft-
ware failures because they are inevitable. Local failures should, at worst, result in
degraded performance, not systemic failures such as unplanned system downtime.
The book introduced four design principles—modularity, weak links, redundancy,
and diversity—to isolate the impact of local failures and one operational principle—
the fail fast principle—to quickly detect vulnerabilities by inducing artificial fail-
ures. The collective goal of the five principles presented is to limit the impact of
failures by failing early, isolate the impact of local failures, and learn from small
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failures how to maintain the desired performance as a system and its environment
change. Netflix’s pioneering work shows that stakeholders can build and maintain
web-scale applications in the cloud with a degree of anti-fragility to system down-
time.Analyses of telecom infrastructures and electronic government systems confirm
that the cloud facilitates anti-fragility to downtime.
A series of analyses outlined how to gain anti-fragility to the spreading ofmalware
with unknown and time-varying spreading mechanisms. It was first found that appli-
cation stores utilizing compilers with diversity engines in the cloud could generate
enough software diversity to halt frequent malware outbreaks from spreading over
huge networks of computing devices. Imperfect malware detection/removal was then
added to this simple diversity-enhancing technique to keep the fraction of infected
devices low over time. The resulting halting technique scales to prevent the spreading
of frequent malware outbreaks on networks with millions of devices. While more
work is needed to verify the practicability of the halting technique, the approach
demonstrates that it is advantageous to model huge networked computing systems
as complex adaptive systems and then apply results from network science to analyze
the models’ fragility, robustness, and anti-fragility to different classes of impacts.
If we cannot detect failures in a system, then it becomes impossible to determine
and remove vulnerabilities. Hence, wemust be able tomonitor a system’s behavior to
ensure anti-fragility to a particular type of impact. We have argued that cloud-based
software solutions should have a service-oriented architecture (SOA) with microser-
vices implemented by virtual machines. While it is hard to monitor and analyze the
internal behavior of applications with strongly connected modules, the simplicity of
weakly connected microservices makes it possible to monitor and understand their
individual behaviors. If the graph defining the dependencies between the microser-
vices is not too large and dense, then it is also possible to analyze the consequences
of the dependencies.
We need a technique to detect anomalies in streaming data because cloud
infrastructures typically stream metric data about the status of virtual machines.
Hawkins’ learning algorithm is an interesting choice for anomaly detection in stream-
ing data. The algorithm is based on a theory of how the brain learns, called hierarchi-
cal temporal memory (HTM). While the HTM learning algorithm may not always
provide the best anomaly detection, it is very flexible and can be applied to many
different metric streams. HTM automatically builds online data models, removing
the need to store huge amounts of data in a database. Since the HTM algorithm is
able to quickly detect anomalies, it facilitates corrective actions in real time. An
application called Grok utilizes the HTM learning algorithm to detect anomalies in
virtual machines running on the AmazonWeb Services (AWS) cloud. Grok is able to
detect anomalies that are hard for humans to see in the raw feed of AWSmetric data.
The application has also been successfully applied to user-defined metric streams.
In conclusion, many of today’s ICT systems with strongly connected modules
are too fragile to downtime and other large-impact events. While anti-fragile ICT
systems have no absolute guarantee of avoiding the intolerable impact of all possible
swan events, it is practicable to build systems that handle the impact of surprising
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eventsmuch better thanmany current systems. In aworldwhere people are becoming
increasingly dependent on ICT, we need to build anti-fragile systems to avoid rare
but hugely negative events affecting whole populations.
13.2 Future Anti-fragile ICT Systems
Only complex adaptive ICT systems need to be anti-fragile to different classes of
impacts because only complex systems are vulnerable to swans in the form of highly
surprising, global failures with intolerable impact. We have concentrated on how
to create anti-fragile systems in the cloud because its pay-as-you-go pricing model
makes it economically feasible for even startups and other small companies to build
anti-fragile solutions. Further investigation into the anti-fragility of ICT systems
should consider whether additional design and operational principles, as well as
anti-principles, are needed to ensure anti-fragility to different classes of impacts.
A new principle should only be introduced if it is valid for many types of systems.
The introduction of highly overlapping principles should be avoided.
Simplicity is an obvious candidate to become a general design principle for anti-
fragile systems. We have already promoted simplicity by recommending the use
of SOA with microservices. The single purpose of a microservice makes it easy to
understand what each part of a system does. Furthermore, weak links between the
services limits the effect of local failures andmakes it easier to understand a system’s
overall behavior. However, more work is needed to understand the full meaning and
impact of simplicity in the context of anti-fragile systems. New architectural patterns
facilitating anti-fragility to classes of incidents would be particularly welcome. We
also need to better understand the effort required to monitor anti-fragile systems.
Another obvious candidate to become a design principle is openness. Indirectly,
we have also promoted openness by considering the anti-principle of closedness.
Openness can undoubtedly reduce the negative impact of coincidental events. The
advantage of openness is less clear when, for example, nation states are attacking
each other’s vital ICT infrastructures. More work is needed to fully understand the
implications of openness in the context of anti-fragile systems of critical national or
international importance.
The study of real systems is necessary to gain more insight into the concept
of anti-fragility. While it is hard for independent scientists to obtain information on
electronic payment systems, studies of such systems are of particular interest because
of their great importance to society. It is particularly interesting to better understand
how fraud detection can be exploited to achieve a degree of anti-fragility to financial
losses.
The HTM theory discussed outlines how a small part of the neocortex learns
sequences and predicts future inputs. While we applied HTM to detect anomalies
in streaming metric data from the cloud, HTM theory has wider applications. The
neocortex itself is an anti-fragile system (or system of systems) because it continu-
ously learns new sequences and forgets old sequences in a way that is highly tolerant
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to noise, damaged cells, and broken connections. Future HTM theory is likely to
provide important insights into the development of anti-fragile machine learning
systems.
13.3 Future Bio-inspired System Designs
While superficial comparisons between complex adaptive ICTsystems andbiological
systems should be avoided, it is useful to view distributed ICT systems as ecosystems
or communities of autonomous entities interacting with each other and a changing
environment. To encourage the reader to consider bio-inspired system designs in the
future, we argue that ICT systems of simple and weakly connected modules avoid
much of the fragility associated with strongly connected legacy systems based on
old technologies that are hard to maintain and upgrade.
It is impossible to change an ICT system in a controlled manner if we do not
understand its functionality. While a large ICT system has very diverse functionality,
humans can only focus on one task at the time. When the human mind is forced to
focus on multiple difficult tasks simultaneously, it tries to switch between tasks in
rapid succession, making the effort of completing the tasks much more difficult.
In particular, it is hard for software developers to understand the functionality of an
ICT system consisting of many large, complicated software modules. As the original
developers of a software system move to other projects and new developers start to
modify the original code, the initial design is often violated. Many of these design
violations occur unintentionally because the new developers do not fully understand
the original system design and its implementation. Over time, the many changes to
the original code generate more and stronger dependencies between the modules,
resulting in a strongly connected system that is vulnerable to failure propagation
causing systemic failures.
In general, themore tasks an engineer or developer has to consider at the same time
to create some kind ofmodule, themore complicated themodule is. The development
of simple modules, each with a single limited responsibility, helps explain why the
class ofmicroservice architectures first discussed inChap.5 is becoming increasingly
popular. Since each microservice fulfills a single responsibility, one developer can
understand the functionality of the microservice without undue strain. Furthermore,
the developers in a team creating a microservice solution can concentrate on a single
task at a time, making it more pleasurable to develop the solution.
The class of microservice architectures with weak links is the result of years of
engineering work in buildingweb-scale applications with very high availability, scal-
ability, and performance. A microservice solution mimics nature. The whole system
is constantly evolving, without the limited availability associated with monoliths. In
particular, microservices come and go. Microservice solutions are “living software”
that remove much of the fragility of legacy software because it is easy to remove
old services and create new ones. In fact, developers often write a completely new
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microservice rather than modify an old service, because the limited functionality
makes it easy to write a service from scratch.
Experience with microservice solutions suggests that building systems with sim-
ple and weakly connected modules can significantly reduce the fragility associated
with legacy systems. The functionality of a system should be divided over many
modules such that a single human can understand what each module does without
undue effort. Weak links, redundancy, and diversity should then be used to limit the
impact of local failures.
13.4 The Need for Anti-fragile Processes
While we have mainly considered how to design and implement anti-fragile ICT sys-
tems, another related approach to anti-fragility is to consider systems and their stake-
holders as adaptive complex processes. This view provides us with a very general
approach to the study of anti-fragility. In fact, a process may very well be anti-fragile
to a particular type of undesirable outcome without any technology involved at all.
Hence, we could study processes in the area of computer science, as well as society
in general, to better understand fragility, robustness, and anti-fragility to particular
impacts.
The international research community in cryptography has long deployed anti-
fragile processes to develop new cryptographic solutions. A universally accepted
cryptographic primitive such as a cipher or a hash function is the result of a competi-
tive process in which some researchers suggest new primitives and other researchers
try to determine if the primitives have exploitable vulnerabilities.After several rounds
of modified suggestions and attacks, a new primitive emerges that is very hard to
compromise because the cryptographers have learned from their own and others’
earlier mistakes. However, even after this long and hard selection process, cryptog-
raphers know that the only way to ensure a primitive’s strength over time is to keep
attacking it on a regular basis. The same is true for cryptographic protocols.
One example of this never-ending anti-fragile process is the many evaluations
of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, leading to new and more secure
protocol versions. However, the serious Heartbleed Bug incident demonstrated that
large-impact incidents can still occur. While many have evaluated the TLS design
through the years and mitigated vulnerabilities, it is also necessary to carefully
validate the implementations of TLS. The Heartbleed Bug disclosed in April 2014
involved an improper input validation in the OpenSSL cryptography library, a much
used implementation of the TLS protocol. The missing bounds check allowed theft
of the servers’ private keys and users’ session cookies and passwords. While many
large companies used the OpenSSL cryptography library, it seems that none of them
had carefully validated the code. This serious incident demonstrates the danger of
trusting software librarieswithout evaluating the security of the code. Trust by default
must be replaced by an understood degree of trust.
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To improve the security of complex adaptive ICT systems, it is necessary to
develop anti-fragile processes to maintain a high level of confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. As argued in Chap.2, risk management processes based on the
prediction of incidents are not enough because the risk of a complex ICT system
may very well be dominated by swans, which are notoriously difficult to predict.
Hence, we need anti-fragile security processes that limit the impact of inevitable
security incidents and learn from these incidents how to create more secure systems.
Everybody with the ability to change the security of an ICT system should have “skin
in the game,” that is, they should share the responsibility for the consequences of a
successful attack, not to be punished but to ensure a subsequent period of learning
and mitigation to improve security and to stop similar attacks in the future.
13.5 Challenge to Readers
The author wrote this book to educate himself and the reader about anti-fragile ICT
systems and to argue that it is both possible and desirable to develop and operate
such systems. Some of the book’s specific proposals will undoubtedly be replaced
by better solutions, while others will hopefully survive. Since our knowledge of anti-
fragile ICT systems is still limited and fragmented, more work is needed to better
understand these systems. Improvements to the outlined solutions are very welcome,
as well as brand new solutions with anti-fragility to different types of impacts. To
model real systems, create anti-fragile processes, and discover ways to improve and
extend the contents of the book, the interested reader will do well to first study the
many surprising perspectives, interesting ideas, and important insights introduced
by Taleb [8–12], Dekker [17, 18], and Geer [28–33].
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 2.5 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/) which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s)
and source are credited.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or
reproduce the material.
References
1. D.H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer, Chelsea Green Publishing, 2008.
2. J.P. Crutchfield, “The Hidden Fragility of Complex Systems—Consequences of Change,
Changing Consequences,” in Cultures of Change: Social Atoms and Electronic Lives, edited
by G. Ascione, C. Massip, and J. Perello, Actard Publishers, 2009, pp. 98–111.
3. D. Helbing, “Systemic Risks in Society and Economics,” SFI Working Paper 2009-12-044,
2009, www.santafe.edu/media/workingpapers/09-12-044.pdf.
4. D. Helbing, “Globally Networked Risks and How to Respond,” Nature, vol. 497, 2013, pp.
51–59.
5. S.M. Rinaldi, J.P. Peerenboom, and T.K. Kelly, “Identifying, Understanding, and Analyzing
Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,” IEEE Control Systems, vol. 21, no. 6, 2001, pp.
11–25.
6. R.G. Little, “Controlling Cascading Failure: Understanding the Vulnerabilities of Intercon-
nected Infrastructures,” Journal of Urban Technology, vol. 9, no. 1, 2002, pp. 109–123.
7. K.J. Hole, “Management of Hidden Risks,” IEEE Computer, vol. 46, no. 1, 2013, pp. 65–70.
8. N.N. Taleb, Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets,
2nd edition, Random House, 2005.
9. N.N. Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 1st edition, Random
House, 2007. See also the 2nd edition from 2010 with a new essay on robustness and fragility.
10. N.N. Taleb, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder, Random House, 2012.
11. N.N. Taleb, “The Fourth Quadrant: A Map of the Limits of Statistics,” Edge, 14 September
2008.
12. N.N. Taleb, R. Read, R. Douady, J. Norman, and Y. Bar-Yam, “The Precautionary Principle
(withApplication to theGeneticModification ofOrganisms),” 2014, arxiv.org/abs/1410.5787.
13. M.J. Kavis, Architecting the Cloud, Wiley, 2014.
14. B. Wilder, Cloud Architecture Patterns, O’Reilly, 2012.
15. C.Perrow,Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, PrincetonUniversityPress,
1999.
16. J.H. Miller and S.E. Page, Complex Adaptive Systems, Princeton University Press, 2007.
17. S. Dekker, Drift into Failure, Ashgate, 2011.
18. S. Dekker, Safety Differently, 2nd edition, CRC Press, 2014.
19. S. Robinson and M.M. Robinson, Holonomics, Floris Books, 2014.
20. C. Gros, Complex and Adaptive Dynamical Systems, Springer, 2008.
21. C.C. Elisan, Malware, Rootkits & Botnets, McGraw-Hill Osborne Media, 2012.
22. Q. Li and G. Clark, “Mobile Security: A Look Ahead,” Security & Privacy, vol. 11, no. 1,
2013, pp. 78–81.
23. M.E.J. Newman, Networks: An Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2010.
© The Author(s) 2016




24. M. Franz, “E Unibus Pluram: Massive-Scale Software Diversity as a Defense Mechanism,”
Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms Workshop 2010, Concord,MA, 21–23 September
2010, pp. 7–16.
25. R. Cohen, S. Havlin, and D. Ben-Avraham, “Efficient Immunization Strategies for Computer
Networks and Populations,”Physical Review Letters, vol. 91, no. 24, Article ID 247901, 2003.
26. D. Montague, Essentials of Online Payment Security and Fraud Prevention, Wiley, 2011.
27. J. Hawkins and S. Blakeslee, On Intelligence, Times Books, 2004.
28. D.E. Geer, “Monopoly Considered Harmful,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 1, no. 6, 2003,
pp. 14–17.
29. D.E. Geer, “Monoculture on the Back of the Envelope,” ;login:, vol. 30, no. 6, 2005, pp. 6–8.
30. D.E. Geer, “Dan Geer Keynote,” Source 2008 Conference, Boston, MA, 13 March 2008,
http://geer.tinho.net/geer.sourceboston.txt.
31. D.E. Geer, “Dan Geer Keynote,” Source 2012 Conference, Boston, MA, 18 April 2012, http://
geer.tinho.net/geer.sourceboston.18iv12.txt.
32. D.E. Geer, “Complexity Is the Enemy,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 6, no. 6, 2008, p. 88.
33. D. E. Geer, “People in the Loop: Are They a Failsafe or a Liability?” Suits & Spooks, 8
February 2012, http://tinyurl.com/7cavobr.
34. K.J. Hole and L.-H. Netland, “Toward Risk Assessment of Large-Impact and Rare Events,”
IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 8, no. 3, 2010, pp. 21–27.
35. M.T. Nygard, Release It! Pragmatic Bookshelf, 2007.
36. D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.
37. J. Humble, J. Molesky, and B. O’Reilly, Lean Enterprise, O’Reilly Media, 2015.
38. D. Zwieback, “Antifragile Systems and Teams,” O’Reilly Media, 2014.
39. P. Triana, Lecturing Birds on Flying: Can Mathematical Theories Destroy the Financial
Markets? Wiley, 2009.
40. B. Mandelbrot and R.L. Hudson, The (Mis)behavior of Markets: A Fractal View of Financial
Turbulence, annotated edition, Basic Books, 2006.
41. A. Tseitlin, “TheAntifragile Organization,”Communications of the ACM, vol. 56, no. 8, 2013,
pp. 40–44.
42. S.C. Currall and M.J. Epstein, “The Fragility of Organizational Trust: Lessons From the Rise
and Fall of Enron,” Organizational Dynamics, vol. 32, no. 2, 2003, pp. 193–206.
43. L.H. Nestås and K.J. Hole, “Building and Maintaining Trust in Internet Voting,” IEEE Com-
puter, vol. 45, no. 5, 2012, pp. 74–80.
44. E.A. Whitley and G. Hosein, Global Challenges for Identity Policies, Palgrave Macmillan,
2010.
45. E. Pieri, “ID Cards: A Snapshot of the Debate in the UK Press,” project report, ESRCNational
Centre for e-Social Science, University of Manchester, 2009.
46. U. Wilensky, NetLogo, Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling,
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 1999, https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo.
47. G.S. Lynch, Single Point of Failure, Wiley, 2009.
48. L. Bass, P. Clements, and R. Kazman, Software Architecture in Practice, 3rd edition, Addison-
Wesley, 2012.
49. P. Csermely, Weak Links, Springer, 2006.
50. S.E. Page, Diversity and Complexity, Princeton University Press, 2010.
51. Y. Bar-Yam, “The Limits of Phenomenology: From Behaviourism to Drug Testing and En-
gineering Design,” New England Complex Systems Institute (NECSI) Report 2013-08-01,
arxiv.org/abs/1308.3094.
52. M. Richards, Software Architecture Patterns, O’Reilly Media, 2015.
53. S. Newman, Building Microservices, O’Reilly Media, 2015.
54. L. Krause, Microservices: Patterns and Applications, Amazon Digital Services, 2015.
55. P.J. Sadalage and M. Fowler, NoSQL Distilled: A Brief Guide to the Emerging World of
Polyglot Persistence, Addison-Wesley, 2012.
56. K.J. Hole, “Diversity Reduces the Impact of Malware,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 13, no.
3, 2015, pp. 48–54.
References 143
57. Det Norske Veritas, “Vurdering av Altinn II-platformen,” report in Norwegian commissioned
by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, version 1.1, 2012.
58. Capgemini Norge, “Altinn—en plattform å satse på?” report in Norwegian commissioned by
the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2012.
59. Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs, “Digitizing Public
Sector Services,” Norwegian eGovernment Program, 2012, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/
dokumenter/digitization-public-sector-services/id698435.
60. Government ministers Karl Eirik Schjøtt-Pedersen and Rigmor Aasrud discussed the effort
to digitalize Norway’s public sector, Digitaliseringskonferansen, Oslo, Norway, 30–31 May
2012.
61. Video by The Guardian, “How Geeks Opened up Government,” 2013, www.guardian.co.uk/
technology/video/2013/jun/13/geeks-opened-up-government-video.
62. K.J. Hole, “Building Trust in E-Government Services,” IEEE Computer, vol. 49, no. 1, 2016,
pp. 66–74.
63. P. Rost, C.J. Bernardos, A. De Domenico, M. Di Girolamo, M. Lalam, A. Maeder, D. Sabella,
and D. Wübben, “Cloud Technologies for Flexible 5G Radio Access Networks,” IEEE Com-
munications Magazine, vol. 52, no. 5, 2014, pp. 68–76.
64. M.S.Dayananda and J. Priyanka, “Managing SoftwareDefinedRadio throughCloudComput-
ing,”Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Advanced Communication Control
and Computing Technologies, Ramanathapuram, India, 23–25 August 2012, pp. 50–55.
65. I.R. Lorange, “Hendelsesrapport: Problemer i Telenors mobilnett 10. juni 2011,” report from
Telenor in Norwegian.
66. Post- og teletilsynet, “Hendelsesrapport: Utfall i Telenors mobilnett 10. juni 2011,” report
from the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority in Norwegian.
67. I.R. Lorange, “Hendelsesrapport: Problemer i Telenors mobilnett 17. juni 2011,” report from
Telenor in Norwegian.
68. Post- og teletilsynet, “Hendelsesrapport om utfall i Telenors mobilnett 17. juni 2011,” report
from the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority in Norwegian.
69. R. Dyrlie, “Hendelsesrapport 2: Problemer i Telenors mobilnett 10. juni 2011,” report from
Telenor in Norwegian.
70. Post- og teletilsynet, “Foreløpige erfaringer og forslag til tiltak etter ekstremværet Dagmar,”
report from the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority in Norwegian, 2012.
71. Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, “Teknologiskiftet i Telenors infrastruktur,”
report from the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection in Norwegian, 2013.
72. K.J. Hole, O. Lysne, and S. Maharjan, “Consequences of the Trust Relationship between
Telecom Operators and Vendors,” white paper from Simula Research Laboratory, version
0.9.2, 2014.
73. Post- og teletilsynet, “Hendelsesrapport: Dobbelt fiberbrudd i Telenors nett, 23. mai 2011,”
report from the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority in Norwegian.
74. “Kost-/nyttevurdering av tiltak for styrking av norsk sambands- og IP-infrastructur,” risk
analysis in Norwegian by Nexia and Styrmand for the Norwegian Post and Telecommunica-
tions Authority.
75. B. Potter, “Necessary but Not Sufficient,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 8, no. 5, 2010, pp.
57–58.
76. E.M. Hutchins, M.J. Cloppert, and R.M. Amin, “Intelligence-Driven Computer Network De-
fense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains,” Proceedings
of the Sixth International Conference on Information Warfare and Security, Washington, DC,
17–18 March 2011, pp. 113–125.
77. P. Larsen, A. Homescu, S. Brunthaler, and M. Franz, “SoK: Automated Software Diversity,”
Proceedings of the 35th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Jose, CA, 18–21May
2014, pp. 276–291.
78. M. Garcia, A. Bessani, I. Gashi, N. Neves, and R. Obelheiro, “OS Diversity for Intrusion Tol-
erance: Myth or Reality?” Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE/IFIP 41st International Conference
on Dependable Systems & Networks, Washington, DC, 27–30 June 2011, pp. 383–394.
144 References
79. J. Han, D. Gao, and R.H. Deng, “On the Effectiveness of Software Diversity: A Systematic
Study on Real-World Vulnerabilities,” Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on
Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, Milan, Italy, 9–10 July
2009, pp. 127–146.
80. J. Balthrop, S. Forrest, M.E.J. Newman, andM.M.Williamson, “Technological Networks and
the Spread of Computer Viruses,” Science, vol. 304, no. 5670, 2004, pp. 527–529.
81. M. Kitsak, L.K. Gallos, S. Havlin, F. Liljeros, L. Muchnik, H.E. Stanley, and H.A. Makse,
“Identification of Influential Spreaders in Complex Networks,” Nature Physics, vol. 6, no. 11,
2010, pp. 888–893.
82. K.J. Hole, “Toward a Practical Technique to Halt Multiple Virus Outbreaks on Computer Net-
works,” Journal of Computer Networks and Communications, vol. 2012, Article ID 462747,
December 2012, http://www.hindawi.com/journals/jcnc/2012/462747/.
83. T. Jackson, B. Salamat, A. Homescu, K. Manivannan, G. Wagner, A. Gal, S. Brunthaler, Ch.
Wimmer, andM. Franz, “Compiler-Generated SoftwareDiversity,” inMoving Target Defense:
Creating Asymmetric Uncertainty for Cyber Threats, edited by S. Jajodia, A.K. Ghosh, V.
Swarup, C. Wang, and X.S. Wang, Springer, 2011, pp. 77–98.
84. K. Kravvaritis, D. Mitropoulos, and D. Spinellis, “Cyberdiversity: Measures and Initial Re-
sults,”Proceedings of the 14th Panhellenic Conference on Informatics, Tripoli, Greece, 10–12
September 2010, pp. 135–140.
85. P. Wang, M.C. González, C.A. Hidalgo, and A.-L. Barabási, “Understanding the Spreading
Patterns of Mobile Phone Viruses,” Science, vol. 324, no. 5930, 2009, pp. 1071–1076.
86. J. Caballero, T. Kampouris, D. Song, and J. Wang, “Would Diversity Really Increase the
Robustness of the Routing Infrastructure against Software Defects?” Technical Report CMU-
Cylab-07-002, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity, 2008, http://repository.cmu.edu/ece/40/.
87. J.O. Kephart and S.R. White, “Directed-Graph Epidemiological Models of Computer
Viruses,”Proceedings of the 1991 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security
and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May, 1991, pp. 343–359.
88. J. Maeda, The Laws of Simplicity, MIT Press, 2006.
89. P. Larsen, S. Brunthaler, and M. Franz, “Security through Diversity: Are We There Yet?”
IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 12, no. 2, 2014, pp. 28–35.
90. K.J. Hole, “TowardsAnti-fragility: AMalware-Halting Technique,” IEEE Security & Privacy,
vol. 13, no. 4, 2015, pp. 40–46.
91. K. Salah, J.M. Alcaraz Calero, S. Zeadally, S. Al-Mulla, and M. Alzaabi, “Using Cloud
Computing to Implement a Security Overlay Network,” Security & Privacy, vol. 11, no. 1,
2013, pp. 44–53.
92. E.G.Amoroso, “From the Enterprise Perimeter to aMobility-Enabled SecureCloud,” Security
& Privacy, vol. 11, no. 1, 2013, pp. 23–31.
93. M. Abadi, M. Budiu, Ú. Erlingsson, and J. Ligatti, “Control-Flow Integrity Principles, Imple-
mentations, and Applications,” ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, vol.
13, no. 1, 2009.
94. J.Milliken, V. Selis, and A.Marshall, “Detection andAnalysis of the ChameleonWiFi Access
Point Virus,” EURASIP Journal on Information Security, vol. 2013, no. 2, 2013.
95. A.-L. Barabási, R. Albert, and H. Jeong, “Scale-Free Characteristics of Random Networks:
The Topology of the World-Wide Web,” Physica A, vol. 281, no. 1–4, 2000, pp. 69–77.
96. Numenta, “Hierarchical Temporal Memory,” white paper, version 0.2.1, 2011.
97. R.W. Price, “Hierarchical Temporal Memory Cortical Learning Algorithm for Pattern Recog-
nition on Multi-core Architectures,” Master’s Thesis, Portland State University, 2011.
98. M. Galetzka, “Intelligent Predictions: An Empirical Study of the Cortical Learning Algo-
rithm,” Master’s Thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of Applied Sciences
Mannheim, 2014.
99. J. Hertz, A. Krogh, and R.G. Palmer, Introduction to the Theory of Neural Computation,
Addison-Wesley, 1991.
100. J.H. Holland, Adaption in Natural and Artificial Systems, MIT Press, 1992.
References 145
101. J. Copeland, Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction, Wiley-Blackwell, 1993.
102. Y. LeCun, Y. Bengio, and G. Hinton, “Deep Learning,” Nature, vol. 521, 2015, pp. 436–444.
103. J. Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, MIT Press, 2000.
104. R. Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of
Physics, Oxford University Press, 1989.
105. R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness, Oxford
University Press, 1994.
106. D.J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, 1996.
107. V.B. Mountcastle, “An Organizing Principle for Cerebral Function: The Unit Model and the
Distributed System,” in The Mindful Brain, edited by G.M. Edelman and V.V. Mountcastle,
MIT Press, 1978, pp. 7–50.
108. S. Ahmad and J. Hawkins, “Properties of Sparse Distributed Representations and their Ap-
plication to Hierarchical Temporal Memory,” 2015, arxiv.org/abs/1503.07469.
109. Numenta, “The Science of Anomaly Detection,” white paper, 2014.
110. Numenta, “Rogue Behavior Detection,” white paper, 2014.
111. M. Scheffer, J. Bascompte, W.A. Brock, V. Brovkin, S.R. Carpenter, V. Dakos, H. Held, E.H.
van Nes, M. Rietkerk, and G. Sugihara, “Early-Warning Signals for Critical Transitions,”
Nature, vol. 461, 2009, pp. 53–59.
112. D. Sornette, “Dragon-Kings, Black Swans and the Prediction of Crises,” 2009,
arxiv.org/abs/0907.4290.
113. V. Chandola, A. Banerjee, and V. Kumar, “Anomaly Detection: A Survey,” ACM Computing





Active column, 120, 121
Active state, 121





Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3), 52













































active state, 121, 122
inactive state, 122
inhibition, 120, 122










© The Author(s) 2016








Cloud-native solution, 49, 63















Cortical learning algorithm (CLA), 113
























diversity engine, 10, 81, 100













health care services, 58




















Google App Engine, 63
Google Play, 100
Government Digital Service (GDS), 61
Graph
average degree, 82, 94, 101
configuration model, 86
















Hawkins, Jeff, 10, 113, 136
Heartbleed Bug, 139
Heinlein, Robert A., 127
Hierarchical temporal memory (HTM), 113
Hindsight bias, 15, 69
Homogeneous, 82, 94
Honeypot, 101
Hub, 82, 94, 105
Hudson, Richard L., 23
I
Identity Documents Act, 27





Infection probability, 83, 95






Internet of Things, 73, 126









Load balancer, 48, 51, 58


























worm, 15, 93, 99
worst-case spreading, 83, 99, 102
Mandelbrot, Benoit, 23
Mean degree, 86
Mean time between failures (MTBF), 64























National Identity Register, 27





NetLogo, 30, 87, 104, 106
Network
average degree, 94, 101
giant component, 86
homogeneous, 82, 94, 103
























Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection,
70
Norwegian Food Safety Authority, 63
Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry,
57
Norwegian Post and Telecommunications
Authority, 69
Norwegian Public Roads Administration, 70
Norwegian Public Safety Network, 76
Numenta, 10, 113
NuPIC, 113, 125











Persistent targeted attacks, 89
Potential bit, 119
Potential synapse, 120, 121
Prediction, 16, 117
Predictive state, 121
























cannot predict, 40, 69, 77
definition, 20
dependency, 20








Service-oriented architecture (SOA), 48, 60
Silent failure, 54
Simian Army, 54
Single point of failure, 16, 35, 51, 58
Single-type component, 86



















Taleb’s four quadrants, 21





Toy model, 11, 42, 67









Uniform Resource Locator (URL), 83
V
Valid synapse, 120, 121
Variable order memory, 118
Vesicle, 116
Virtual machine, 47, 49, 54
Virtualization, 60
Vulnerability, 6, 82
W
Wang, Pu, 91
Weak link, 37
Web-scale solution, 47
